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Foreign Minister Outlines Greek 'Provocations'

AU2308122794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Text] Today, 22 August 1994, Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi sent a letter to foreign ministers of the member countries of the European Union, the CSCE, and international forums regarding the latest developments in Albanian-Greek relations.

Mr. Serreqi's letter reads: I would like to draw your attention to the deep concern of the Albanian Government regarding another Greek provocation inside the Albanian-Greek border. At 0607 [0407 GMT] on 21 August 1994, a Greek crop dusting plane, which took off from Corfu, violated the airspace of the Republic of Albania for 39 minutes. Before leaving, the plane released in Albanian territory leaflets bearing the Greek flag and calling for the overthrow of the existing order in Albania.

The Albanian Government considers the incident of 21 August 1994 a very serious provocation against the sovereignty and integrity of the Albanian state, which runs counter to the most elementary norms that govern relations between sovereign states, the United Nations Charter, the principles of the Helsinki Act, and other international documents. It considers this act to be a premeditated provocation and stresses that the leaflets bearing the Greek flag and calling for the overthrow of the present order in Albania clearly reveal its aims.

I would like to stress that this is not a sole act, but a continuation of the repeated provocations by the Greek side, which reached their climax with the tragic incident of 10 April 1994, when a Greek commando entered Albanian territory and committed a terrorist act by killing two Albanian soldiers. After committing the crime, the commando returned to Greek territory.

In the same way, on 7 July 1994, two Greek soldiers entered 800 meters into Albanian territory and, after firing on the Albanian border guards, returned to Greek territory. There have been recurrent violations of Albanian territorial waters by Greek ships. The Greek authorities have recently embarked on a massive and violent deportation of Albanian economic emigrants, accompanied by manslaughter, as in the case of the 24-year old Albanian youth Ormet Hysen Gjoka.

All these acts have followed threatening statements by the Greek military authorities, which do not exclude the possibility of using military potential against Albania.

To investigate the aforementioned events, the Albanian Government has proposed creating of an impartial international commission as well as continue dialogue in order to resolve the problems that are outstanding between the two countries, but the Greek side has refused.

The Albanian Government is convinced that the policy of pressure, blockades, and provocations pursued by the Greek Government and other Greek institutions is materialized in their territorial claims expressed in the notion of Vorio-Epir and the illegal efforts to Hellenize it. This is occurring at the same time as the Belgrade regime in Kosova is increasing its repression, violence, and murders, something that testifies to the common Serbo-Greek strategy to cause a dangerous destabilization in the southern Balkans with unpredictable consequences for the whole region, for which the Greek Government bears responsibility.

I would like to avail myself of the opportunity and ask you to condemn these serious acts by Greece against the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Albania and exercise all your authority to stop them.

Ministry Issues Statement

AU2308122994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in Tirana on 22 August—read by announcer]

[Text] At 1900 [1700 GMT] today, 22 August 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova received Mr. Khristos Tsalikis, Greek ambassador in Tirana. Referring to the latest flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Albania by a Greek aircraft and the very serious interference in its internal affairs, Mr. Starova lodged a protest with the Greek ambassador on behalf of the Albanian Government.

Commenting on the serious incident of 21 August and today's hasty and irresponsible response by Mr. Evangelos Venizelos, Mr. Starova told the Greek ambassador that this act cannot be considered as a trivial isolated incident, but a continuation of a series of similar acts in the recent past. Mr. Starova went on to express surprise at how it was possible, without carrying out a complete investigation, for Mr. Venizelos to declare that this grave incident had nothing to do with the Greek state or Greek foreign policy.

I want to add here, Starova further commented, that such stands have also characterized the Greek side in previous cases, even though the Albanian side has insisted on joint investigations. He stressed that the entire responsibility for this incident and its consequences falls on the Greek side.

In conclusion, Mr. Starova told the Greek ambassador that the Greek Government was urged to take every measure expeditiously to discover the organizers and those who actually carried out the grave and shameful incident of 21 August.

The Albanian ambassador in Athens was recalled to Tirana today for consultations.

'Strict' Embassy 'Supervision'

NC2408100894 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 0900 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] An ATHENS NEWS AGENCY dispatch today says that the Greek Embassy in Tirana is under strict supervision by the police and plainclothes men, who appear to have more authority than the police, since they are not limited to checking the passports of Greek correspondents, deputies, and European Parliament deputies. They also keep notes recording their observations, including such things as names and passport numbers. The police are carrying out checks at the hotels where Greek correspondents are staying.

Tirana Trial of Ethnic Greeks Continues

AU2408100494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Text] Andrea Zarbakulla, the Asphalia chief for Ioannina, was the name mentioned most at today's trial [of five ethnic Greek minority members]. Defendant Vasil Caka recalled that at a meeting with leaders of the Institute of Vorio-Epirot Researches and the Assistance Institute, Andrea Zarbakulla was present, too.

The Assistance Institute director brought a double-barreled shotgun to Vasil Caka. The majority of witnesses admitted that the institute had donated double-barreled shotguns to them.

Defendant Dhimiter Stefa testified that the Omonoia [Greek minority organization] presidency and defendants Bezhani and Papakristo met representatives of Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis in Ioannina. According to the defendant, Andrea Zarbakulla was present at the meeting.

Gezim Kalaja testified that he had met defendants Kosta Qirjako and Irakli Sirmo in Ioannina. The defendant confessed that he received a recommendation from Eqerem Kavaja, a witness at yesterday's hearing, who was in prison with both defendants. Kalaja requested to meet Greek politicians and journalists in Ioannina. Defendants Qirjako and Sirmo sent him to the office of Andrea Zarbakulla. They presented Zarbakulla as a personality of Greek politics. After the meeting, both defendants told Gezim Kalaja that Zarbakulla was Asphalia's chief. Both defendants, the witness, and Zarbakulla were present at this meeting. The meeting lasted about 35 minutes.

Vasil Gjikopulli testified about the course organized in Ioannina. Gjikopulli admitted that Irakli Sirmo could easily manage to issue cards at the Greek police. The witness repeated the fact that Sirmo lived in the castle. Witness Jorgo Buka confessed that he received a double-barreled shotgun and shells from the Assistance Institute and that this institute donated double-barreled shotguns to minority persons. The witness said that during the electoral campaign, special funds were granted to Omonioa. The funds were controlled by Bezhani.

According to Jorgo Buka, defendant Theodhori Bezhani had issued visas for profit. He had maintained ties with Greek employees in Kakavije and had given information on minority problems. It is interesting the fact that the Assistance Institute in Ioannina had given double-barreled shotguns to minority persons. This is perhaps the only case where hunting weapons including shells were donated as humanitarian aid.

Democratic Party Financing

AU2308153594 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 21 Aug 94 p 2

[Martin Leka report: "Democratic Party Was Financed by Greece"]

[Text] For some time, different stories have been in circulation concerning the Greek Government's financing of the Democratic Party's [PD] rise to power. However, they have all remained theories.

Yesterday, a journalist and former deputy finally put an end to all this guess work in front of the Tirana Court, the Tirana chief prosecutor, many Albanian and foreign journalists, and diplomats. It was Panajot Barka who publicly stated that the PD had obtained money from the Greek Government and former prime minister Mitsotakis.

Even before the trial started, it was expected that Barka's testimony would be interesting. It intrigued people who knew that Barka had been a deputy of the Albanian parliament connected with the problems of the Greek minority, then organized in Omonoia [Greek minority organization]. At the start of yesterday's session, presiding judge Deda invited citizen Panajot Barka to testify. Barka, replying to the judge's questions, spoke about his several visits to Greece as a member of Omonoia and a deputy. It seemed that Barka would leave the courtroom like all the other witnesses. However, we "forgot" that the prosecutor was also in the court, and indeed not one but two of them: Thanks to prosecutor Gjokutaj, who made him "open up," Barka began to talk:

Genc Gjokutaj: Do you know anything about money given to Omonoia by different organizations or associations?

Panajot Barka: I do not know of Omonoia having received money in my time. I only know that the PD and not Omonoia received money from the Greek State. It even received a large sum, which in those days meant exceptional funding. Of course, this was excusable during the struggle against communism, but we are very sorry to see the PD receiving money from the Greek Government while we, who were lined up alongside the PD, did not receive money.

This was the testimony of former Deputy Barka. It seriously accuses the PD of breaking Albanian law. It seriously accuses former PD Chairman Sali Berisha. A statement of the truth from them as soon as possible would be an act of civil courage. Otherwise, their silence will stain the story of how the PD came to power, with the "purchase" of people's party sympathies.

After the court session, Barka did not confirm the sum in drachmas given for the PD's electoral campaign, which was of such exceptional value to them. He admitted that this exceptional sum did not include the cars the PD leaders were given whenever they went to Greece or the typewriters and other propaganda equipment for the electoral campaign. Meanwhile, unconfirmed Greek sources speak of a sum of 80 million drachmas.

Mr. Thoma Mico, deputy of the Party for the Protection of Human Rights, also confirms that the PD was financed by former prime minister Mitsotakis' New Democracy. He states that "A sum can emerge at any moment," and adds that "Many people and journalists in Greece have told us that they have knowledge of the sum given by New Democracy to the PD for the electoral campaign." However, Deputy Mico made the revelation of the sum "conditional on the course of the trial."

How will the trial of the five members of the Greek minority now proceed? Will the ruling party "defend" its honor and not permit the sum to be revealed? What will happen in the end, now that the cat is out of the bag, all but its tail?

A complicated business...

Police Arrest Three for Distributing Leaflets

AU2308141194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Text] At 1515 [1315 GMT] on 18 August 1994 on the outskirts of Tirana, the police caught the following Albanian citizens red-handed with a considerable number of anti-Albanian leaflets, which were received from the Ioannina Institute of Vorio-Epirot Researches:

Edmond Kutulla, an Albanian national born in Himara in 1958 and resident there. In his statement, Kutulla explained that he had taken these leaflets from Greece to distribute them in Himara and Tirana.

Vangjel Namiku, born in Himara in 1950 and resident there. He is a highly educated economist, director of Former Food Enterprise in Himara, and currently representative of the Assistance Institute for Himara.

Gligor Rrapo, born in Himara in 1942 and resident there, employed in Athens as a hydrotechnical engineer.

The content of the leaflets is as follows: Vorio-Epirots are no longer alone—they will win and live in freedom; No to Berisha's lies; Beggars and traitors will suffer; Freedom to six Omonoia leaders.

Opposition Demands Extraordinary Assembly Session

AU2308164594 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 20 Aug 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Democratic Alliance and the Socialist Party Demand an Extraordinary Session of Parliament"]

[Text] The state's efforts to end the hunger strike of the former victims of political persecution terminated in violence against the strikers, threats, beatings, detentions, arrests, imprisonments, and the opening of files and lists of people formerly implicated in the Sigurimi. Concerned by this, the deputies of the Democratic Alliance and the Socialist Party parliamentary group have sent to the presidium a demand for an extraordinary session of the People's Assembly.

The appeal addressed to parliament states that, "Being totally opposed to the detention and arrest of dozens of former prisoners, observing the measures of violence, repression, and state terror used against this group and against Albanian citizens in general, and on the basis of the Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions, we demand an extraordinary session of the People's Assembly on Monday 22 August." The parliamentary groups concerned are demanding this extraordinary session in order to make it possible to call for interpellations from the following:

1. Procurator General Alush Dragoshi in order to urgently explain the legal basis for the measures against the hunger strikers and in particular: a) the reasons for the mass arrests and detentions of dozens of former prisoners; and, b) the stand taken and measures carried out by the procurator general in defense of legality and human rights against the Public Order Ministry's flagrant violation of the law by opening and speculating with the files [of the former Sigurimi];

2. ShIK [National Intelligence Service] Chairman Bashkim Gazidede, in order to explain his source of information connected with the files of the former political prisoners mentioned in the statement of the Public Order Ministry; and

3. The public order minister in order to explain the legal basis for the violence used against the hunger strikers, to explain what measures have been taken against those stated by the Public Order Ministry to have used firearms, and to elucidate the aforementioned statement.

The deputies of the Democratic Alliance and the Socialist Party have still not received a reply from Mr. Pjeter Arbnori and the presidium. Nevertheless, their demand is fully in accordance with the law and includes serious arguments and reasons. The demand will in all probability remain a demand, because it will be hard for Mr. Arbnori and his friends to interrrupt their vacation, but all the more because Pjeter and some other former victims of persecution have dissociated themselves from the presidium of the Association of the Former Victims of Persecution and have reconciled themselves to the decisions and measures taken against the hunger strikers. It must moreover be said that the Social Democratic Party signed this demand on Wednesday [17 Aug] and withdrew its signature on Thursday. As ever, this colorless party both was and was not in favor of summoning parliament to an extraordinary session in defense of human rights and freedoms.

Customs Tax Causes Cuts in Imports, Price Hikes

AU2408084394 Tirana PASQYRA in Albanian 19 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "Why Is There a Fall in Imports?"]

[Text] The Albanian market is dominated by imported goods. This is a known fact, and it seems that the Albanian economy itself will not be able to compete for a long time in the future. Yet, a fall in imported goods is observed.

Why? What could be the reason for this?

"Specialists" may give a variety of reasons, but those who are really conversant with the situation assert that the main reason for the decline in imports has been and remains the high customs tax, usually mounting to 20, and often to 30 percent. At various times, this customs tax has increased to such a degree that it has placed hundreds and thousands of merchants, particularly medium-sized ones, in difficulties. It is true that these high customs taxes could "warm up" the pockets of the government, but at the same time they create difficulties not only for those hundreds and thousands of merchants, but also for the Albanian consumers at large, who are deprived of a variety of goods and articles that are either lacking on the market or are extremely over-priced.

It is an aspect which shows that our government's actual economic policy is rather unbalanced. It could be stated that such a customs policy is being pursued in order to encourage domestic production. This is too good to be true, because we already know all too well the Meksi government's "concern" about employing hundreds and thousands of jobless people (the prime minister himself has stated that his government possesses no funds at all to create new jobs).

Trade Delegation Head Outlines Moscow Trip Aims

AU2308123194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0600 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] A Bulgarian Government delegation headed by Kiril Tsochev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of trade, departed for Moscow approximately one hour ago.

Prior to his departure, Mr. Tsochev specified the goals of the official visit in an interview with Khorizont Radio Network as follows:

[Begin Tsochev recording] It is well known that in recent years economic relations between our two countries have somehow deteriorated. It is not the purpose of our current visit to accomplish a drastic upswing in our relations at this point, but I will be trying to speed up the liberalization of mutual trade, to eliminate tariff restrictions, and thus to increase the exchange of goods between the two countries, to facilitate the exports of Bulgarian goods which are already well known on the Russian market, goods for which no marketing and no preliminary preparations are required. It is very easy to provide such goods. The same applies to certain Russian commodities and basic raw materials for Bulgaria.

In this connection I would like to point out one of the objectives that I am expecting to achieve during my visit, namely to negotiate the import of a certain amount of crude oil which should be directly delivered to the Neftokhim Oil Processing Plant. It is the first time that I have mentioned the subject in this interview with you, as a matter of fact within the framework of an agreement between Bulgaria and Russia. Further, I would like to specify the clauses of an intergovernmental agreement between the two countries, which was signed for a period of 25 years. It concerns the establishment of a gas distribution dispatch center in Bulgaria for all the Balkans. This is an interesting project which means not only to direct the distribution of gas for neighboring countries from Bulgaria, but also to supply gas for our population and for our industrial areas, as well as to provide an opportunity for the future construction of a central gas installation [vurkhova gazova tsentrala] for Bulgaria. [end recording].

Ministry Cited on Muslim Recruitment for Cyprus

AU2408083694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] In our stance toward the Republic of Cyprus we will follow the line and plan of UN Secretary General Dr. Butrus Ghali, Radko Vlaykov said at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing.

He explained that the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry still has not received a reply to the query it sent to competent authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, concerning details regarding the recruitment of Bulgarian Muslims for the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which has not been recognized by Bulgaria.

According to Mr. Vlaykov, according to unofficial data there are a few hundred recruited Muslims, something that contradicts certain rumors and articles that imply that their number is in the thousands.

Air Force Commander Views Fuel, Spares Shortage

AU2308151394 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 18 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview With Major General Ivan Parapunov, commander of the Bulgarian Air Force, by Colonel Konstantin Lichev; place and date not given: "The Choice Is Between Supplying Fuel or Cutting the Air Force"]

[Excerpts] [Lichev] General, can we rely on the Air Force today?

[Parapunov] It is still possible to rely on us; however, if no aircraft spares are supplied by the end of the year, we will not be able to carry out our duties.

[Lichev] Can you respond to every violation of our airspace?

[Parapunov] We can still react to individual violations of our airspace, but if the situation becomes more complicated, then there is room for concern regarding the functioning of the Air Force. Then we would not be able to rely on our individual, excellently trained pilots and on their chances. The personnel whom we use for combat duty today are not too great in number, and this is normal all across our country.

[Lichev] Can we say that our pilots are not sufficiently trained?

[Parapunov] Our pilots' training depends principally on the experience that they accumulate over the years. However, we occasionally note that even experienced pilots begin to lose their flying skills, mainly because of the lack of flying and of fuel and spares. [passage omitted]

[Lichev] How long will the Air force be able to operate under such conditions?

[Parapunov] You should direct this question to the politicians and statesmen who rule Bulgaria. We experts know very well how much longer we can operate under such conditions. If the people who rule Bulgaria do not become concerned about our Air Force, they will be forced to worry about a foreign air force. The Bulgarians are tough people. They have suffered a lot and survived. But things must change over the next few months if we want to have a national Air Force and continue the rich Bulgarian traditions in this respect.

[Lichev] How are the flying plans being implemented, albeit limited?

[Parapunov] Unfortunately, only 85 percent of the flying plans envisaged for this year will be implemented. The main reason is the shortage of fuel, lubricants, and spares, rather than the human factor. [passage omitted]

[Lichev] Are there many dissatisfied people in the Air Force?

[Parapunov] I determine whether there are many or just a few dissatisfied people in the Air Force on the basis of the complaints that are filed. Most of the complaints are of a social, everyday nature. The young pilots and their families are in the worst situation. The limited flying time also causes dissatisfaction. A fear of flying syndrome has begun to emerge. This is a dangerous phenomenon, and the Air Force must not hide it. The choice is between supplying fuel and cutting down the Air Force. Let us not deceive ourselves—things look bad. The fact that we are carrying out limited tasks, mostly with our best pilots, does not mean that we can do everything.

[Lichev] Does the absence of a Law on Defense and the Armed Forces affect the general functioning of the Air Force?

[Parapunov] Personally, I do not believe that this bill will be passed by the end of the year. This evokes mistrust and indifference, something very dangerous in the Air Force. [passage omitted]

Increasing Number of Draft Dodgers Causes Concern

AU2308202794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattrubtued report: "Five Percent of Recruits Are Hiding From the Military Authorities"]

[Text] Sofia—Approximately 5 percent of the young men who should enter the Army barracks as recruits in September 1994 are deliberately hiding from the military authorities and are unwilling to serve in the Army on a voluntary basis. This was announced by the Ministry of Defense on Thursday, 18 August. The amount of the fine to be paid in such cases varies between 5 and 50 leva. Colonel Tanyu Boyadzhiev, commander of the Burgas Oblast Military Administration, declared that he considers this an outrageous insult to the Bulgarian Army. According to him, in the United States the fine envisaged for such offenses amounts to $10,000 and is being collected by the company where the parents of the recruits in question are employed.

In the Burgas area, 193 of 4,612 youths due for military service are hiding from recruiting commissions. Six of them have totally disappeared, together with their parents; 51 of them left to go abroad after they learned of their imminent recruitment. A total of 47 are serving their sentence for draft dodging in prison. Colonel Boyadzhiev threatened to publish within the next two weeks a list with the names of those whose wherabouts are currently being investigated.

In 1994 a total of 2,000 graduates from higher educational institutions, 1,500 of whom are married and have families, are expected to be enrolled in officers' schools. According to Colonel Boyadzhiev, it was a mistake for legislators to permit recruits who passed their university entrance exams to postpone their Army service until after graduation. In so doing, the Army is deprived of highly intelligent 18-19 years old boys who have graduated from elite high schools or technical secondary schools, Col. Boyadzhiev says. Today 20 percent of recruits are ethnic minorities.

The military authorities in Vidin also report that 3 percent of recruits are hiding. In the Sliven area, 56 of 1,456 recruits have disappeared. Two of them firmly refused to join the Army ranks.

In Veliko Turnovo, 6 percent of the recruits who appeared before the medical commissions were declared affected by chronic diseases. Cases of young men with mental deficiencies and abnormalities are becoming more and more frequent. This was announced by Col. Delinikolov, commander of the Veliko Turnovo Military Administration. The number of homosexuals has also increased, but the law does not yet envisage their exemption from Army service. Col. Delinikolov announced that interventions by relatives and friends on behalf of draft dodgers will be subject to sanctions.

A total of 15 percent of Veliko Turnovo recruits have an elementary school education and will join the construction forces. The situation in that branch of the Army is a cause of concern, however. Large building projects are no longer being constructed, and others are managed by private companies; the state meanwhile pays 75 leva per day for the soldiers' upkeep.

Feeding the recruits is a basic concern and the problem is treated as a priority in deciding the budget, General Prokopiev, deputy chief of the General Staff, declared in a radio interview. Financial resources are not sufficient to provide for basic supplies. Hence, we will let soldiers in the garrisons go on leave without disrupting the obligatory 30 percent unit combat readiness, declared the high ranking military official.

According to rumors in Sliven, it costs as much as 100 leva to be rid of the military service. Gen. Prokopiev pointed out that such cases are difficult to prove, but an officer from the Plovdiv Military Administration has already been dismissed, demoted, and handed over to the Prosecutor's Office after he dared to relieve some recruits in his unit from their military service.

BSP Calls For Defense Minister's Resignation

AU2308142794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Some 812 officers of the Bulgarian Army have been dismissed on the basis of a personal decree of the minister of defense, Nikolay Dobrev, member of the Executive Bureau of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council, said.

This, the BSP believes, is a pointless and unfounded move, because it does not resolve the problems of the Bulgarian Army.

According to the BSP, it represents the implementation of an order, where the defense minister serves as the instrument of implementation. The Socialists think the minister should voluntarily resign in a dignified manner.

Minister on 'Monstrous' Effects of Land Law

AU2308154094 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 18 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Agriculture Minister Georgi Tanev by Rumyana Penkova; place and date not given: "Law on Land Forces Us To Wage War Against Ourselves"]

[Excerpts] [Penkova] Minister Tanev, there are only a few days left before September. What are your intentions, what are you going to do, and is the government really going to resign?

[Tanev] If you think that I will be sorry about my ministerial post you are mistaken. I think that the government will report its activities during its three-month mandate period and then the National Assembly should decide its fate. I have read in several newspapers that Prof. Berov has promised to resign. I myself have not heard anything of this kind. All I know is that Prof. Berov asked for a three-month mandate to accomplish a certain task.

[Penkova] In other words, he should drive the cab to a certain address....

[Tanev] Precisely. If the National Assembly decides that the address has been reached or has almost been reached, it would make the appropriate decisions. This is my opinion. If you check the protocols of the National Assembly, you will see that Prof. Berov did not say "I shall resign." The National Assembly members are our employers. We will do what they decide. [passage omitted]

[Penkova] The autumn is coming, and the minister of agriculture has already informed citizens that the price of bread will increase, and that there will be no meat or milk. What are we going to do?

[Tanev] The minister does not control the price of bread, but he has done what he can—he determined that the minimum purchase price of grain should be 3,100 leva [quantity not specified], and this price will also protect the producers. The maximum price for grain of excellent quality will be 4,000 leva. I think that these prices will prove profitable for the producers. However, at present I cannot demand that the prices in our country are equal to international prices. [passage omitted]

[Penkova] How do you explain that only 2 percent of the 200 million leva allocated by the budget for subsidizing the interest on loans in the animal husbandry sector have been utilized?

[Tanev] I can explain this by the Land Law. I think that this law was devised across the border rather than in Bulgaria. It does not serve Bulgaria but rather our neighboring countries, producers of meat, milk, cheese, and so on.

[Penkova] You mean the law provides them with the chance of freely exporting onto the Bulgarian market?

[Tanev] Precisely. The basic task of the law was to return the land. However, no one calculated how much it would cost. The destruction of animal husbandry was caused by this law. If you visit Dobrudzha you will shed real tears. It is monstrous. It is a war we are waging against ourselves. [passage omitted]

BSP Announces Referendum on Policy Program

AU2308153994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Boyka Bashlieva: "Referendum To Be Held 15 September-15 October on BSP Program"]

[Text] An all-party referendum on the Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] program is scheduled to be held from 15 September to 15 October 1994. This was announced at yesterday's news conference held at the BSP's headquarters at 20 Positano Street. The special commission that was elected at the 41st BSP Congress finalized the documents after a stormy session that lasted late into the night.

Not only BSP members but also the party's supporters are also expected to say whether they approve of the program. It is up to the basic party organizations to select their own method of voting—by secret or open ballot. Socialists will be able to cast their votes even if they are not in the place of residence of their own organization.

The documents on the holding of the referendum will be adopted on Tuesday, 23 August, by the Supreme Party Council's Executive Bureau and in the first days of September a special meeting of the Supreme Council is scheduled for the same purpose.

A total of 47 members of the Program Commission have approved the document, while Rosen Karadimov and Dimitur Yonchev abstained. There was no vote against. Prof. Kyuranov has declared that he will express his view after reading the document in its final version. This was announced by Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP, in connection with certain allegations that the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracies] leader has categorically rejected the program.

According to statements at the news conference, it appears that the BSP members debated up to the last moment about the essence of the BSP, namely about what kind of party it actually is and about what social basis it represents. The approach to Marxism, the necessity of adopting a charter on civic and ethnic peace, and the acceptance or rejection of capital punishment were also discussed. Georgi Purvanov explained to journalists that the debates were not prompted by ideological concerns but were based on purely technocratic arguments. According to him, there is no basis for any ideological conflict within the party.

KNSB Accuses Government of 'Social Genocide'

AU2308194094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] In an open letter to the political leaders Ahmed Dogan [leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms] and Zhan Videnov [leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party], Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], describes the state policy conducted in the country as an wild, cynical, and illiterate monetarism. In the letter he points out that by refusing to compensate the population for the inflation, which is the highest in Europe, the Bulgarian Government is applying the method of social genocide against the population. It is absurd that left-wing parties are conducting a radical right-wing socioeconomic policy, the letter points out.

Implications of Czech-German Relations Explored

94CH0396A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 16 Aug 94 p 13

[Article by Egon T. Lansky: "Extremists Hold Czech-German Relations Hostage"]

[Text] On Saturday, July 30, a small group of Czechs and Germans tried to hold an act of reconciliation at the National Memorial Cemetery in Terezin. The town, about 60 kilometers (38 miles) north of Prague, was turned by the Nazis into a ghetto where tens of thousands of Jews from all over Europe met their deaths. For others, the town became a transit station on the way to Auschwitz and other death camps that carried out what the people around Hitler called "the final solution of the Jewish question." An old fort on the outskirts of the town served simultaneously as a grim prison and execution place for political prisoners.

The organizers of the July 30 ceremony were unable to carry out their act of reverence for the dead. About 20 rowdies, said to be members and sympathizers of the infamous extremist Czechoslovak Republican Party, attacked them with rotten eggs and verbal abuse and destroyed some of the floral wreaths they had placed on gravestones. A handful of police officers watched without trying to intervene.

At home and abroad, the melee attracted great publicity and drew much comment from politicians. Within days, the local district chief of police resigned and an investigation singled out other officers for disciplinary action. At least one of the hooligans was charged. These moves were swift and adequate measures aimed at punishing those responsible and setting an example. But what might the episode say about Czech society? And what, if any, will the political consequences be?

Any assessment of these questions must necessarily be personal. In my case it is determined by the fact that I myself am a survivor of the Terezin ghetto (called Theresienstadt in German), as well a member of the board of the Prague Jewish Community.

Anyone analyzing the current state of Czech society should not forget to take into account the sensitive problem of the Sudeten Germans, a minority of about 2.5 million in prewar Czechoslovakia. Many of them collaborated with the Nazis during the occupation, and in the war's immediate aftermath, the vast majority were stripped of their property and forcibly transferred to Germany and Austria. During the communist era, warnings about the Sudetens' desire for revenge were a steady part of official Czechoslovak politics; this was one of the few measures of communist propaganda that proved successful. So much so, in fact, that even now the fear of Sudeten revenge serves as a surrogate expression of Czech patriotism—especially among those who hold former Sudeten property and worry, despite official denials, that they will have to give it back should the Sudetens "return."

The Czechs, like most people who have endured a long period of totalitarian rule, lack positive experiences of an everyday democracy that features respect and tolerance for minority views and differing opinions. It is therefore easy for them to see reality as a kind of steady struggle between good and evil. This seems to be a typical post-communist phenomenon, as skinheads and other groups of racist thugs have demonstrated in the Czech Republic and Germany, where most of the hooliganism is committed by former East Germans.

That, of course, is an effort to explain, not accept, such behavior. The fertile ground for violence can be attributed in no small part to the fact that there has been hardly any public debate—or more importantly, meaningful political dialogue—on the Sudeten issue. With as intense and complicated a historical relationship as Czechs and Germans share, and considering the fact that the two countries each share their longest border with one another, this is all the more striking. I think it is a far more worrisome situation for the Czechs. I don't say this because I am a Czech citizen, but because the Germans have now had nearly 50 years of experience with democracy. In Czech society, the handful of people who can remember the democratic period before the war are old and out of public life.

As a result of this situation, President Vaclav Havel's apology to Sudeten Germans shortly after the 1989 revolution has been neither understood nor accepted by Czechs. The gut feeling of non-acceptance is currently being reinforced by the lack of a political dimension to the Sudeten issue among members of the Czech government and the opposition alike.

The question actually involves more than the Sudetens—it is about Germany, and as such is the single most important problem for Czech foreign policy. This is not to say that the Sudeten problem alone determines the relations between the countries, but rather that without a clear and realistic mutual understanding of the issue, the two countries will not be able to truly move forward together in a fruitful way. It should also be mentioned that as a small country, the Czech Republic is much more dependent on relations with rich and powerful Germany than vice versa.

The Czechs will always have to be one step ahead in strategic thinking to answer the following two critical questions: What is our basic interest with regard to Germany? And how shall we persuade the Germans that our best interests are also in their best interest?

If this will stand as the lesson we learn from the July 30 incident at Terezin, then the embarrassment and resurgent trauma brought on by the melee will have been a reasonable price to pay. However, extremists from both sides need one another as much as they need publicity in order to force upon the rest of us their notion of human relations. As long as we give them the opportunity, they will continue to hold both Czechs and Germans for ransom.

Visegrad Countries' Media Struggle for Survival

*94CH0387A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
9 Aug 94 p 3*

[Article by Kevin Drew: "Media Get Economics Lessons"]

[Text] Bratislava—At a time when Central Europe's journalists are learning difficult lessons in press freedom, they are also struggling with even harder lessons about the bottom line.

Money problems are a main reason for the downbeat mood among TV and print journalists in the region five years after the revolutions that swept away communism. Just how the market forces will reshape the media is still unclear.

"I've never heard that democracy brings money," says Jacek Kozlowski, an adviser to the Polish National Radio and Television Council. "But I have heard that the free market brings money."

Amid problems in balancing the books, the media in Central Europe are engaged in running conflicts with governments over regulation of the industry. Added to the daily difficulties involved in deciding what can or should be written or broadcast, there is a growing realization that forging a successful newspaper, radio or TV station is a tougher task than anticipated.

Dozens of newspapers and magazines have glutted local markets in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. In the Czech Republic alone, more than 60 radio stations are operating. Here in the Slovak capital, a dozen daily newspapers are published. Numbers like those are unnaturally high for such relatively small markets, media analysts say.

There were Western countries with only four or five national dailies, says Peter Schutz, co-owner of DOMINO, a Slovak weekly. "In Slovakia, we have 12. It won't last. Some have to go out of business."

Echoing concerns in neighboring countries, Maria Jurickova, state secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Culture, says the small advertising market in her country is making it hard for radio and television stations to establish the financial leverage for true freedom.

Compounding that problem is increased competition for foreign investors. In the past two years, outside investment in Poland's electronic media has grown from $100 million to $220 million.

Meanwhile, though, Westerners are becoming increasingly wary. British media consultant Michael Gunton reports a 95 percent failure rate in trying to link foreign investors with Central and Eastern European newspapers. He says too many newspaper publishers see Western money only as a bailout mechanism, and not as a long-term investment demanding eventual profits.

Western investors who attended a recent two-day media conference here said political and legal stability in Central Europe counts more than anything else. Many Westerners, including Austrian Walter Tributsch, who has already invested in Radio CD in Slovakia, are awaiting elections or legislation in the Visegrad Four countries before dishing out more money.

"For people wanting to invest in this part of the world, knowing how far you'll deregulate will be important in determining who will come," adds Charlie Cox of Great Britain's DAILY MAIL and EVENING STANDARD.

Governments have tied regulation to resources in the Visegrad countries, frustrating private radio- and TV-station owners.

Andrej Hryc, chairman of the Association of Independent Radio Broadcasters in Slovakia, accused the Slovak government of misusing its authority. The government has allowed state-run Radio Slovakia to attract 90 percent of the ad market through subsidized rates without redistributing any funds to the 23 privately owned stations, he said.

But the debate over regulation has peaked over codes of professional conduct. Czech President Vaclav Havel, for example, does not give interviews without first approving the content, thanks to incidents in which he says his words were misrepresented.

"We have to find a balance between the public's right to know and the accountability of the media," says the Slovak Ministry of Culture's Jurickova.

Many in the industry seem to agree. "Self-regulation would be a dangerous precedent, especially here in Central Europe," says Ivan Baba, who has worked as a newspaper editor and in government in Hungary.

For all of the frustration faced by the media, Western journalists and bureaucrats may have had the best advice.

"Such pessimism is unjustified," says William Cheshire, columnist and former editor of THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC. "The media here has had just a few years to develop their industry. We've had over 200 in America, and we're still working on it."

Czech-Slovak Federation Not Forgotten

*94CH0387B Prague PRAGUE POST in English
9 Aug 94 p 13*

[Commentary by Egon T. Lansky, Prague journalist and political analyst: "Keeping the Czechoslovak Spirit Together Despite the Split"]

[Text] A leading Czech politician, member of the ruling coalition and holder of one of the highest offices in the country, spent his summer holiday in Slovakia's Tatra mountains. While there, he could not quite understand why he had to exchange his Czech currency for Slovak currency. He obviously had never accepted that the administration of which he was a member had abolished the currency union more than a year before.

This story reached me a few hours before writing this piece. It suggests that two summers after the 1992 elections—which we have been told time and time again led to the dismantling of Czechoslovakia—some of those who presided over the separation are not fully in tune with its consequences.

Others saw the negative consequences in advance and were fearful of still more negative consequences. Among this group were the people who, upon the suggestion of Jiri Suchy, an actor and director of the Semafor theater, founded the Spiritual Parliament of the Czechoslovak Federation. On July 24, the body convened for the third time, this time in the Moravian town of Ostrava.

Suchy suggested forming the Spiritual Parliament in January 1993 in an article in the weekly MOSTY (BRIDGES), the only truly Czechoslovak newspaper remaining, and a staunch supporter of Czech-Slovak mutuality.

Suchy has said that the "Spiritual Federation" he has in mind represents the continuity of everything positive Czechs and Slovaks have ever achieved in the fields of culture and spirituality.

As public citizens, he has argued, people from each country must respect the political fact of the division, but no one can rule over their friendship and spiritual relations. The Spiritual Parliament thus makes no claims to political power.

MOSTY readers nominated members for Suchy's parliament. Among those named were Olga and Dasa Havlova, the wife and sister-in-law of the Czech president, as well as his brother, Ivan; former federal Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier; Slovak Minister of International Relations Pavol Demes; Czech ex-premier Petr Pithart; and several ex-ambassadors, artists, writers and scientists. The list was varied enough to include famed athlete Emil Zatopek and his wife Dana, both Olympic gold medalists.

The founding session in Brno (centrally located between Prague and Bratislava, the Moravian city was chosen as the capital of the Spiritual Federation) took place Oct. 28, 1993—on the 75th anniversary of the founding Czechoslovakia.

Martin Porubjak, a former Slovak deputy premier, said that one purpose of the assembly was "to resist drifting apart, when that is what the economies of our two countries do.

"According to Marxism—as they used to teach us—economics should determine even spiritual alienation. To prove that, with the end of communism, even that Marxist truth is dead and buried is one of the reasons we've gathered here."

The Brno meeting was a great success. The so-called White House, where it took place, proved too small to accommodate the several thousand guests who arrived (at their own expense) from all parts of the former Czechoslovakia.

The second gathering of the parliament was in February 1994. The place was Skalica, a tiny Slovak town on the border with Moravia. So near the border, in fact, that the participants had a chance to meet true Czechoslovak twins—their parents' house was right on the border, and one is Czech, the other Slovak.

That may sound somewhat funny, but in the present situation the consequences can be serious. People in the neighboring Moravian town of Sudomerice can no longer get medical care in the Skalica hospital and must seek help miles away instead.

At the Skalica gathering, too, the house was packed with enthusiastic participants. They sent an appeal to the politicians and parliaments of the Czech and Slovak states to secure a free flow of students and access to higher education in both countries.

The number of Slovaks studying in the Czech Republic and Czechs studying in Slovakia has fallen tenfold, mainly because students from one republic who study in the other must now pay higher, foreign-student fees. Yet we are not foreigners to one another.

The European Union has a rule allowing the free cross-border flow of students on equal conditions. The Czech-Slovak Spiritual Parliament argues that bringing the rules of our two countries into line with the EU would be a natural symbol that we are seeking and actively supporting European integration. At their recent meeting, Czech President Vaclav Havel and Slovak President Michal Kovac promised to work toward this goal.

There are many unfulfilled promises between Prague and Bratislava: The customs union agreed to by the two governments is more or less fictitious; the border between Slovakia and the Czech Republic is currently one of the tightest in Europe. Also, there are still large groups in both countries suffering from the consequences of the Czech law on citizenship.

There are many other unresolved issues. Instead of dreaming of reunification, the parliament deals with smaller issues in the name of building a true special relationship.

Suchy summed it up at the first parliament meeting in Brno: "Czechoslovakia used to be spoken of as the heart of Europe. Let us not now become its heart condition."

CSSD Chairman Discusses Party Policies

AU2308150594 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 13 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Milos Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party, by Pavel Dostal; place and date not given: "Halftime for the Government May Be the Half-Life of the Coalition"]

[Text] [Dostal] How do you feel about the clearly demonstrated instability of the government coalition?

[Zeman] I do not believe that the primary cause of it is, as is sometimes claimed, animosity between individual politicians in the government coalition, although it has certainly played its part.

[Dostal] So, what do you believe the cause to be?

[Zeman] I consider the chief factor of this instability is that, at the halftime of its existence, the present government has not managed to perform many of the essential tasks listed in its policy program. This may lead to growing fears on the part of some smaller coalition parties of discrediting themselves because of their coresponsibility.

[Dostal] Do you believe that one of the government parties might leave the coalition?

[Zeman] I do not expect that anything like this will happen, but the instability of the government coalition results, as we have all witnessed, in markedly different voting by the coalition deputies on government proposals in parliament and the ever-increasing number of cases where they are forced through not by a consensus but, rather, by the sheer power of the ODS [Civic Democratic Party].

[Dostal] Nevertheless, the government, regardless of party affiliations, refuses to answer to parliament for the implementation of its own policies.

[Zeman] That certainly is a new specifically Czech feature. After all, even the U.S. President presents the Address on the State of the Union to Congress every year.

[Dostal] The government argues, however, that individual ministers report to the parliamentary committees.

[Zeman] Nevertheless, the government is not a simple sum of its individual ministers. A government that likes to boast so much should not let such an opportunity pass and brag to parliament and, by extension, to the public about its fabulous achievements over its two years in office.

[Dostal] The government claims, however, that no deadline is set anywhere in the policy statement for any of the individual tasks.

[Zeman] That is a completely meaningless argument. If the government promised to deal with agriculture, for instance, or develop a modern strategy for our educational system, including vocational training, it is logical to expect that documents would be produced as soon as possible so that it could test them during the next period and turn them into the appropriate legislation. To formulate them at the end of the term of office, on the other hand, would entail the risk of the next government considering them just pulp. A new school year is around the corner, and the only thing the education minister has been able to do is to explain at a news conference when he himself spells a word with an "s" rather than with a "z" [a difficult aspect of Czech spelling]. This does not seem like much to me.

[Dostal] One of the overdue items in the policy statement is the problem of the higher administrative units, which became a bone of contention within the coalition.

[Zeman] As an opposition party, the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] contributed to the effective pressure on the ODS that subsequently rather hectically changed its original and completely nonsensical proposal to match regions with districts and replaced it with another proposal.

[Dostal] In this context, could one say that your proposal to start consultations among the democratic parties on a no-confidence vote in the government was just writing on water?

[Zeman] On the contrary, I think it was a matter of political pressure that would not have been possible if the stands of the CSSD, the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], the KDU-CSL [Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party], and even the KDS [Christian Democratic Party] had not been so close. Hence, with a certain degree of exaggeration, one can say that the halftime of the government may be the half-life of the government coalition.

[Dostal] What approach should the CSSD use in this situation?

[Zeman] A long-term analysis does not rule out the possibility, to say the least, that, after the parliamentary election in 1996, the CSSD could form a coalition with some of the small parties of the present coalition. Medium-term deliberation forces us, at our 1995 congress, to intensify work on the CSSD election program, which is understood to be an alternative government policy statement. Finally, short-term reflection leads us, as anticipated in the resolution of our Central Executive Committee, to counterpose our own positive concepts against the individual unfulfilled items of the government's policy statement and synthesize them into a form of complex alternative in the form of an election program.

[Dostal] So, the government policy statement is for the CSSD a wrong alternative?

[Zeman] We should not simply reject the government's policy statement. After all, the current ruling parties won the last elections, and they have the right to formulate such a policy statement however they like. In the emerging situation, however, we can argue that this government reacts more than it governs. Thus, it is not actually doing what it promised parliament.

[Dostal] What do you all actually consider unsuccessful?

[Zeman] There are not just a few unfulfilled items. In addition to the already mentioned topics of education and agriculture, there is a lack of action on tax evasion, a failure to separate social funds from the state budget, a complete absence of a housing policy that has led, for all intents and purposes, to a halt in housing construction, a growing neglect of social policy, problems in pension planning, an imminent conflict with the trade unions and, thereby, a disruption of the social peace, a failure to deal with crime in general and organized crime in particular, and, most recently, the disintegration of the Czech Army. That is, of course, not to mention the criminal privatization of large health-care facilities, transportation problems, and the astonishing absence of any industrial policy. I am giving you just a list because each of these topics would require a separate interview.

[Dostal] All you are saying—is it not just words, words, words?

[Zeman] Certainly not because we are trying for deeds in parliament. Whether it is our Deputy Fischerova, for instance, who became much involved in the matter of the privatization of the Na Homolce hospital and even obtained the support of the coalition deputies or my namesake, Deputy Zeman, who concentrates on education policy. It was our Deputy Kraus who opened up the hushed-up "Swedish affair" of Lieutenant General Barta [who was accused of shoplifting in Stockholm]. There are dozens of such examples, and, therefore, I must reject your accusation that deeds do not follow our words. I believe that we should also intensify our criticism of the gradual reduction of the control mechanisms, which risks a shift from a democratic to an authoritarian state. Today, nobody doubts the dislike of the ODS for respecting the democratic procedures. When I expressed this opinion a year ago, I was a lone runner. Today you can hear the same thing, albeit in a more elegant wrapping, from ODA and KDU-CSL politicians.

[Dostal] What would you say about the alleged secret coalition agreement between the CSSD and the ODS?

[Zeman] It cannot be completely ruled out that it was a test blimp, with the aim of discrediting the CSSD if we actually began, if only for a second, to consider such a possibility in the spirit of the Hirsian willingness to accommodate [reference to Pavel Hirs, chairman of the Liberal National Social Party]. The problem here is that the voters in the next elections will decide not according to how accommodating the present opposition is but, rather, how convincing and how well-based its arguments are for a different alternative.

[Dostal] Nevertheless, the ODS support remains incomparably higher than that for the CSSD?

[Zeman] The increasing failures of the government alternative, against which the public will learn more about our alternative, will necessarily result in growing support for the opposition parties. So the only point in question is that the social democratic alternative is the one the public chooses. Of course, this requires its constant parallel presentation, accompanied by a greater force of our criticism. The social democratic policy must be so convincing that it addresses even undecided voters. And, according to surveys, there are many of these.

ΩMilitary Cutbacks, Modernization

94P21110A

[Editorial Report] The Czech Defense Ministry is in the process of formulating plans for the utilization of the approximately 2.5 percent of GDP that the parliament has appropriated for the maintenance of a viable defense force. Current defense planning combines downsizing measures with efforts to modernize the sometimes obsolete equipment used by Czech forces. (HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 22 Jun 94)

Planned defense cutbacks include base closures and reduction in the overall size of Czech forces. The number of military airfields will be reduced from 12 to five, and numerous other military facilities are slated for transfer to civilian use, including 250 on the territory of the former West Bohemia military district alone. (TELEGRAF 19 Jul 94) The Czech military was reduced from a strength of 105,857 in January 1993 to 88,101 in June of this year. Of these, 31,156 are professional soldiers. According to Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, plans call for a further reduction in force to a permanent level of 65,000 by 1995. (CESKY DENIK 29 Jun 94)

In spite of the policy of military downsizing, new equipment acquisitions are planned, due to the obsolescence of materiel dating back to the Warsaw Pact era, which, in the words of Major General Oldrich Barta, the commandant, Office of Logistics, is "about as effective as a catapult or bows and arrows," and to the need for NATO-compatible systems. (TELEGRAF 22 Jun 94) According to Barta, only infantry fighting vehicles, certain hand-held weapons, TATRA heavy-duty transport vehicles and tractors, chemical-warfare defense and decontamination systems, and training aircraft have comparable quality to those of Western armies, whereas command and control, communications and electronic warfare equipment, missile, antitank, and artillery systems, munitions and most of the other vehicular park equipment are below acceptable standards. (TELEGRAF 22 Jun 94) The Czech tank force currently consists of 414 1960's-vintage T-54's and T-55's and 543 more modern T-72's. (LIDOVE NOVINY 27 Jul 94) The T-72's reportedly require new night-vision, fire-control, engine, and transmission systems as well as the addition of reactive armor. (LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Jul 94)

According to Petr Bakovsky in a TELEGRAF article on 22 June, the situation of the Czech Air Force is considered to be most critical because the bulk of its combat air arm consists of obsolescent MiG-21's and MiG-23's. In spite of their weaknesses, some of the MiG-23's will be modernized to fill the void until 2005, when more modern aircraft can be acquired. All MiG-2l's will be eliminated by the year 2000. Ten MiG-29's still in the inventory will have been eliminated because of uneconomical operations effective 18 June 1994.

Czech air defense systems are considered vulnerable to an enemy attack because they consist chiefly of fixed-site systems. Funds for the purchase of mobile antiaircraft missile systems are, however, not available. (LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Jul 94)

Defense Minister Baudys is said to favor modernization of existing equipment whenever possible because this generally costs only 30 percent of the price of new systems. Baudys told the Prague daily HOSPODARSKE NOVINY that Israel has been assisting the Czech Republic in its modernization efforts. He also said that he favors weapons acquisitions from countries such as Israel that demonstrate political and economic stability. He noted that, while Russia had offered to repay some of its debt to the Czech Republic with weapons shipments, "the Czech Army cannot depend on a country whose development may turn out to be very complicated." (HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 1 Jun 94)

Russian Treaty Ratified; Penal Code Amended

AU2308162894 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Juraj Alner: "National Council Allowed Parties To Invest 10 Million Each in the Election Campaign"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—[Passage omitted] The Slovak parliament yesterday ratified the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation, without returning to the controversies over the assessment of the August 1968 aggression. The Russian parliament ratified the Treaty, which had been signed by the presidents of the two countries a year ago, last month.

At the proposal of Environment Minister Juraj Hrasko, parliament then ratified two ecological documents pegged to European norms—the Convention on Climatic Changes and the Convention on Biological Diversity. [passage omitted]

Parliament also discussed and approved a series of changes and amendments to laws that, in their entirety, represent an important stage in recodifying the Penal Code and bringing it closer to European norms. A draft amendment to the Penal Code, which brings it into harmony with Council of Europe recommendations, was submitted by Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner. The amendment expands the possibilities of imposing fines, speeds up the process of criminal proceedings, releases police officers for extensive investigations in the field, enables witnesses to be protected against intimidation, and makes extensive monitoring possible in the struggle against the dissemination of drugs, the counterfeiting of money, and arms smuggling. The aim of the government-sponsored bill on the struggle against the laundering of money from the most serious, and particularly organized, forms of crime is to create a set of special legislative measures to prevent, expose, and punish activities aimed at "laundering dirty money." Following a debate, the deputies approved a bill that changes and amends the Penal Code, the Law on Misdemeanors, and the Law on the Community Police. In their entirety, the approved amendments make the procedures against criminals more rigid.

Kukan Views Current Foreign Policy Issues

AU2408081894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Aug 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by Milan Rusko; place and date not given: "Everyday Practice Is in Harmony With Strategy"]

[Text] [Rusko] At a recent meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Foreign Affairs Committee, you said that there was consensus among the political entities with regard to the basic priorities of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy. On the other hand, objections are often raised to specific steps. How do you react to them?

[Kukan] I believe that our orientation has been clearly defined. There is broad political consensus on this issue, which is appreciated abroad. The assessment of specific activities and individual steps is a different matter. Views on them can really differ in our country, which need not be detrimental. It would be imprudent to duck or ignore critical remarks. On the other hand, even the sharpest criticism should be competent and should respect the framework defined by our basic foreign policy orientation. I find precisely these criteria lacking in the pseudo-critical formulations about alleged "state tourism." Their authors do not see or do not want to see—it is hard to say which is worse—that it was precisely through personal contacts that we have accelerated, for example, the process of ratification of the European agreement on the Slovak Republic's association to the European Union [EU]. We hope that the ratification process will be successfully concluded by the end of the year.

[Rusko] What is still lacking?

[Kukan] Ratification of the European agreement by the remaining five countries. Within the framework of the endeavor to accelerate this process, the ministry has proposed institutionalizing the process of implementation of the European agreement and appointing Lubor Bystricky, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as chairman of the government council for the implementation of the European agreement. The government has approved the proposals, which is an important step toward institutionalizing relations between Slovakia and the EU.

[Rusko] What role does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play in formulating the Slovak Republic's security policy?

[Kukan] We use as points of departure the basic foreign policy orientation of the Slovak Republic, the everyday practice of other states, and our specific needs. We cooperated, for example, with the Ministry of Defense in drafting the Partnership for Peace presentation document and the Slovak Republic's defense doctrine. The individual program of the Partnership for Peace project is under preparation. Our relations with the Western European Union [WEU] have acquired a new dimension, which is documented by the recent visit to Slovakia by Dudley Smith, president of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly. He came here after the Paris meeting of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, where I had presented Slovakia's specific ideas about the security architecture of the European Continent, the basic elements of which should be NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE.

[Rusko] Ever since the declaration of its independence, in fact, Slovakia has been feeling outside pressure regarding the issue of minorities. How do you assess our prospects?

[Kukan] We assess them within the context of the evolution of views on the Pan-European scale, which are gravitating toward the elaboration of certain rules that would be acceptable in all states. The life of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities is a matter of practical human coexistence, rather than one of big politics. With regard to this issue, politicking is gradually being abandoned, and rational views are manifesting themselves more clearly than in the past. This is also true of the issue of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric power project. Apparently, this is happening under the impact of businesslike arguments and proof that have been registered also by international experts.

[Rusko] Hungarian Prime Minister Horn's recent talks in Bratislava gave a new impetus to Slovak-Hungarian relations. In what state do these relations find themselves, and how will they develop, in your opinion?

[Kukan] Yes, dialogue at the highest level has started, which could become an impetus for solving open issues and problems encumbering mutual relations. At the same time, we declare our will to continue this dialogue, which, however, is conditional on the readiness to seek and accept compromise solutions. Both sides have clearly expressed their endeavor to contribute to the reinforcement of stability in our region, which should also help accelerate our integration into European economic, political, and security structures.

[Rusko] The Slovak Republic is among the youngest states in Europe. It is not easy to establish oneself in the European political and economic structures. Do we even have the chance to participate visibly in the management and activity of European organizations?

[Kukan] In the short period of its existence, the Slovak Republic has become a member of a number of important economic and political structures, in which it operates as a fully fledged and self-confident member of the international community. Slovak diplomacy is making full use of membership in those structures to realize our foreign policy interests. Some facts testify to our improving position in this regard. Just for illustration, I would like to mention the appointment of Jan Kubis, former ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the UN organizations in Geneva, as director of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center or the election of Jan Carnogursky as deputy chairman of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

[Rusko] The NRSR ratified the treaty with Russia. The time of ratification coincides with the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1968, in which the former Soviet Union played a key role. Is this treaty good for us?

[Kukan] There is no doubt that the Russian Federation represents a very important partner for Slovakia. Because the establishment of prerequisites for the development of mutually advantageous comprehensive cooperation is among the most important tasks of our foreign policy, I believe that the ratified Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation is in full conformity with Slovakia's foreign policy aims. It is a standard treaty that bases further cooperation on equal and correct relations, which rules out any form of interference in the exclusive powers of the other contracting party. I would like to stress that it is precisely this kind of relations with the Russian Federation that we seek. Naturally, one cannot disregard the fact that NRSR bodies were considering the treaty at a time when we recall the infamous anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion of our territory. However, I am able to state with a feeling of satisfaction that the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation takes this fact into consideration and unequivocally condemns the 1968 invasion and the subsequent occupation. I am therefore of the opinion that the ratification of the treaty precisely in these August days is of a symbolic value, which is a matter of concern to us.

[Rusko] Since assuming office, what changes have you made in the concept of the ministry's work and in the network of the Slovak Republic's representative missions?

[Kukan] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a living and developing organism. It is the body of the foreign service of a young state that is being built under the conditions of rapid changes in international life. Certain changes in the concept of the ministry's work are therefore natural. However, these changes do not concern the fundamentals, which are given by the Slovak Republic's permanent state interests. We are reinforcing that part of our ministry that is in charge of our aspirations for integration into European and transatlantic structures. With regard to the network of representative missions, I can imagine that its quality could be improved. Unfortunately, we are currently limited by our financial possibilities. It costs money to build and establish a representative mission. I would like to note, however, that, when a representative mission has been set up and operates, it can never be unprofitable for the state. This is what I would like to tell critics who regard the present number of our representative missions in the world as some kind of a luxury.

Market for Arms Sought in Southeast Asia

94CH0397A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
16 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Brendan McNally: "Slovakia Pushing Its Arms on the South Asian Market"] txt

[Text] Slovakia's arms industry may soon be doing more business in southern Asia, thanks to a new plan under which Slovak and Indian manufacturers would build modernized T-72 battle tanks for use by the Indian Army and for export to the growing southern Asian market.

Following a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao last month in New Delhi, Slovak Prime

Minister Jozef Moravcik said he hoped to expand bilateral defense cooperation and sell Slovak defense hardware to the Indian military.

"These prospects will depend upon the interest shown by India. If India desires it, there can be arms sales," Moravcik said.

In addition to the modernized tanks, Moravcik has proposed selling 400 Zuzana self-propelled howitzers at roughly $1 million each. India is reportedly negotiating with tank-maker ZTS Martin for 45 T-72-based armored recovery vehicles and other types of heavy armaments.

Slovakia has a strong defense-industrial base, and in addition to building heavy armaments could supply more advanced military technology, Moravcik said. Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis stressed the importance of joint production.

While Indian officials would not confirm the deal, Indian Defense Ministry officials did confirm that an agreement had been signed between the state-owned defense firm Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. of Bangalore and Tatra Sipox, a Slovak firm that builds armored versions of the weapons carrier Tatra 815 heavy truck.

Slovakia's active role in promoting export sales of its military technology stands in stark contrast to Czech government policy. Industry watchers say the Czech arms policy is largely hands-off, owing to the dogmatic free-market philosophy of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

The Slovak government's support for its defense industries is "completely different from the situation in Bohemia," said Samuel Kodaj, director of special production at ZTS Dubnica.

"Here the weapons industry is still [made up of] state-owned enterprises. We have an association of defense industries that works to solve questions of coordination of development work and planning. We have very close cooperation with the Army."

SDL Chairman Reveals Party Election Strategy

AU2308202894 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 11 Aug 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL, by Pavol Minarik; place and date not given: "The Election Campaign in Slovakia Will Create an Image of the Enemy"]

[Text] [Minarik] After the victory of Kwasniewski's Democratic Left Alliance in Poland and Horn's Socialist Party in Hungary, you apparently also have a chance. What do you expect from the September parliamentary elections in Slovakia?

[Weiss] Of course, we would like to confirm the political trend that is making headway in Central Europe. We, with our left coalition Common Choice, will do everything in our power to win the election. This election will decide the future orientation of Slovakia, and, at the same time, will be a dispute over the generational alternative for the country.

[Minarik] How does your situation differ from that of the Polish or the Hungarian left wing?

[Weiss] Neither in Poland nor in Hungary have the nationalist tendencies asserted themselves in the election campaign. Moreover, no one was intimidating the population there as is done in this country. Certain political forces in Slovakia are threatening with the Hungarian peril or the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. In Hungary and Poland, the focus was on the economic and social problems. We will endeavor to conduct the campaign in the same direction because that is essential, but we are not going to be the only actors on the Slovak political scene.

[Minarik] Does this mean that there will be more political suitors for the left-oriented voter?

[Weiss] It means that, in addition to the ordinary politics based on expert solution to problems and social sentiments, there will be tendencies to conduct the election campaign by creating an image of the enemy. They will endeavor to set some Slovaks against others, or Slovaks against Hungarians and vice versa. We condemn such a campaign because such a perception of the problems of the country does not benefit the Slovak Republic. Slovakia has tremendous possibilities and can use them only if it does not succumb to the lures of populism and demagoguery.

[Minarik] HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] chairman Vladimir Meciar claims that cooperation with your party—i.e., the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left]—would be possible, but it is necessary to "straighten up" or replace you and your deputy chairman, Milan Ftacnik. What is the reason for such a request from Meciar?

[Weiss] There are politicians who reduce politics to personal relations, to secret or private talks. I am not one of them. I assess the personalities on the Slovak political scene realistically, on the basis of their influence and by their positive or negative features. Relations between the HZDS and the SDL are not, at least from my side, marked by any personal antipathy or aversion to someone. The SDL and the HZDS simply are two different political entities. We have different programs, and our political culture also differs. We also have a different political philosophy. Our understanding of the methods for the assertion of state political interests of the Slovak Republic is also somewhat different, as is our understanding of political objectives—in particular, of the apolitical technique used in politics. Therefore, it is fallacious to assume that, if someone attempts to "straighten up" the SDL leadership or replace it, the differences in political style between the HZDS and the SDL will disappear. While the SDL is from both domestic and foreign political views an accepted political party, with a social democratic orientation, the HZDS still is just an unfashioned movement. It actually is a personal party formed to the image of a single man. It is precisely this lack of shape, the fact that the HZDS does not belong to any European political family, that causes the tension on the Slovak domestic political scene. Unfortunately, as long as the HZDS is not a clearly defined political party, this atmosphere will remain.

[Minarik] There seems to also be something else that prevents cooperation between the SDL and the HZDS.

[Weiss] Talks about cooperation are one thing, but another is the aforementioned endeavors to straighten up or replace the leadership of the party that is to become a partner in the coalition. Another thing is if an HZDS deputy uses the Nazi salute in the parliament as Mr. Luptak did a while ago. The SDL is a party that consistently follows antifascist traditions, and we simply do not have the sense of humor necessary for such "jokes."

[Minarik] The coalition government in Slovakia, in which the SDL is considerably represented, has passed its 100 days in office. How were they?

[Weiss] The broad coalition from the left over the center and on to the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] is a certain experiment in Slovakia. It is not a simple government because four political entities with substantially different programs and not always building on the same political values must be brought together. Nevertheless, I believe that this experiment was very necessary and useful for Slovakia. Namely, there have been several political coups in Slovakia since 1938, and a lot of hatred, which is generated from political defeats in such coups, has been accumulated. Therefore, it is very important that, instead of speculating on hatred, we opted for cooperation. We learned to seek what brings us together and put aside what separates us. If this government did nothing else, this means the development of political culture. Moreover, it was a clear signal to the world that there are political forces in Slovakia that are able to cooperate effectively.

[Minarik] The SDL has formed an election coalition with the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Farmers' Movement. What is your objective?

[Weiss] This election alliance is the result of natural proximity of our programs and harmonizes with the long-term political orientation of the SDL. It also corresponds to the orientation of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia toward the creation together with other parties of a broader social democratic-oriented political trend in the Slovak Republic. The Green Party stands to the left of the center. After a well-considered judgment, it decided to join this coalition. Because of its rational program of environmental protection, we consider its presence beneficial for the coalition. We view the Farmers' Movement similarly. The transforming Central European countries need a stable political scene, and we want to contribute to its creation in the Slovak Republic by this coalition. Moreover, herewith we offered to the voters a clear political and generational alternative to the politics applied by the post-November [1989] governments.

[Minarik] Would you not say that the Slovak citizen is tired of politics?

[Weiss] I know he is tired but not as much of politics as of its certain style—namely, in Slovakia some politicians keep trying to cast doubts on the parliament as an institution and lump all deputies together. Although the political scene in the Republic remains obscure and encompasses 60 registered political parties, I am convinced that the citizen-voter will not punish the bad politicians or bad politics by not going to vote. He can do it only by not voting for those who did not keep their promises and opting for a different alternative.

SDL Leader on HZDS, Hungarian Coalition

AU2308162594 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 19 Aug 94 p 1

[Interview with Milan Ftacnik, deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, by "alg"; place and date not given: "All Possibilities Remain Open"]

[Text] [SLOVENSKY DENNIK] Various reports have surfaced recently about internal discussions within the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. There is talk about two wings, one of which is pushing for cooperation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], while the other opposes it. Even the names of the protagonists of the two currents have been mentioned. What is the real situation?

[Ftacnik] Theory has overtaken practice in this case. We have not made any substantive decision on this matter yet. There are various debates, but no official discussion on this issue has taken place. The options depend solely and exclusively on the election results. The range of possibilities is extremely wide, from speculation that the HZDS might win 90 seats, which would be an absolute catastrophe, down to scenarios according to which the majority might be won by the current coalition—naturally, without parties that would hardly be able to integrate into some government coalition.

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] There is also the theory that someone else from the HZDS might form the coalition government instead of Vladimir Meciar, who would be shoved aside to some other, nongovernmental post. The names of Sergej Kozlik and Julius Toth are being mentioned in this context. Would such an option be acceptable to the SDL?

[Ftacnik] Commenting on this would be premature. The HZDS must make its opinion known after the elections. It would be inexpedient to comment on this issue until then.

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] The electoral preferences have not shown any significant changes of late, which means that the postelectoral distribution of individual blocs will be roughly the same as it is now. A great deal will therefore depend on the position of the SDL and the Hungarian parties. Is the SDL prepared for various alternatives, including the possibility of Hungarian parties joining an open coalition?

[Ftacnik] This will depend on the Hungarian parties. In their electoral program, these parties lay down conclusions from the Komarno meeting [of 8 January 1994, at which the demands of the Hungarian minority were formulated] as the basis for their negotiations with other parties. I believe that, in this way, they themselves said no to possible postelectoral cooperation with Slovak parties. The fact that in the Komarno appeal there is talk about autonomy or even territorial autonomy or signs of an endeavor to divide Slovakia and establish a special territorial entity is not acceptable. It is definitely not acceptable to the SDL, and the same goes, I think, for other Slovak political parties.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 19 August on page 2 carries a 300-word Juraj Alner report on a meeting between Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, and Vladimir Dlouhy, Czech minister of industry and trade, in Bratislava on 18 August. Carnogursky is quoted as having told Dlouhy that, "in view of the fact that the Hungarian coalition has included in its resolutions the fulfillment of the demands from Komarno, it has excluded itself from any coalition with Slovak parties."]

More Army Desertions, Draft Dodging Predicted

AU2308071694

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 August on page 3 carries a 1,000-word interview with Colonel Stanislav Hajicek, deputy chief of the Supreme Military Court, by Pavol Vitko entitled "Hidden Behind Mother's Skirt; One in Two Sentenced Soldiers Was 'Disloyal' to the Army." The interview, the place and date of which are not given, deals with the growing number of cases of draft dodging, unauthorized leave, and desertion among Slovak Army conscripts.

According to an introductory passage, in the first six months of this year, Slovak military courts sentenced the same number of people as in all of 1993. About one-half of the convicted conscripts, 591, have reportedly been sentenced on charges of draft dodging, unauthorized leave, or desertion.

According to Hajicek, the incidence of draft dodging (Article 280 of Penal Code) is the least frequent of the above three offenses. A total of 17 conscripts have been sentenced under Article 280 in the first six months of 1994, he says, most of whom were Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to perform alternative civilian service "on the ground that civilian service is a substitute for army service and, as such, military service in a certain sense." Asked about the sentences, Hajicek says that, while the law permits prison terms of between six months and five years, draft dodgers now initially receive suspended sentences "to give them time to change their mind before they are called up again." The colonel admits, however, that, of all of the court cases he knows, only one Jehovah's Witness actually changed his negative attitude toward military service.

The most frequent criminal offense among conscripts, Hajicek continues, is "arbitrary abandonment" of the unit, which is a temporary leave without authorization. As he notes, 357 soldiers were sentenced for this offense in the first half of the year, for a total of 563 cases of "arbitrary abandonment" (some conscripts reportedly managed to commit the offense several times before criminal proceedings started). A more serious offense, according to Hajicek, is desertion, which he qualifies as "long-term defection." A total of 187 conscripts were sentenced on charges of desertion in the first half of the year, he says.

Asked about the reasons for desertion, Hajicek says that, in most cases, the conscripts "did not come to terms psychologically" with the rigid military regime. The second-most-frequent cause of desertion and arbitrary abandonment is family problems. Hajicek voices surprise at the fact that the number of desertions and arbitrary abandonments is growing, although conscripts are now able to travel home far more frequently than under the previous regime.

Crime Rises 14 Percent in First Half of Year

AU2308153794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Aug 94 p 11

[Article by Tibor Michal: "Report on the Security Situation in the Slovak Republic in the First Half of 1994, Submitted by Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner to the National Council of the Slovak Republic Committee for Petitions, Legal Protection, and Security": "One Criminal Act Every 3.5 Minutes; From Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner's Report"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—[Passage omitted] Whereas, in the first half of 1993, 67 murders were committed in Slovakia, in the first half of this year their number declined by 11. What is more, of this year's 56 murder cases, the police have already succeeded in solving 51—that is, 91 percent—which is a high clear-up rate, compared with other types of crime. This figure is all the more remarkable because the perpetrators very often act in a highly professional way, and their victims are often discovered belatedly. [passage omitted]

Compared with the first half of last year, there has also been a decline in the number of robberies—from 718 to this year's 651. However, the police have cleared up fewer than 60 percent of them. There is a growing number of robberies during the day, even at the most frequented places, as well as of feigned robberies staged for speculative reasons. [passage omitted]

A total of 74,918 crimes were registered in Slovakia in the first half of this year, which is 14 percent more than in the same period last year. In other words, 414 crimes were committed per day, or one every 3.5 minutes. The growth in the crime rate has slowed, compared with the preceding years, the clear-up rate has increased, and the protection of public property has improved. On the other hand, property-related crime is on the rise. [passage omitted]

Also, the use of drugs, particularly heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and hashish, is spreading. The distribution of drugs is in the hands of organized groups. The cities of Bratislava, Zilina, Kosice, and Lucenec and the High Tatra area appear to be the most problematic in this respect. There were six drug-related deaths in the first six months of the year, which is the same as for the whole of 1993. The victims were young people between the ages of 17 and 21. [passage omitted]

Despite some positive features, there is no reason to rejoice. Crime continues to plague Slovakia. [passage omitted] Although the interior minister does not lament in his report and proposes a further 19 operative measures for his department, it seems that the police alone, without society's help, will not be able to protect society against the criminals' audacity.

Finance Minister on 'Tough' Budgetary Measures

AU2308154294 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Aug 94 pp 26, 27

[Interview with Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi by Katalin Bossanyi; place and date not given: "We Are Facing a Past Laden With Burdens—Interview With Laszlo Bekesi on Avoiding the Payment Crisis"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Bossanyi] This interview follows a government session that was apparently decisive on economic issues, that accepted the adjustment package, and where your concept of holding out the prospect of tough measures made a breakthrough. How do you assess the success and did you have to yield at all?

[Bekesi] The success belongs to the government: Although we had professional debates, I did not have to make unprincipled compromises. It has been proved that we are beginning to be consistent in implementing the program that we announced—although this has been disputed by many people. Through gradually improving the balance, we will first stabilize the economy, and then we will establish conditions for well-founded growth. Our current measures are necessarily restrictive and, at the same time, preventative. However, through implementing them, we can avoid the worst, namely the country becoming insolvent.

Three Surprises

[Bossanyi] Let us talk openly: Are you trying to frighten us or can such a situation really arise?

[Bekesi] I am not at all trying to frighten anyone: The facts speak for themselves. If we do not radically reduce the accumulated deficiencies in the macroeconomy both in 1994 and 1995, then the country will become insolvent by the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996. I will mention two facts to indicate the situation: This year, the total state debt has already reached the total amount of GDP that can be created and, in 1996, the debt-servicing burdens will take away a third of the total state revenue. This is the reason we have to act immediately, however unpopular this task is. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] An argument against your program is that the trade unions cannot accept it. However, when the current package was accepted, it seemed that, at least in the first round, you mainly had to fight with the professional lobbies.

[Bekesi] I seriously believe that the main issue is to reduce state expenditure, rather than to fight with the trade unions. Naturally, this issue will also be raised at the interest coordination talks with the trade unions because it affects wages, institutions, and staffing. However, in the first round, our talks were indeed constructive. At the same time, it is true that the lobbies are forging powerfully ahead.

[Bossanyi] Which group is the strongest at the moment?

[Bekesi] he agrarian lobby, for example. In this case, the "beauty" of the bargaining is that our goals coincide. The Hungarian agricultural economy has to be lifted out of the abyss. However, this is not merely a matter of finance. The negative roll-on effects of compensation will also have to be alleviated. Defense is another difficult area where the problems are quite astounding. All these are connected to the reform of the state administration—and of the Army—that has never been implemented. The new government intends to implement these changes and we are aware of the level of resistance to this. Certain crisis regions and the large industrial enterprises that have not been privatized are the third rock-solid area where we have to make compromises with many lobbies. The majority of these are in a truly bankrupt situation. This has to be admitted. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] In the draft supplementary budget—and this is part of the adjustment package—you stipulate that the 1994 deficit will be reduced to 330 billion forints. To do this, taxes will have to be raised and demand reduced. At the same time, you are projecting a 450-billion- to 500-billion-forint deficit for 1995, which is 7 to 8 percent of the GDP. Does this mean that, instead of improving, the situation will further deteriorate?

[Bekesi] The macroeconomic indicators will have to improve nominally, and a relative deterioration will occur owing to the extremely high debt-servicing and the ensuing—and already mentioned—danger of insolvency. The 330 billion this year is a key figure because we will not get loans if it is any higher and we do not have enough domestic savings to cover it. As a result of the current forced measures, we want to improve the 1994 budget package by 60 billion forints. The package indeed contains tax increases but this will not really increase the revenue this year. In my view, it is more important that, following this, we will not touch consumer tax or value added tax next year. The immediate start of the reform of state administration that was put off before is a braver and more important government decision. First of all, we will reduce the support of decentralized funds: We will merge and even terminate the small separate budgets. It is an immediate decision that the government will start to be very thrifty with its own expenditure.

[Bossanyi] For example?

[Bekesi] A complete freeze on government investment, renovations, car replacements, and stock purchases, the effective freezing of management wages, and a reduction in staffing. In addition to this, we are planning to abolish offices and re-examine background institutions. All these will not bring much in terms of savings but they clearly indicate that the state is beginning the savings with its own operational costs. It is also an important step—and it is again causing a great stir—that we have to face our real productive capacity and decide on major prestige investments. This is why we have decided not to organize the world Expo. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] What do the figures for 1993 and the first half of 1994 indicate?

[Bekesi] Unfortunately, they clearly show that the economic growth was basically financed through further debt. The vast bulk of the increased production did not increase exports. The demand for the extra output sold on domestic markets was mostly created by the additional expenditure of the state administration and increased wages that were not in proportion with the increase in production. The difference could only be financed from international loans: This is why the gross debt increased and the current balance of payments is deteriorating. Therefore, the economic growth does not have a base, and thus cannot be lasting. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ's Peto on Horn's 'Unrealistic Promises'

AU2308162394 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Aug 94 p 5

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Szabolcs Szereto; place and date not given: "The Prime Minister's Speech Is Not in Accordance With the Coalition Government Program"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Peto] Immediately after the elections, Gyula Horn made a statement that was seen by Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] leaders as containing unrealistic promises and not being in accordance with the country's economic situation. Horn repeated the same in his speech made on the occasion of National Day [20 August]. The contents of his speech were not in agreement with the coalition government program. The mention of a property tax is only the most striking example. From the outset, a decision by the Constitutional Court makes it impossible to have to make a statement on one's assets but, besides this, we consider the introduction of a property tax inappropriate for dealing with economic problems. On an important issue such as this, no statements should be made unilaterally, without prior coordination with the government and the coalition partner. I believe that it is the task of the government and mainly of the prime minister to explain clearly to the public why the restrictive measures signed by Laszlo Bekesi [finance minister] and accepted by the government are needed. [passage omitted] In a coalition government, I cannot imagine a casting of roles whereby the prime minister publicly formulates popular measures that are impossible to implement while unpleasant but possible measures have to be presented by the finance minister or the smaller coalition partner.

[Szereto] I believe that what you are saying here indicates the deepest crisis in the coalition's brief history. Does the SZDSZ wish to take the issue to the coalition's Coordination Council?

[Peto] Naturally. I hope that this issue can be settled by the end of the week. [passage omitted]

[Szereto] The opposition often expresses the view that the intentions of the smaller coalition partner prevail more than would be justified by the election results (for example, the Bekesi program and the cancellation of the world Expo). Do you agree with this view?

[Peto] As for the views on the coalition, we cannot talk about a united opposition stance. Even the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the biggest opposition party, has not decided what to choose as the focal point of its criticism of the government. [passage omitted] Many current opposition members find the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], rather than the SZDSZ, emotionally close to them. Behind the criticisms of the dominance of the Free Democrats, there is a tactical goal to make the MSZP's parliamentary group turn against the SZDSZ. As for our supposed dominance: The government decisions are in accordance with the coalition agreement. It has never been a secret that the Bekesi program is close to our ideas. [passage omitted]

[Szereto] The SZDSZ is holding a conference of delegates in October where the officers will be re-elected. It is already known that you will be running for chairman. Is it possible that an alternative political line might emerge at this conference and that this will be represented by another candidate for chairman?

[Peto] I do not know of anyone else intending to run for chairman. However, the nomination process has not even been started yet; therefore, it is possible to visualize counter candidates. It is known that Peter Tolgyessy [the former chairman] opposed the coalition and this political difference exists in the SZDSZ regardless of the fact that he, just like the other parliamentary group members, voted for the government program. As a matter of fact, the majority of those who are against the coalition wish to remain within the party. [passage omitted]

Editorial Views 1st 'Confrontation' in Coalition

AU2408081794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Aug 94 p 7

[Unattributed editorial: "A Hairline Crack"]

[Text] The confrontation between Gyula Horn and Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] Chairman Ivan Peto on the first coalition conflict sounded slightly dramatic on television on 21 August. In his position as prime minister, Gyula Horn announced his intention to introduce taxation on the increase in the value of property [vagyonnovekedesi ado]. This is precisely the problem, because he would have only been allowed to announce this in his capacity as party chairman. Although this issue appeared in the election program of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], it was not included in the joint action plan during the coalition coordination talks, because it contradicted the position of the SZDSZ.

A coalition conflict? Definitely so. If two parties form a government alliance, every responsible leader should observe this agreement in any circumstance, and no one can present unilateral ideas on behalf of the partner without preliminary coordination. At the same time, it is also true that SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto used a slightly stronger formulation than necessary when he said that he cannot imagine a scenario in which the head of the government formulates popular plans that cannot be implemented, while the finance minister or the smaller coalition partner is in charge of presenting unpleasant plans. This formulation probably led to the situation in which the issue has been slightly blown out of proportion.

What is the issue after all? Perhaps Peter Boross' prediction seems to prove right, namely that this coalition will not last long and the voters might soon come to the voting polls again? This is hardly plausible. It was clear already from the government spokesman's statement on Monday [22 August] morning that no one is thinking of divorce or even a test of strength; coordination comes now according to the normal rules set out in advance, and if the sides fail to come to an agreement, the debated issue might be taken off the agenda.

All in all, the issue definitely gives cause for thought and an opportunity to draw several conclusions. The coalition government did not learn enough from the first weeks of its activity when it was justly criticized for dictating an exaggerated quick pace to itself; it should have first thoroughly analyzed things and only acted later. The population is well aware of what this government coalition inherited from its predecessor, and this is why the people voted the way they voted in May. However, people can find it difficult to understand that they must start work in hot haste while every small measure affects us all.

The other lesson is that one should not overdramatize everything. This conflict is more open than the coalition conflicts of the former government. In that tripartite coalition, the Hungarian Democratic Forum clearly played the dominant role and gave little opportunity for its partners to interfere. Therefore, this conflict only shows hairline cracks in the wall of coalition activity. However, unless sufficient attention is paid to this, these cracks might later threaten the static safety of the building.

Hungarian University in Slovakia Discussed

94CH0365A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 13 Jul 94 p 6

[Interview with Istvan Gilanyi, director of Kralovsky Chlmec Municipal University, by Ferenc Toth; place and date not given: "University Versus Bureaucrats Hungarian Students Do Not Qualify for Family Allowances?"—first paragraph is UJ SZO introduction]

[Text] Amidst the change of governments in Slovakia, the battle over Kiralyhelmec [Kralovsky Chlmec] Municipal University appears to have quieted down. Otherwise the chests of local citizens are swelling with pride, because it has been unprecedented for the Slovak Parliament to devote so many hours of its time to the affairs of a remote small town's educational institution. Arguments have been presented for and against, and they suggest that even some ethnic Hungarian MP's [members of parliament], let alone their Slovak colleagues, are not entirely clear about the details of KHVE's [Kiralyhelmec Municipal University's] operation. In the following, Istvan Gilanyi, the director of KHVE, tells us the circumstances under which the institution was established and how it operates at present.

[Gilanyi] The idea of establishing a university first arose at a meeting of Laszlo Mecs People's College. In our region too, there is an increasing demand for accountants and marketing experts. Moreover, the unemployment rate exceeds 20 percent. There are many young people among the unemployed, and we thought that retraining would help them find jobs. Initially we were planning merely a spring-and-summer residence course. Later we thought that a correspondence course would be more sensible. But as they say, the more one gets, the more he wants. In the end we decided in favor of a day school.

[Toth] With which educational institution in Hungary have you been able to establish contact?

[Gilanyi] First we requested Miskolc Economic University to organize our curriculum. For certain reasons, we did not find that curriculum suitable. Therefore we contacted a professor at Budapest University of Economic Sciences. He undertook to elaborate our curriculum, and even to "recruit" several experts in Budapest. With their assistance, instruction began in the 1993-1994 academic year.

[Toth] How have you been able to find the money for the university's operation?

[Gilanyi] We would have been unable to begin our work without the municipal administration's support. The successful continuation of our work is the result of a well organized—and timely—endowment. We were able to repair within a very short time the building assigned for instruction. Those months were quite hectic, because also the entrance examinations were held in midsummer. In spite of everything, there were plenty of applicants.

[Toth] In what subjects do applicants have to take entrance examinations?

[Gilanyi] Mathematics and history. The questions were compiled on the basis of the textbooks—mainly secondary-school textbooks—used in Slovakia. The examiners went by the set of requirements applicable in Slovakia rather than in Hungary.

[Toth] Official Slovak policy was not overjoyed by the university's establishment.

[Gilanyi] Writings of an aggressive nature first appeared in the Slovak-language press. The university's legality was questioned. Of course, the accusations proved to be without any foundation. After all, the establishment of an institution of this kind does not require parliamentary or government approval. A legal opinion from the prosecutor general also confirmed this.

[Toth] According to certain speeches in Parliament, the university actually is not a university, but merely a course for further training, and the graduates do not receive diplomas.

[Gilanyi] The purpose of these and similar speeches, I believe, is quite clear. Those who have failed in their attempts to undermine the university's legal status are now seeking other objections. They have also questioned the validity in Slovakia of the diplomas earned here. Unfortunately, in addition to such groundless and transparent objections, we also have to cope with the bureaucracy's malice. The parents of KHVE students are not receiving family allowances. The law clearly states that parents are entitled to family allowances if their children are students under 26 years of age. The offices concerned simply refuse to accept our certificates of enrollment.

[Toth] That must have a serious financial impact on the families. After all, there is also tuition to be paid. How much is the tuition?

[Gilanyi] The tuition was supposed to be 1000 korunas per semester. But we waived this amount in the second semester, because the parents were not getting their family allowances. We will make every effort in the future to cut tuition costs. Some of the students chose our school specifically because they could not afford to study at a more distant university or abroad. We were very pleased to have applicants also from Western and Central Slovakia.

[Toth] Thank you for the interview. In conclusion I would like to note that, according to international agreements now in force, Slovakia and Hungary must mutually recognize the diplomas and certificates of their respective universities and colleges. These agreements are binding on every signatory country.

Veszprem County Gives Building to Jewish Groups

94CH0358B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Jul 94 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Synagogue in Veszprem—The General Assembly Was Generous"]

[Text] The Veszprem Jewish Congregation was recently given a community building free of charge following a unanimous decision by the Veszprem general assembly; this is how the news item reads. To find out what had brought this about we went to talk with Laszlo Wollak, the president of the congregation.

"We definitely feel that this was a momentous decision of symbolic value," he said. "The downtown building turned over to us (26 Ovaros Square, Veszprem) has been an abandoned structure. The Jewish cultural, educational, and religious organizations operating in the county have expressed a need for a joint headquarters; it was this need that the Veszprem lawmakers responded to with their decision. The building is in a rather dilapidated state and will require a significant investment of funds to renovate. We believe that it will be ready for community use by 1997. It will house the Veszprem Jewish Congregation, the Veszprem County Jewish Cultural Association, the New Ch Nevra Khadisha Foundation, the Khadima Fliers and Sports Club, but it will also be used for the purposes of the synagogue. We also plan to provide opportunities to study the Talmud-Torah and the Hebrew language, and later on we also hope to build, inside the facility, a mikve (ritual) bath. I should point out that after decades of effort, ours is the only re-formed Jewish congregation in the country. We are made up of 83 families, and by request of the MAZSIHISZ [Federation of Hungarian Jewish Religious Congregations] the city congregation also attends to needs countywide while allowing the Jewish Congregation of Papa, for example, to retain its independence. We receive numerous inquiries about our programs from Jews and non-Jews alike. Evidence of this could be seen at the Holocaust commemorations held in virtually every town around the county as well, for example, as in the recent staging of an excellent presentation for members of the Jerusalem Mountain Friendship Circle on the origins of the circle's eponym.

Interior Minister Discusses Zacharski Controversy

LD2308193094 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski said today that Marian Zacharski's resignation as head of the intelligence service might not be accepted by him. The head of the Internal Affairs Ministry added that the final decision in the matter will be made once he has talked with President Lech Walesa. The minister said neither the president nor the prime minister knew anything about the plans to appoint Marian Zacharski head of the intelligence service.

Today the head of the Internal Affairs Ministry was presenting explanations concerning Marian Zacharski's appointment at a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

[Begin Milczanowski recording] I was the architect, the main architect and, in fact, the only architect of this decision. Lieutenant Colonel Marian Zacharski was, if I may put it so, my designee. [end recording]

The minister added that Marian Zacharski has been an active intelligence officer for many years.

[Begin Milczanowski recording] The one and only, let us say, motive for my designation—that is, Lt. Col. Zacharski's candidacy for the office of director of the intelligence directorate—was his very high, top-level professionalism, competence, initiative, and dynamism. And, as I have said, he has also shown evidence of his loyalty toward the Polish state beginning in 1990. [end recording]

Minister Milczanowski conceded that he had not envisaged that the appointment would give rise to so much controversy. The head of the Internal Affairs Ministry did not agree with the view expressed by many politicians and representatives of Poles abroad that the appointment could hamper our entry into NATO.

[Begin Milczanowski recording] I do not at all believe that I made any mistake here. No, I do not believe I made a mistake here. [end recording]

Andrzej Milczanowski added that, until Zacharski's resignation is finally accepted, he will continue to head the intelligence service.

Further on Resignation

LD2308210094 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has said it was he who proposed Marian Zacharski's candidacy for head of the Polish intelligence service and that he will insist that the latter's resignation be rejected. Next week he is to meet President Lech Walesa about this. Despite his resignation, Zacharski remains in office.

[Correspondent Slawomir Matczak, identified by caption] For more that two hours, the ministers discussed the latest changes at the Internal Affairs Ministry. Ministers Milczanowski and Olechowski outlined the detailed preparations to Zacharski's appointment, which went on for several months.

[Begun Milczanowski recording] I was the architect, the main architect, and, in fact, the only architect of this decision. [end recording]

[Matczak] As the main reasons, Minister Milczanowski cited professionalism and the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Zacharski has continuously been an intelligence officer for a dozen or so years and has also been at at the State Protection Office. It has now been 10 years since his exchange in 1984, Milczanowski reminded his audience.

The decision on the candidacy had not been consulted with the country's top authorities.

[Begin Milczanowski recording] The president did not know about this appointment. I told the president quite some time ago that the question of replacement of the director of the directorate of intelligence was in the cards, but I did not tell him who was the person concerned.[end recording]

[Matczak] A different view was presented last week by Minister Milczanowski's deputy, Jerzy Zimowski.

[Begin recording; caption notes recording made on 18 August] [Jerzy Zimowski, Polish deputy interior affairs minister] Well, the Belweder knew this decision had been made. That's all I can say.

[Minister of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski, identified by caption] I believe no interviews should be given about the services, about the intelligence service. [end recording]

[Matczak] Lt. Col. Zacharski's resignation has not been accepted. Next week Minister Milczanowski will be persuading the president that this is the best candidacy. He also believes that Lt. Col. Zacharski's direction of the intelligence service will not harm our integration into NATO.

He has a different view about the head of the police. A new candidate has already been selected to take over as chief commandant after Zenon Smolarek, but the minister would not reveal who it was.

Justice Minister Comments

WS2408085794 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0615 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy prime minister and justice minister, by Krzysztof Skowronski, at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw; from the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Excerpt] [Skowronski] Why does Milczanowski want to retain Marian Zacharski?

[Cimoszewicz] Well, why are you asking me that question?

[Skowronski] Why should I not ask you?

[Cimoszewicz] I am merely an observer in this case, just as all of us here are. I think this case reflects a classic dilemma: What must a cat be like in order to catch mice? As is known, in some societies it is all the same to people what the cat should be like. He should have certain characteristics, he should be effective. It looks as if we spend more time thinking whether he should be black or white.

[Skowronski] What do you think the cat should be like, and can this cat be Marian Zacharski?

[Cimoszewicz] This cat should, first and foremost, be efficient, and he should know the ropes of his profession. Now, whether the decision to appoint Mr. Marian Zacharski as head of the civilian intelligence service was the right decision... [Cimoszewicz pauses] The ultimate decision depends on whether there was someone better for the job.

[Skowronski] What did you think about Milczanowski's statement? Do you think it was a statement against the president, his own game, or something else?

[Cimoszewicz] Minister Milczanowski is a man of honor, and it can be seen that he is bravely taking on the responsibility for the decisions that are made in his ministry. I would not interpret it as a statement against the president's stance, even though I get the impression that, in this situation and at this moment, Minister Milczanowski should not have fueled the fire any further. It is also not good for the intelligence services or for certain political problems in our country or concerning our country.

[Skowronski] Did the government discuss this issue during its session yesterday?

[Cimoszewicz] Yes, it did.

[Skowronski] What did the ministers say?

[Cimoszewicz] I will not tell you this because this part of the session was secret.

[Skowronski] How will the Zacharski issue end?

[Cimoszewicz] We will see.

[Skowronski] On what does the resolution of this case now depend?

[Cimoszewicz] It may, to a certain extent, depend on the announced meeting between Minister Milczanowski and the president. However, I think that, ultimately, the head of government will also have to take a stand on this issue, particularly if we take into account the fact that members of this government have different opinions, which are being expressed in public.

[Skowronski] What stand will be taken by Waldemar Pawlak?

[Cimoszewicz] Really, this is not a question for me.

[Skowronski] What arguments is Minister Milczanowski submitting?

[Cimoszewicz] You probably heard what he said at the press conference.

[Skowronski] What was Mr. Olechowski's role in this case, and what did he say at yesterday's government session?

[Cimoszewicz] He presented foreign reaction.

[Skowronski] What was the nature of that reaction?

[Cimoszewicz] You are probably also familiar with it from the mass media.

[Skowronski] Are you?

[Cimoszewicz] I am, yes, as far as the content is concerned.

[Skowronski] Minister Olechowski did not say anything essentially new, then, at yesterday's session of government?

[Cimoszewicz] Despite how much I like this radio station, I must say that I will not say anything more about this case because, as I have already said, the proceedings of the government session are confidential. [passage omitted]

Oleksy Pledges To Investigate

LD2408095794 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0600 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] In an interview for the "Signals of the Day" program, a Polish Radio First Program feature, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy said that he will insist on clarification of all of the details connected with Marian Zacharski's appointment as head of the civilian intelligence service of the State Protection Office.

[Begin Oleksy recording] I shall make efforts so that the ultimate end of this story becomes clear, so the public can find out what the specific elements in this affair were. There was much publicity around this matter, and I doubt that Poland has benefited from it or that we here in Poland have benefited from it. This matter has aroused my great concern, and not only mine. I think this matter has brought to the surface what I would call a sickness of the decisionmaking mechanisms in the country. This should be a matter of urgency, starting at the very top. How is it possible that decisions important to the security of the country and its image abroad are made in such a convoluted manner and that there is such decisionmaking obscurity and obscurity of intentions, in which I think, they were made?

Taking into account the fact that the shortcomings are quite obvious here and the ambiguities quite intriguing, it seems that, when the matter is finally made clear, someone should take responsibility for it. [end recording]

Recent, Possible Personnel Changes in MSW

WS2308120494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by G.S.: "Noise About the MSW"]

[Text] The prime minister has not yet signed the decision on recalling Police Chief Commandant Zenon Smolarek. Yesterday Waldemar Pawlak was in Italy. It is worth recalling that on Friday there arose a controversy on this subject after Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy told the Radio Information Agency that Smolarek's recall had been approved by the prime minister. Waldemar Pawlak firmly denied this.

Before he went on vacation, Minister Andrzej Milczanowski proposed two candidates for the post of chief commandant: Warsaw Police head Jerzy Stanczyk and Krakow Commandant Boguslaw Strzelecki. ZYCIE WARSZAWY claims that the prime minister would rather offer this post to his friend Michal Ksiazkiewicz, who is the police commandant in Plock. The Warsaw daily also speculated on the recall of Internal Affairs Deputy Minister Jerzy Zimowski, who would be replaced by a politician of the Polish Peasant Party: Andrzej Grzyb, Krystyna Ozga, or Michal Kurek. Janusz Wolny of the Press Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] does not want to comment on this speculation. It does not seem likely, however, that the president, who considers the MSW to be his "own" ministry, will allow any of the coalition members to make personnel changes, all the more so because Minister Milczanowski often said that the recall of Jerzy Zimowski would also mean his resignation.

"If anyone levels a charge of political responsibility, the entire MSW leadership should bear it because it is possible that we did not calculate the facts well enough. I would humbly accept a decision on my recall," Jerzy Zimowski said not long ago, when the MSW was criticized following Marian Zacharski's nomination as the head of the civilian intelligence department. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that Zacharski's resignation, after only three days of filling the post, will be the beginning of (and a pretext for) personnel moves within the MSW.

Incidentally, it has not been the only controversial personnel decision in MSW recently. First, controversy was stirred up in 1993 by the nomination of Colonel Gromoslaw Czempinski as the head of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. Two colonels of the Polish People's Republic's [PRL] special services—Henryk Jasik and Janusz Luks—will probably have promising careers. The present internal affairs deputy minister, Henryk Jasik, was previously an adviser to the internal affairs minister. Janusz Luks became the head of the intelligence services after Jasik was promoted to his present position.

The Saturday issue of GAZETA WYBORCZA, quoting PolSat television information, reported further personnel changes in UOP that followed the recall of Marian Zacharski and Piotr Niemczyk. It was suggested that two posts would soon be vacated: counterintelligence head Konstanty Miodowicz's and UOP press spokesperson Irena Popoff's. Miodowicz, former activist of the university students' opposition in Krakow, was termed as the last high official who "did not serve the Security Service of the PRL era." It was also reported that Gromoslaw Czempinski is not satisfied with the work of Irena Popoff; the present UOP press spokesperson is now learning Russian because she is to become a liaison in Moscow. "Konstanty Miodowicz is not the only functionary who came to UOP after 1990 and now holds a high post," Irena Popoff told RZECZPOSPOLITA and added that she would not take a stand on informal guesses and rumors. She also recalled that Gromoslaw Czempinski informed journalists about her recall from the post of press spokesperson at a briefing late in July, which was reported by the press.

Columnist Writes About Walesa's 'Crisis'

WS2408091694 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 24 Aug 94 p 1

[Untitled commentary by Stanislaw Cwik under the "One Hundred Words" rubric]

[Text] A year before the presidential election, Walesa is going through an evident crisis. He fought with determination for control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. As it turns out, however, he is not coping with this very well.

He is trying to rescue his authority over the Army by promising more money from the budget, but probably no one is taking this seriously. It so happens that this does not depend on the president. He is attempting to show that he is in control of the situation in the MSW. However, facts seem to suggest otherwise. In addition, the Zacharski case, particularly the president's appeal for his recall, simply discredit the Belweder. They put into question his ability to supervise the MSW.

Finally, the Drzycimski case. The most faithful aide to the president in recent years was sent by him on an obligatory vacation. If things continue to develop this way, it will really be difficult to understand with what and with whom Walesa will want to run in the election.

Zych Denies Intention of Running for President

WS2308120394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "Zych: I Do Not Intend To Run; Declaration or Just Appearances"]

[Text] Jozef Zych declared on Sunday during a television program on agricultural matters entitled "Tydzien" [The Week] that he does not intend to run for the post of president. It is not known whether this statement is an expression of the unskillful playing of a political game, or, on the contrary, an expression of a far-sighted game in which the stakes are high. No one thinks it is the final political declaration.

Asked by a journalist of the "Tydzien" program whether he would run for president, Jozef Zych said that it was not the subject of his interest and thoughts and that he does not intend to run. He also said, which he has often reiterated while answering such questions, that it is too early to speak about a Polish Peasant Party [PSL] candidate for president; the decision will be made during the party's convention or by its congress. He himself feels good in the Sejm and says this is where he belongs. On Monday, when asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA, he confirmed his earlier statement.

In PSL circles, Zych's statement came as a certain surprise. Some say that Zych's behavior was an expression of the unskillful playing of a political game; others say the opposite—that it is an expression of his farsightedness. Probably no one doubts that Zych is still thinking of taking part in the election campaign. "If he really does not intend to run, he should inform the top authorities of the party as soon as possible, so as to avoid any misunderstandings," a PSL member said.

"Zych does not like sharp encounters, and this is why he is delaying the beginning of the election campaign," one Sejm deputy states. Another one adds: Zych has never played a real political game, and this is why does not know that it is not possible to win by means of modesty. These are all mere appearances. He would prefer to be officially anointed by the prime minister, by the top authorities, and only then would he say: Yes, I accept this task. He does not know that, if he keeps saying that the best place for him is in the Sejm, he may eventually convince people that this is really the case.

It is known that, if the PSL were to begin the presidential campaign too early, it would not be favorable to the party because of its participation in the government. The possibility cannot be ruled out, then, that the PSL leaders have decided that, to ensure favorable conditions of governing to the prime minister, as well as to delay the attacks of competitors against the PSL candidate, the PSL will begin the presidential campaign no earlier than next year.

None of RZECZPOSPOLITA's interlocutors look upon Jozef Zych's statement as the final one. Unofficially he is still seen as a candidate for president. Prime Minister Pawlak has also suggested that agreeing on a PSL presidential candidate will not cause a split in the party (before that we wrote that conflicts within the PSL might be aggravated if the party fielded a candidate other than the Sejm's deputy speaker [Zych]) and that this candidate will be Zych. Nothing seems to suggest that there have been any changes in the PSL internal decisions since last week.

Discontinuation of Popular Privatization Rumored

WS2308120694 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Jerzy Krajewski: "How To Prevent Privatization; Will the Government Make a Decision on Discontinuing PPP?"]

[Text] *Waldemar Pawlak's economic advisers are trying to persuade him to give up the popularity aspect of privatization. If the compensation option wins, 3-5 trillion zlotys that was to be gained from the sale of participation certificates will not go into the state budget.*

"The decision has essentially been made that the Popular Privatization Program [PPP] will for the time being be limited to the compensation option. In the first phase, participation certificates will only be distributed among senior citizens and employees of the budget-paid sector, with regard to whom the State Treasury has obligations due to a valorization of benefits that was supposed to have been carried out in 1991 but never was," Jan Monkiewicz, a secretary of State at the Office of the Council of Ministers told ZYCIE WARSZAWY yesterday. "So far, nobody has conducted a thorough macroeconomic analysis of what will happen to the economy after the program is implemented. After all, about 10 percent of state-owned enterprises are at stake. So it will be safer to conduct an experiment with National Investment Funds on a smaller scale."

On the other hand, when Monkiewicz was asked by reporters about popular privatization during yesterday's official press conference devoted to the "Strategy for Poland," he said only this: "An official statement in that regard by the government will be announced in the very near future."

What Does Kaczmarek Say to That?

On Monday, neither Grzegorz Kolodko (deputy prime minister and finance minister) nor Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek managed to find enough time to talk to ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the topic of the PPP. In a conversation published in yesterday's edition of the Catholic daily SLOWO, however, Minister Kaczmarek stated that his ministry is in favor of launching the PPP with the popular part and postponing the compensations.

Poland—One of the Last in Europe

The implementation of the compensation option of the PPP would mean that participation certificates will go to about 1 million senior citizens and 2.5 million employees of the budget-paid sector, instead of the about 28 million adult Poles, as several governments have promised in the past. Poland would then be the only postcommunist country not to have conducted popular privatization.

Things Could Be Bad

According to employees of the popular privatization department at the Privatization Ministry, limiting the PPP to the compensation part only could result in the entire program's backfiring.

The most important problem would be the lack of financial means that were supposed to be involved in the PPP by such international banks as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Western banks had promised capital and foreign loans amounting to a total of about $1.5 billion to companies precisely because of the "popularity" [powszechnosc] aspect of privatization. If the compensation option is implemented, however, the granting of these credits will be put in serious jeopardy because compensations are the government's internal business.

Without the capital boost, it will be hard to restructure the enterprises allocated to the PPP, especially given that prime ministerial advisers suggest that the best companies be excluded from the group and that they be privatized in the capital manner. The fact is, however, that, already at this point, almost half of the companies submitted to the PPP are unprofitable. The exclusion of good companies from the program will result in 60-70 percent of the companies being unprofitable.

The change in the PPP concept will cause a further delay in the restructuring of enterprises, which in turn will make their financial situation worse. Under such a situation, it will be hard to demonstrate the PPP's efficiency, whereas the program's second stage will be put in serious jeopardy. In addition, the government will have to explain to 24 million Polish people why, despite earlier promises, they will not get their hands on the participation certificates after all.

CUP Discusses Wages, Prices, Investments

WS2308143094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20-21 Aug 94 p 7

[Article by K.J.: "Economy After Seven Months; Greater Investment, Lower Wages In Budget Sector"—table not included]

[Text] An increase in production and investments, as well as an improvement in the finances of enterprises—these are some of the positive phenomena observed in the first seven months of the year. However, as the Central Planning Administration [CUP] predicts, the situation in the economy may deteriorate if, because of drought, food prices rise and more cash comes into circulation. CUP fears a high profit increase in enterprises—if it were to be earmarked for higher wages and not for investments.

For the time being, wages in enterprises increased in July only by 0.9 percent, whereas in July they increased by as much as 4.1 percent. According to CUP, this results from the fact that profit bonuses were paid out much less often in July.

Even if enterprises raise wages in August only enough so as not to "fall under the corporate tax on above-normative pay [popiwek]"—that is, by 3 percent, and in September by 2 percent—it may still turn out to be necessary to carry out a thorough valorization of retirement and other pensions. This will occur even if wages in the budget sphere stay in the third quarter at the level of 4,635,000 zlotys [Z].

Incidentally, CUP forecasts for the budget sphere are not very optimistic. Probably at the end of the year the average monthly pay in the budget sector will not be greater than Z4,680,000. This means that it will be almost Z100,000 lower than predicted in this year's budget. As a result, it will not amount to 91.3 percent of the predicted average wage in the enterprise sector, as was originally envisioned.

As we have already stated, after July the financial results of enterprises improved. The earning capacity in the first six months came to 4.8 percent, whereas a year ago it was 3.6 percent. Out of each Z1,000 of receipts, enterprises this year achieved the average profit of Z19, whereas a year ago they received only Z1.

However, improvement in earning capacity does not go hand in hand with improvement in the financial results in sales. CUP information confirms our earlier guesses that an improvement in the earning capacity results first and foremost from the fact that tax burdens have been lessened, not from an increase in the profit from economic activity. It follows from the CUP data that the profit from production-service-commercial activity is on the wane. This is proved by the fact that the cost level indicator deteriorated from 91.4 percent in the first six months of 1993 to 94.5 percent in the first half of this year.

According to CUP, the fact that the earning capacity is increasing is also linked to an increase in subsidies and to the process of lessening the debt burdens of enterprises. The high net profit is first and foremost a consequence of suspending the popiwek, of the lower (from mid-1993) dividend, and of decreasing the personal income tax burdens (probably thanks to investment benefits—note by K.J.). As a result, this year the obligatory burdening of the gross profit with the popiwek, the dividend, and the income tax has so far reached almost 60 percent, whereas a year ago it was 96.3 percent.

There are clear signs of an investment revival to be seen, particularly in private companies, where expenditures on investment increased this year by 10.8 percent in comparison with last year. However, state-owned enterprises are also making investments. Big enterprises (that is, those that employ over 50 persons in industry, and over 20 in other types of activity) spent Z69.1 trillion on investments, which, in real terms, is 6.8 percent more than a year ago.

The results achieved in the construction sector are rather poor compared to the above. In July, the dynamics in the construction-assembly production had been the lowest since April 1993 (if we do not include June). In July, half as many (45.7 percent) apartments as a year ago were built.

According to CUP, the overall improvement of the situation in the economy would be more promising if it had not been for the drought. Poorer crops of grain, potatoes, vegetables, and fruit, as well as smaller deliveries of milk to dairies, may result in an increase in food prices. CUP predicts that the prices of fodder will go up, while peasant's revenues will go down.

Finance Ministry-NBP Dispute Over Inflation

WS2408094794 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 24 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by P.S.: "Dispute Over Inflation; Finance Ministry Versus NBP"]

[Text] *According to the Finance Ministry [MF], the presentation by the deputy chairman of the National Bank of Poland [NBP] of inflation forecasts that contradict the tasks the central bank should be implementing this year increases inflationary tendencies and is not conducive to strengthening economic stability or confidence in the zloty. The NBP's view, on the other hand, is that the forecasts that were published will have absolutely no impact on the rate of price increases. Below, we publish views by MF Press Spokesman Jan Wojnowski and NBP Press Spokesperson Renata Wisniewska.*

According to the MF, the course of inflation processes recorded up to now approximates the rate of 23 percent, which was adopted in principle guidelines for the January-December 1994 period. The forecast that the rate of inflation will be about 30 percent by the end of the year would mean that the NBP approves of an acceleration of inflation to the level of about 2.5 percent per month. The MF does not know why the NPB intends to deviate from a Sejm resolution of 5 March of this year concerning the principles of monetary policies for 1994. According to the resolution, December 1994 prices should be no more than 23 percent higher than those of December 1993. The NBP's response is that, at the meeting of NBP and MF leaderships on 5 August, a high-ranking MF official said that the most recent forecast at the time was at the level of 25.9 percent, which is close to forecasts made by the NBP's leadership.

The MF's view is that, under conditions of decreasing inflation, it is very important that central bank interest rates be reduced. The MF has submitted an initiative with the NBP for conducting a combination of the process of interest-rate decreases and decreases in the rate of zloty devaluation. The NBP has agreed to only the latter operation. According to the MF, this is not a coherent solution because it causes foreign money to "get cheaper" compared to domestic money; also, it could possibly put the competitiveness of exports in jeopardy. High interest rates decrease investment demand, which in turn decreases the current rate of economic growth and delays economic restructuring.

The NBP's view is that a decrease of interest rates is out of the question because of a high increase in the money supply, which amounted to 18 trillion zlotys over the first 10 days of August alone. The central bank points out that neither theory nor practice requires that reductions in interest rates be combined with decreases in the rate of devaluation (IMF experts also agree with that). Decreasing the rate of devaluation will not result in a decrease of foreign-currency reserves (which have been on the rise recently), but what it could do is contribute to a slowing down of inflation. The NBP reminds the MF that the 1994 investment rate exceeds the GDP, whereas the structure of investments has been undergoing positive transformations. So it would be awfully hard to see a negative role of high NBP interest rates in all that.

The MF points out that the extent of financing the budget deficit by the NBP has not yet been defined. Work aimed at reconciling financial policies with monetary policies has been scheduled for the latter half of August, and this is when talks with the NBP will be conducted on the whole issue. The 1995 budget deficit is expected to be at the level of 3.4 percent of the GDP.

The NBP's view is that, if the level of NBP financing of the budget deficit remains at the same level next year as this year, a 16-percent rate of price increases remains a utopian goal. If, on the other hand, the level of financing the budget deficit is substantially reduced, while retaining general financial and monetary discipline, reducing inflation seems realistic, just as does a 16-percent rate of price increases in 1995.

East-West Transportation Discussed With Ukraine

WS2408095194 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 24 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by J.S.: "East-West Transportation; Poland To Be a Link"]

[Text] Before there can be any link between the West European transportation system and the eastern one, Poland must first modernize its domestic railway and road connections with its neighbors. This was recently discussed at a working meeting in Lutsk between the Polish Transportation Minister and his Ukrainian counterpart.

The railroad network is in particular need of very quick modernization. It was decided that two connections should be established: Warsaw-Chelm-Kovel-Kiev and Warsaw-Przemysl-Lvov-Kiev. Right now, in both Chelm and Przemysl, passengers waste two hours while carriages are adjusted to fit on wider tracks. There is a proposal to extend the normal track from Przemysl to Lvov, which would automatically shorten the journey and the cumbersome activities at the border.

The planned greater exports of Polish coal to Ukraine and greater imports of iron ore and metallurgical components will result in better utilization of the special wide-track railroad in Poland and the areas where sulfur and metallurgical components can be transported.

Also discussed at the meeting in Lutsk were problems concerning road traffic, especially new connections between our two countries. They concerned two primary aspects—a bilateral configuration of connections and the problem of how they will fit in with the European superhighway network in the future.

The A-4 Trans-European superhighway begins in Lisbon and will ultimately end in Kiev. Poland would like a connection running through the south of our country, which would, at the same time, join the Ukrainian capital with West Europe. For Ukraine, it would be a very good connection with Germany, as well as with countries to the west and in Scandinavia. We would have better access to the Black Sea ports and countries in Asia.

There is also another solution, which is less favorable to us. In line with it, the through-traffic corridor would run through countries south of Poland. It is not yet known how the main through-traffic route from Ukraine to West Europe will run. Road administrations in both countries are working on various designs.

Bishop Tokes Warns Against Conciliation Misuse

AU2308132994

[Editorial Report] Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian on 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13-14 August on page 2 carries a 6,400-word article in five parts by Presbyterian Bishop Laszlo Tokes under the headline: "Pecs-Gyula-Szeged-Neptun Via Marosvasarhely-Kolozsvar- Arad, or the Pitfalls of Hungarian-Romanian National Conciliation Policy." In it Tokes attempts to explore the "contradiction between domestic and interstate Hungarian-Romanian relations," and the "hypocrisy of Romanian politics," concluding that conciliation should not provide a means of falsely furthering the country's international reputation.

After mentioning examples of an apparent improvement in bilateral interstate relations—official meetings in Szeged, Gyula, and Bucharest, and various unofficial initiatives—Tokes notes that a "deterioration can be seen in domestic Hungarian-Romanian relations." He refers to the issue of the King Matthias statue in Kolozsvar (Cluj), the new education law that is "emphatically discriminative" against the Hungarians in Romania, and President Iliescu's "official statement" calling the politics of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, RMDSZ, "unlawful and anticonstitutional." In his view, the current anti-Hungarian actions are very "reminiscent of the measures that prepared for the bloody events in Marosvasarhely (Tirgu Mures) in March 1990."

Returning later to the situation of the RMDSZ, Tokes claims that it might even be "forced to go underground" as a result of a government statement threatening criminal proceedings against acts of "civil disobedience" which "the RMDSZ is forced to use against open provocations." He quotes the "Romanian unity party's (PUNR, the Romanian National Unity Party) abusive language," calling the RMDSZ a "Hungarian terror-organization."

Talking about the "policy of handshakes" pursued by the Hungarian Government and the various private initiatives, Tokes warns lest the "uncritical goodwill" or a "fundamentally flawed policy" favors the enemy and "turns against our interests." He claims that, "parallel to the strengthening of the policy of handshakes," we have to assume "political maneuvering, abusing the honest human handshakes and manipulating the true intentions of appeasement" behind the Romanian state political intentions.

In Tokes's view, the "forever double-faced" Romanian politics that "seek the favors of Europe and America" continue to be successful in maintaining the delicate balance between the "devastating domestic reality and the professionally constructed favorable foreign image," concealing "its dictatorial and repressive nature" with the impressive image of democracy. He claims that, even after a year, Romania has not fulfilled the conditions of membership in the Council of Europe. According to Tokes, the western political efforts wishing for "unconditional peace and stability," which continue to be "very little sensitive to national minority issues" are not encouraging for the Hungarians in Romania. He compares Europe's attitude to that of Hungary's peace efforts that ignore the real problems. He states that it is "self-deception to cooperate in conciliatory 'show programs' and open one's arms for deceptive embrace" while this same power that is a partner in these handshakes obviously supports events that make "people's blood boil."

In Tokes's view, "increasing political pressure" is being exerted on the RMDSZ by "the power that unscrupulously misleads the Romanian masses" and the anti-Hungarian nationalist camp. He claims that the "disarmingly positive tendencies" of the policy of handshakes lead in this same direction, and so do the political circles in Hungary and Europe that wish to see the "rather delicate and uncomfortable" national minority issue that "endangers the region's peace and stability" closed as soon as possible.

Tokes claims that the increasingly frequent handshakes contradict reality, and a "false political intent and premeditated national-communist propaganda attempts to divert attention from the dismal reality under the pretense of friendship and conciliation." He says it is "too early" to talk about "credible and mutual intent" for national conciliation because, on the Romanian side, "the honest political will" for conciliation does not yet exist. "Every day," many further facts and events clearly prove that "it is too early to talk about a credible mutual intention for national conciliation."

In his view, the "policy of suppressing the national minorities has not really changed for 75 years" and its ultimate goal is to "establish a homogeneous Romanian nation-state." He goes on to mention some "current nationalist measures that deprive people of their rights." Among such are the "militarization of the Szeklers' Land, its occupation by the police and military," the "economic destruction" of the population in counties where Hungarians are in the majority, and the "war of Hungarian language place name signs."

Tokes states that, through its measures, the government "violates" the "minority and, generally, basic democratic rights and freedom." For example, the government decrees limiting relations with foreigners, in particular the sister-city relations, contradict the "loudly announced policy of rapprochement and conciliation." After mentioning several unofficial, grass-roots initiatives for conciliation, Tokes notes that Romanian makers of politics show a "complete lack of interest, and even hostility to the spontaneous Romanian-Hungarian friendship societies."

Tokes begins his conclusions by stating that the "autocratic and suppressive political course that endangers the mere existence of Hungarians in Romania," which thinks in terms of one nation, and deprives people of their rights "has been unbroken since Trianon" and "its key word is homogenization." He claims that "the national-communist power—which survived the 1989 changes—and its extreme Romanian nationalist allies are even now continuing a frontal attack on the history, culture, language, identity, institutions, schools, churches, organizations, and the human, community, and national minority rights" of the Hungarians in Romania. To hide this political course and to deceive the public, the Romanian power "continues the window-dressing policy of the Ceausescu regime" and its goal is to create a "favorable foreign image of Romania that conceals the serious domestic political situation."

In his view, unintentionally, the "handshakes" and the unsuspecting conciliation movements "do a substantial favor to the double-faced" Romanian political efforts. He states that the "Romanian power ensures that it makes maximal use of these—otherwise commendable—efforts in its own interest." In view of all this, "all declared Romanian peace initiatives, and generally, the Romanian national minority and peace policy—which have a good international reputation—have to be treated with fundamental reservations."

Tokes notes that, "to avoid misunderstandings, rapprochement and conciliation are the only alternative that serves a purpose" in bilateral relations because any other way would only offer "unforeseeable destruction, the Balkan alternative to our peoples."

He nevertheless warns that no one should participate in any kind of "self-fulfilling compromises and pseudo-solutions" that put off the real problems. He states that conciliation and handshakes must not take place with those for whom the "policy of conciliation is only a strategic means and a double-edged propaganda weapon to deceive the world and to annihilate our minority Hungarian community."

Government To Deliberate on Visa for Former King

AU2408102994 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 16 Aug 94 p 9

[Corina Caramete and Andrei Badin report on Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements: "The Decision To Grant Entry Visas Is an Administrative but Also a Political Decision"]

[Text] "The decision to grant entry visas for a visit on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 23 August 1944 act is an administrative but also a political decision," said Mr. Mircea Geoana, Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman. However, the Foreign Ministry is still awaiting explanations from the organizations that sent an invitation to His Majesty King Mihai to visit Romania. Only when the Foreign Ministry receives the respective explanations will it state its own viewpoint. However, a position on granting or refusing entry visas will be taken only after consultations with President Iliescu and other decisionmakers in the current leadership. In connection with conditions that might be set for King Mihai's visit, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the major condition regards the private nature of this visit. Asked whether the government will request a visa of a secret nature, similar to the one suggested in case of the visit planned by the king last Easter, Mr. Mircea Geoana said that nothing like that has been suggested, except for conditions to ensure "the security of the respective persons." Asked to comment on the significance of the 23 August 1944 event, the spokesman avoided a clear statement and mentioned that this event had two components: turning arms against Germany and installing communism in Romania. However, the representative of the Romanian Foreign Ministry admitted that before 23 August 1944 the existence of the Romanian State had been uncertain and the 23 August 1944 act represented an attempt to save what still could be saved.

Proceeding from the assumption that the 23 August 1944 act represented an important contribution made by Romania to the defeat of Nazism, we asked the Foreign Ministry spokesman for an official viewpoint regarding the fact that our country is virtually the only one that so far has done nothing to mark the start of the offensive of the Allied Forces 50 years ago, which included events such as the Allied Forces' landings in Normandy and the state coup in Romania. Here is his answer: "We have nothing to celebrate because in accordance with the Paris Peace Treaty, Romania is a defeated country." Insisting on this aspect, we reminded Mr. Geoana that, for example, the major contribution of Romania to the victory of the Allied Forces was recently recognized by the U.S. Congress and it seems strange that nothing is being done in Bucharest. We also insisted on the negative way in which this fact is being regarded abroad, taking into account the fact that the U.S. Administration indicated in no uncertain terms even to Romania's Foreign Minister Melescanu that from the viewpoint of the United States, Marshal Antonescu is a war enemy and was the fascist dictator of Romania and his rehabilitation would lead to a deterioration in Romanian-U.S. relations.

Aide Confirms Former King's Wish To Visit

AU2408103294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Aug 94 p 3

[Report by "A.B.": "Statements of the Press Representative of His Majesty King Mihai"]

[Text] His Majesty King Mihai wishes to come to Romania and attend the ceremonies occasioned by the 50th anniversary of the historical act of 23 August 1944, stated Mr. Mircea Ciobanu, media representative for His Majesty King Mihai. Mr. Ciobanu made these statements in connection with certain information circulated in the press according to which the king will not come or does not wish to come to Romania.

His majesty's representative for relations with the media also said that His Majesty King Mihai has received several invitations to participate in the festivities occasioned by the 50th anniversary of the 23 August 1994 act, events that start on 21 August and will continue throughout the year. Thus, in this entire period his majesty the king can respond to the respective invitations, said Mr. Mircea Ciobanu.

It is noteworthy that recently in various circles some rumors have been circulated to the effect that King Mihai does not wish to come to Romania. This information is incorrect and its only goal is to discredit the king, said an official source close to the royal house of Romania. "His majesty wishes wholeheartedly to come to Romania and those who disseminate those rumors know this very well," said the quoted source.

PAC's 'Profound Dissatisfaction' With CDR

AU2308153894 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 15 Aug 94 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "A Decision That Postpones the Denouement"]

[Text] At a meeting held in Bucharest last Saturday [13 August], the National Council of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] decided that the PAC should sign the additional protocol proposed at the 3 August meeting of the National Council of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. Mr. Nicolae Manolescu's [PAC president] party was the only CDR member not to sign the document yet. A decision on that matter was postponed until the meeting held at the end of last week. The rejection of the protocol by the party's leadership forum would have effectively amounted to the PAC's exit from the CDR. Therefore, the vote in favor of signing the document is tantamount to a decision to remain within the Convention.

The result of last Saturday's discussion was received with relief by many people. The unity of the opposition was saved. After a moment straying, the PAC has returned home. Is that really the case? I do not think so. The statement adopted by the party's leading forum claims that the PAC never considered not signing the protocol—all the turmoil was about a mere postponement of the signing procedure. This statement wants to convey the impression that the failure to sign the protocol on 3 August was nothing other than a lesson in democracy that the PAC wanted to offer the CDR president, Mr. Emil Constantinescu, the other members of the Convention, and our political life in general. However, I do not think that this was the reason Nicolae Manolescu's party initially refused to sign the protocol. The PAC wanted to reject the document and leave the Convention. The final goal was to set up a more complex alliance with the Democratic Party [PD] and the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR]. However, in the time between 3 August and last Saturday's meeting, the party leaders realized that leaving the Convention would amount to a veritable political suicide. The party's electorate gave a clear indication that it opposed breaking with the CDR. Through its recent anti-Manolescu campaign, ROMANIA LIBERA did nothing more than express the state of mind of this electorate. Weighing both the pluses and minuses of an exit from the Convention, with a view to entering new alliances, the PAC leaders concluded that the party must remain within the CDR. It must remain there for the time being, since, as can be seen from the statement, the PAC is only postponing the break-up. Expressing hopes that the CDR will adopt several measures to restructure itself, the PAC statements points out: "The PAC is relying on this hope and reserves the right to proceed accordingly, if its expectations do not come true."

Therefore, the PAC National Council decision was made on the assumption that the unity of the CDR and the opposition must be above all interests and conceits. It was not taken easily, but rather out of fear that the current moment is not suitable for a rupture. This means that the signing of the protocol will not automatically lead to the disappearance of the profound dissatisfaction of the PAC with the structure and leadership of the Convention. Moreover, one can expect that this dissatisfaction will become even more virulent in the coming period. By deciding to sign the protocol, the PAC leadership has put its pride to a hard test. One should beware of spoiled pride! After a period of apparent resignation, pride is beginning to manifest itself much more vehemently than before. The statement adopted by the National Council clearly proves that, by signing the protocol, the PAC has not renounced to its rebellion against the current CDR formula and against Emil Constantinescu. Written in such a way as to justify the party's failure to sign the protocol, the statement actually amounts to a violent attack against CDR President Emil Constantinescu, who is accused of nondemocratic practices. In the next period, Emil Constantinescu is expected to lead the main opposition alliance with even greater firmness than before. This attitude will obviously clash with the PAC's pride. Will PAC leader Nicolae Manolescu resign himself to being Emil Constantinescu's mere subordinate? It is hard to imagine that—as hard as to assume that, if it stays in the CDR, the PAC will cease to struggle to convince the others of the need to overthrow what the statement implies: Emil Constantinescu's dictatorship. While it is beneficial to the PAC, last Saturday's vote is negative for the CDR. It will not diminish, on the contrary it will amplify, dissent within the alliance.

In this respect, it would have been much better for CDR unity if the PAC had decided not to sign the protocol. The much needed clarification within the CDR would have taken place. As it is, it has been postponed for later, at a cost that may prove quite expensive, including the risk of a possible CDR dismantlement.

Antiaircraft Weapons Fired at Sarajevo Suburbs

AU2408095394

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 24 August carries in its regular 12-minute newscast several reports on continuing Serbian attacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Brcko correspondent Hamiz Deronjic reports that "last night the aggressor carried out fierce attacks on the free Brcko territory from a safe distance. Almost all of the defenders' positions came under artillery fire, which began in the early evening and lasted throughout the night. Using 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, rifle grenades [Tromblon], and antiaircraft machine guns, the enemy targeted the central part of Brcko's defenses and shelled Djukici. The enemy used 82-mm mortars to target Vranovaca and Vitanovici. The defense in Bajici came under the heaviest shelling. The aggressor used 120-mm howitzers to shell the area. There have been no changes to the Brcko defense lines."

Correspondent (?Tefik Mujic) reports from the Doboj East Press Center that "the aggressor turned the relative calm on the eastern part of the Doboj front into hell during the evening. Suddenly and without any reason, the aggressor from (?Lipac) and Borik fired 10 82-mm and 120-mm mortar bombs at Rudine and the free part of Stanic Rijeka. At the same time he directed fierce small arms fire at the defense lines [words indistinct] and 82-mm mortars from (?Tekucice), firing nine shells at the villages of Klokotnica and Lijesnica. Four civilians were wounded and the material damage was great. This morning the Doboj front is relatively quiet, with only the usual small arms and antiaircraft weapons provocations."

An unidentified correspondent at the 3d Corps Press Center says that "after yesterday's success in moving the defense lines forward by 1 km and the capture of the village of Strajiste, our troops from the 201st Chivalrous Hill Brigade successfully repelled a combined artillery-infantry attack and seized an M-72 machine gun, an M-53 machine gun, and an M-84 machine gun. The defenders on Plane, despite the force that descended on them—with mortars, tanks, Bofors guns, and antiaircraft weapons—successfully repelled the chetnik attack designed to recapture the lost territory. Throughout the night on the Vozuca front, the chetniks fired used small arms and mortars against Lukici, Glinik, and Simin Brijeg, but the defense lines remain stable and unchanged."

Correspondent Izudin Durakovic, reporting from the Operative Group Gracanica 2 Press Center, says that "throughout the day the chetniks on the Gracanica front employed mortars and snipers from all directions to target our defense lines on Vis. The evening hours were marked by Broving fire from Novi Boljanic at Stjepan Polje, while mortars [words indistinct] and a (?Zis) from Ciganiste targeted the newly-liberated Vis. Nor were the chetniks quiet on the Lukavac front, where they used a (?T-1) gun in (?Stijanovic) to pound Poljic. They also used rifle grenades against the defense lines. The chetnik shelling was accompanied by continuous enemy regrouping and the bringing in of fresh men and equipment on all parts of the front."

Reporting on the Olovo front, Amira Salibasic that "yesterday was an unusually quiet day on the free Olovo territory. The aggressor nevertheless attempted to damage Olovo in other ways. For a second day running, he used incendiary shells to start fires in the vicinity of the forward defense lines. There were continuous enemy antiaircraft and small arms provocations throughout the night, while the region of Bakici was targeted by mortars. All the defense lines are stable."

The studio announcer cites a report by the 1st Corps Information Service on the situation in Sarajevo and says that "the enemy was intensely active overnight along the entire demarcation line around Sarajevo. One of our fellow citizens was seriously wounded in Zelengorska Street. The chetniks fired rifle grenades from (?Pamosac) at Gradina, and from the direction of Ilidza at Sokolovici. Portable rocket launcher shells were fired from Lontos at Zabrdje and from Nedzarici at Stup Hill. An M-84 machine gun fired at Zabrdje, while antiaircraft machine guns and antiaircraft guns targeted Pionirska Dolina and Blekin Potok. An enemy antiaircraft gun was intensively used all night from the direction of Ilidza at the Mt. Igman road. All this was accompanied by continuous enemy small arms fire on all parts of the demarcation line."

Three Civilians Killed in Muslim Attack on Doboj

LD2308194294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1840 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Doboj, Bileca 23 August (TANJUG)—Three civilians were killed and one wounded in a Muslim attack launched from the direction of Gracanica on the wider area of Doboj, the information service of the first Krajina corps of the army of the Srpska republic announced this evening. [passage omitted]

Muslim Refugees Report Atrocities by 5th Corps

LD2308135794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Knin, Vojnic, 23 Aug (TANJUG)—The units of the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, loyal to the Muslim government in Sarajevo, committed horrendous crimes against civilians when they crushed the resistance by the forces of the people's defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia [APWB], loyal to Fikret Abdic, ISKRA news agency reports, citing eye-witness accounts by Muslim refugees who fled the area last night.

More than 30 civilians were brutally killed when Velika Kladusa, the stronghold of the autonomous province of western Bosnia, was taken, while in surrounding villages even children were killed.

Three children were killed in the village of Polje, and the fate of a large number of women, children, and the elderly—who are known not to have crossed to the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK]—is not known, although there are well-founded suspicions that they were killed during Atif Dudakovic's horrific retaliation, the refugees say.

According to them, houses and other immovable objects belonging to the people who fled their homes before the advance of the 5th Corps have been razed to the ground.

The remaining property—agricultural machinery, vehicles, and other things—have been plundered. The villages of Johovica and Marijanovac have been burned completely, and the Muslim civilians claim that several fires were seen on the right bank of the river Korana last night, which leads to the conclusion that Dudakovic's units are setting fire to the remaining houses in that part of the autonomous province of western Bosnia.

UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] has confirmed reports of civilian casualties, estimating their number at around 20.

According to local Krajina authorities in Kordun and Banija, the number of refugees arriving in the RSK from the APWB is constantly growing.

The situation with food and housing is deteriorating, particularly regarding the children, the sources claim. They presume that most of the Muslim refugees will have to return, conditions permitting.

Croatia is still refusing to allow the refugees seeking transit to third countries to cross its territory except for the few persons possessing Croatian and Slovene passports.

Despite this, Croatian authorities claim that they are financing the care of Muslim refugees from the APWB, which is not true because the refugees are not staying in the territory controlled by Croatia and international aid organizations are delivering supplies for about 1,000 refugees staying in the open in the so-called no man's land.

International organizations are still offering minimum aid to the Muslim refugees in Kordun and Banija despite promises of larger amounts.

B-H Army Extends Territory on Maglaj Front

AU2308144994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Report by Hajrudin Ceric from the Press Center of the Maglaj Commune]

[Text] The free territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina gets bigger and bigger by the day. The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now in a position to counter every attack by the aggressor and return the occupied territories to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is in fact what happened on the Maglaj front today. The chivalrous fighters of the 201st Chivalrous Brigade were prepared for the attack and moved forward.

In a vigorous counterattack the (?fighters) of the 201st Brigade shifted the line 1 km toward the notorious chetnik stronghold of Bakotic and liberated the occupied Muslim village of Strajiste.

Enemy losses were substantial in the counterattack. More than 50 chetniks were put out of action, several artillery pieces were destroyed, and a fair amount of [word indistinct] was captured. The Serbian aggressor's attempts to regain lost positions were all in vain today. [Words indistinct] they intermittently fired at the town center with howitzers and mortars. Five civilians were wounded seriously today.

Government Guarantees Safety of Returning Refugees

LD2308131594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1203 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] The Bosnian ambassador to Croatia, Kasim Trnka, speaking at a news conference today in Zagreb, said that refugees are returning to Velika Kladusa, adding that the Bosnian Government guarantees their safety in Western Bosnia. Bosnian Government officials and parliamentary representatives from the Bihac area will visit Turanj today in an attempt to persuade the refugees there to return to Velika Kladusa.

Refugees Blocking Withdrawal of French Troops

LD2408100594 Paris France-Info Radio in French 0805 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Two hundred and fifty French UN soldiers have been held for more than 24 hours in Bosnia. They are being held by refugees from the Muslim enclave of Bihac, who are demanding to be let into Croatian territory after they were driven out of their villages.

The UN soldiers say that they are not too concerned by their fate—they are being held by a calm but firm crowd. These soldiers are returning to France for leave after four months on duty.

Troops Free Themselves

LD2408103394 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1000 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The 250 French UN soldiers who had been held by refugees since Monday [22 August] evening at the Croatian border managed to free themselves this morning.

The soldiers, who were going on leave, were attacked by thousands of refugees from the Muslim enclave of Bihac, in Bosnia, who wanted to go to Croatia. These refugees are fleeing from the enclave because they fear reprisals from the Bosnian troops who took a strategic town last

Sunday. The Croatian Government does not want them. They were holding the UN soldiers in order to put pressure on Zagreb.

However, the 3d UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] French battalion managed to free itself without any violence this morning. It took advantage of a moment of weariness and indecisiveness on the part of the demonstrators, according to the commander of the battalion.

UNPROFOR Comments

AU2408111994 Paris AFP in English 1049 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Zagreb, Aug 24 (AFP)—Two hundred and fifty French UN peacekeepers held up at the Croatian border by refugees fleeing the Moslem enclave of Bihac secured their release early Wednesday, a UN spokesman said.

The thousands of refugees who fled the northwest Bihac region on Sunday, after the defeat of rebel Moslem leader Fikret Abdic, detained the peacekeepers late Monday to draw world attention to their plight.

UN Protection Force Commander Jean-Francois Philippe told AFP from Bihac that the peacekeepers obtained their release on their own initiative "without violence, profiting from a moment of weakness and indecision among the protesters."

Some 3,000 refugees were still gathered early Wednesday at the UNPROFOR checkpoint at Turanj 60 kilometres (40 miles) south of Zagreb, the spokesman said.

The French troops left the border post and took the Topusko- Glina-Sisak road with the aim of reaching Zagreb by midday (10h00 GMT), Philippe said.

The refugees explained that their action of detaining the peacekeepers was intended to pressurise the Zagreb authorities to allow them to enter Croatia.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) are studying the possibility of building camps for the refugees, Philippe said.

UNPROFOR and Bosnian Government forces which recaptured the Moslem region of Bihac on Sunday are trying to persuade the refugees to return despite fears among refugees of Bosnian army reprisals, the spokesman said.

French troops earlier began to free up the road from Velika Kladusa, Abdic's former stronghold in northern Bihac, towards the checkpoint at Maljavac, which is blocked by abandoned vehicles, the French officer said.

Blockade by Serbia Threatens To Close Plants

AU2308131494 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20-21 Aug 94 p 2

[M. Maric report: "INCEL and CELPAK Plants Grind to a Halt"]

[Text] Banja Luka—Owing to the lack of sulfur and industrial salt, which until the drastic sanctions was imported from Serbia, production has ground to a halt in two of the largest Krajina plants, INCEL in Banja Luka and CELPAK in Prijedor. If things do not change, several other companies will be in the same situation, said Svetislav Mudrenovic, vice president of the Serbian Republic Chamber of Commerce and president of the regional Chamber of Commerce in Banja Luka.

The Banja Luka business community believes that this "pointless blockade will soon be lifted." Slobodan Kustrinovic, general manager of the Rudi Cajavec holding company, says that the firm today continues to work for old clients in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "We believe that the Drina River cannot be a border between the Serbs," he said.

It is fortunate that our economy is complementary and I am sure that it can hold out for a long time, says Rajko Kasagic, president of the Executive Committee of the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly. The sanctions imposed on the Srpska republic are bound to damage the Yugoslav economy significantly.

Kasagic supported this claim with a fact dating back to the time when the Serbs did not have a route through Posavina. At the time, a cubic meter of roundwood reached a price of 1,900 dinars on the Yugoslav market, yet once the corridor had been established the price of roundwood plummeted to 250 dinars.

Poultry farmers warned that day-old birds en route to poultry farms were turned back at the Yugoslav border. The same thing happened with fish feed, which endangers the survival of fish.

Although the Yugoslav border has been closed for the sixth day running, it was only yesterday that we were able to obtain two truckloads of flour, says Vukasin Basic, manager of Veleprehrana. Another four truckloads of flour, cooking oil, sugar, and some other foodstuffs are due today or tomorrow. However, since we have no contact with Serbia, we still do not know whether these trucks will be able to cross into the Serbian Republic. We have long since paid the Yugoslav market for 300 tonnes of various foodstuffs, but owing to the blockade, we do not know when the goods will arrive, even though our trucks are already there.

'Weaknesses' in Serbia's Blockade Noted

AU2308152494 Paris AFP in English 1452 GMT 23 Aug 94

[By Michel Viatteau]

[Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug 23 (AFP)—Bananas, Scotch whisky, petrol and heating fuel were freely available here Tuesday [23 August], pointing to weaknesses in Belgrade's blockade against the Bosnian Serbs imposed to persuade them to accept an international peace plan.

Less than three weeks after the embargo was imposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Pale shopowners, like those parts of Sarajevo under Serb control, are not complaining about supplies.

The main effect of the blockade so far in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale, some 15 kilometres (9 miles) outside Sarajevo, is price inflation.

A kilo of bananas now costs 5 German marks (3 dollars), the same price as a litre of gas (a quarter gallon), twice as much as before August 5, the date the embargo cutting political and economic ties was imposed.

Despite initial hardship supply sources have been maintained.

Pale shopowners, who used to go to Serbia to buy goods, now go to Bijeljina, a town near the Serbian border. In a huge open-air market fruit, Slovene toothpaste, Serbian shampoo, whisky, jeans and tunics of unknown origin are all readily available.

The goods are rumoured to bypass the border checkpoints on rafts crossing the Drina River.

"We can't stop trade. There are channels open in the south, the north, the east and the west," Rade Starcevic, mayor of Pale, said.

He says the blockade has made life more difficult, especially for large state companies hampered by a freeze on banking operations with Serbia. Private companies, however, can get hold of goods using foreign currency—German marks, and new Yugoslav dinars.

Fuel can be obtained from Croat-controlled Kiseljak (where it is three times cheaper), one gas station owner here, Veljko Gulijanin, said.

Gulijanin stores fuel for businesses in his tanks and receives a share of what they have in return for the service. He says Serbs and Croats are exchanging petrol for wood and construction materials.

The air of austerity in Pale, the closed restaurants and cafes, decided at the start of the month, began to fade this week as many establishments reopened Monday. But, the mayor's crackdown on alcohol sales—"to respond to the gravity of the situation" following a battle in the north of Sarajevo which left several wounded on the Serb side—is still in force.

Despite the blockade on financial operations with Serbia, linked by monetary union to the self-proclaimed Serbian republic, pensioners are due to collect their June pension as from Wednesday.

A decision which shows—as next weekend's referendum on the contact group's peace plan approaches—that the Bosnian Serb "state" is respecting its commitments to its citizens.

UNPROFOR Prevents Abduction of Ambassador

AU2308150094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Excerpts] All of those expelled from the Cazin Krajina may indeed return to their homes. Kladusa is completely quiet. This was confirmed by Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps, on Croatian Television, phoning directly from Bihac. All of Cazin Krajina is under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of Fikret Abdic's paramilitary units have surrendered to the army. There is no more fighting, the general said. [passage omitted]

The 5th Corps is expecting frequent provocations from the occupied territories of Croatia. It is believed that the chetniks could try to infiltrate the Cazin Krajina subversive groups consisting of the remnants of Fikret Abdic's paramilitary troops. The 5th Corps is aware of that and prepared for it, stated General Dudakovic.

What Fikret Abdic is prepared to do is best illustrated by the case of Kasim Trnka, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Republic of Croatia. Three days ago, when he tried to return to Zagreb from a visit to Cazin Krajina, Abdic's soldiers stopped the UN personnel carrier with the help of chetniks and tried to open the door in hopes of dragging the ambassador out. As Mr. Trnka said himself at a news conference in Zagreb today, the French UNPROFOR soldiers were very resolute and did not allow this to happen. Abdic obviously tried to abduct the ambassador in order to blackmail the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina after he had rejected all its peace proposals and expelled thousands of people. The refugees from Cazin Krajina will be visited today by representatives of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Turanj near Karlovac, said Ambassador Trnka at the news conference. [passage omitted]

4th Corps Commander Views Army Capabilities

AU2408091194 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 11-18 Aug 94 p 9

[Interview with Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 4th Corps, by Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "Poorly Dressed, Well Trained"]

[Text] Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army [B-H Army], gave short, to-the-point answers to all our questions, just as he gives his orders. His corps is fighting against strong chetnik forces from Nevesinje, toward Borak and Kalinovik [in Herzegovina]. On the other side, there have been fierce conflicts between the B-H Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. The wounds go deep, and they must heal now with the implementation of the newly founded federation and the Delic-Roso [B-H Army and HVO officers] agreement.

[Hodzic] Gen. Drekovic, what is the situation in the the 4th Corps' theater of operations?

[Drekovic] The situation is stable and the troops of the 4th Corps of the B-H Army are keeping it under control.

[Hodzic] The front line facing the chetniks is a long one. Nevesinje is down there, and here we have Borci, then Bijela; the chetniks are near Konjic. Up there, on the other hand, there is Kalinovik....

[Drekovic] Yes, we have indeed a very long defense line with the chetniks. But it has been so well secured that they will never again surprise us from there. Our units can now perform successful maneuvers and move whenever necessary. Furthermore, our military training is paving the way for offensive actions.

[Hodzic] Are the chetniks respecting the cease-fire?

[Drekovic] You see, the chetniks have signed many documents that they have not respected. They always resort to provocation. Just two days ago, they fired 43 howitzer shells at the village of Homolje. Our information is that the chetniks are now regrouping. But they cannot take us by surprise any longer.

[Hodzic] What is the situation in Bjelimici, which is closest to the chetnik positions in Kalinovik? Last year, the soldiers of Bjelimici heroically resisted the offensive on Mount Igman, Bjelasnica, and Visocica and remain a thorn in the chetniks' side....

[Drekovic] Bjelimici is well protected. The chetniks can only dream of seizing that point.

[Hodzic] In Herzegovina, there was heavy fighting between the B-H Army and the HVO. What are the current relations between the two armies?

[Drekovic] This is where there were by far the fiercest clashes between the B-H Army and the HVO, and the soldiers of the B-H Army 4th Corps Army keep that in mind. But the plan signed by Delic and Roso, the two commanders, is being implemented and I am sure will produce good results.

[Hodzic] Is there any provocation on the part of the HVO in Mostar as well?

[Drekovic] No, there is not. There was before, though. If we compare the situation in Mostar now and before, we can be satisfied. The army fully implements everything our leaders sign.

[Hodzic] People say that you did an extremely good job organizing the 4th Corps. What exactly did you do when you were appointed commander of the 4th Corps?

[Drekovic] The 4th Corps was composed of parts of previous corps—the 4th and the 6th. We reorganized them, trained special units, for reconnaissance and commando actions.... We trained our units to perform maneuvers. The 4th Corps is now fully militarily structured, deployed, and trained, and has great military potential from Ivan Sedlo to the southern-most free territory of Vranjevic.

[Hodzic] You also have a good training and recruitment center?

[Drekovic] Yes, it has just turned out its third generation of trainees, who are moving into position as we speak. That is how we prepare our young soldiers for battle. Without proper training, there will be no results on the field of battle....

[Hodzic] Your soldiers hold positions on Mt Bjelasnica, Visocica, and Prenj. How are they equipped and do they have appropriate clothes for severe winter conditions?

[Drekovic] Of course, we do not yet have the appropriate clothing. However, we are well enough trained and armed not to allow the chetniks to make any radical moves in the area.

[Hodzic] In addition to the enemy, the 4th Corps has also had problems with bad roads. They have had to walk to their positions.... What is the current situation?

[Drekovic] Our engineering battalion is working on roads. We have already made roads to Bjelimici and Glavaticevo, to which we used to have to walk for up to 16 hours. Now we get there in vehicles....

[Hodzic] Are you satisfied with the mobilization in Mostar, Jablanica, and Konjic?

[Drekovic] I am satisfied with the mobilization in Mostar, simply because everything has been mobilized. Almost everybody was called up. If it had not been like that, we could not have defended the backbone of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is to their credit. As for Jablanica and Konjic, I think they have to revise their ideas on compulsory work duties, as well as on many other things, in order to help them concentrate only on fighting.

[Hodzic] You were commander of the 5th Corps. Do you still keep in touch with your colleague and successor Dudakovic, the present commander of the 5th Corps? Do you know about the situation over there?

[Drekovic] Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps, and I talk every day. Abdic changed his first name from Fikret to Teodor [reference to reports that Abdic had changed his religion from Muslim to Serbian Orthodox]. I once said that he could call himself Slobodan Milosevic for all I care, but he will not destroy the 5th Corps, although it is completely surrounded. The morale and the patriotism of officers and men of the 5th Corps under Atif Dudakovic will preserve that part of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina, of this I am certain.

[Hodzic] Who is Gen. Ramiz Drekovic?

[Drekovic] I was born on 10 June, 1956. I was a member of the former Yugoslav People's Army, which I left on 13 September, 1991. I immediately joined the Patriotic League in Bihac and got a job at the Bihac Security Service Center. Since then, I have taken part in the preparations and the defense of our country.

Ministry Introduces Training of Women for Army

AU2308165794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] The volunteer training of women was the topic of today's news conference organized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Ministry. Here is a report by Mediha Colo:

[Begin recording] [Colo] In accordance with the Law on Armed Defense, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Ministry started receiving candidates for the volunteer training of women on the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state. Assistant Defense Minister Brigadier General Arif Pasalic explained the purpose of organizing this training at today's news conference:

[Pasalic] As a part of the activities to prepare women for participation in the armed struggle of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, we have decided to prepare, constitute, and initiate the training of women (?within the department of military training) by educating them in the recruitment centers with the aim of replenishing the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in those activities and deportments where we now have the possibility to train them.

The training is on a volunteer basis. Women aged between 19 and 27 can apply. [Words indistinct] can be prepared. We cannot accept pregnant women and women who have children under seven years of age. The military training of women is planned and organized in accordance with the needs to replenish the ranks of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Armed Forces and the possibilities to carry out training.

In accordance with this law, all provisions and [word indistinct] that apply to soldiers will apply to the women who will enter military units, that is, the institutions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Women who have already started their training can be discharged on medical and other grounds on the basis of this law. The defense minister is authorized to give certain [words indistinct] regarding the training of women.

[Colo] Regarding the reasons for which the Defense Ministry decided to organize systematic training of women for the requirements of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Gen. Pasalic says:

[Pasalic] We have not organized volunteer enrollment of women and [words indistinct] and them joining the army because we lack soldiers. We are doing this for two or three basic reasons, namely, because of the constitutional right of a woman to participate equally in the struggle of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct] their verification and normal performance of duties in combat just as men. We did not think in terms of percentages and numbers. We will engage, that is, accept as many women as we can accommodate in the training centers and as many as the units will need. We believe that by this we will help citizens, that is, women to [words indistinct] enrollment on a volunteer basis and train a certain number of women to perform tasks that we can prepare them to carry out within 30 days, which are: Surveillance and intelligence activities, communications, [word indistinct] struggle and information-propaganda service, first aid, administrative tasks, [words indistinct], stay in nature, and stay in the nature with survival and [word indistinct].

[Colo] The advertisement for the enrollment of candidates for the volunteer training will be open until 10 September 1994. Women between 19 and 27 years of age can apply at the municipal secretariats of the People's Defense. The training of the first group will last from 20 September to 30 October this year. Upon its completion, women will be incorporated into the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on a volunteer basis or in accordance with combat requirements. [end recording]

Mostar Mayor Outlines EU Administration Policy

BR1908145894 Amsterdam ELSEVIER in Dutch 20 Aug 94 p 37

[Interview with Hans Koschnik, the European Union's mayor of Mostar, by Harald Doornbos in Mostar; date not given: "I Am Not an Old Colonialist"]

[Text] *Authority in the war torn and divided town of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been in the hands of the European Union (EU) for the past month. Bremen's former Mayor Hans Koschnik is busy as the neutral mayor trying to bring Croats and Muslims together in the city. "The EU now understands, I hope, the need to respond in a more courageous and principled manner to our opportunities for peace," he says.*

You could call it the new way of establishing peace for the nineties. You fill up a divided town, until recently the scene of fierce fighting, with West Europeans, give then 70 million guilders for the first six months alone, and try with the help of European police, European doctors, and European engineers to set up projects to ensure that the former enemies learn to work together once again.

It is the first time in the EU's history that it has assumed direct control of a town which lies outside EU territory. The plan is also to place Sarajevo under UN control for the next two years. In Mostar, where Bosnian Croats and Muslims fought one another for a whole year, the EU's job is now to assume effective control.

[Doornbos] Are the people of Mostar happy with the EU's presence in their town?

[Koschnik] Let me be quite clear: The EU is here at the invitation of both parties, Croats and Muslims. Although I must admit that there was a certain attitude on the part of the Croats to the effect of: "Give us the money, but you can stay away." They wanted to make Mostar into a purely Croatian town and establish close ties with the Republic of Croatia. That did not succeed because the international community has continued to recognize Bosnia as a single entity and has not accepted the link between the Bosnian Croats and Croatia. The Croats have thus not achieved their aim. Both groups now understand that they have nothing more to gain by continuing the war. There is a strong will on all sides to build a new Mostar with the help of EU intervention. Not so much because we bring in a lot of expertise and money, but principally because under the umbrella of a neutral power they are able to speak more openly about making their city whole again.

[Doornbos] How are you bringing the parties of Mostar together?

[Koschnik] I have money and that brings a certain authority. But we certainly need more of it to get everything done. Because how is the new joint police force going to be paid for? The problems are growing by the day. I need a refugee program. I need to build new homes. And homes in the countryside must be made available so that people who fled to the city can now return. People must be given new prospects. We must create an atmosphere of peace. I will wait a little bit longer, but then I will be knocking at the door of the European Commission's president. Master, I will say, there are problems which we did not previously know existed. And it costs a lot of money, that much is certain.

[Doornbos] How important is the "Mostar project" for the EU?

[Koschnik] I am simply the executor of the decision made by the EU foreign ministers. I know that this is the chance to organize a peace-stimulating action within the framework of the EU or the Western European Union. We want to make it clear that Europe is not just a part of NATO, but that Europe is also prepared to fulfill a stabilizing role on its own soil. The Americans reproached us, and I believe not altogether wrongly, for taking too long before producing a European response to the question: What are we going to do about the former Yugoslavia? At the start of the Balkan crisis, there was in fact a serious misunderstanding between the different European countries. "Misunderstanding" is in fact putting it mildly, because there were quite simply clear differences in policy toward the former Yugoslavia. Europe has now fallen into line, but we lost 18 months in the process. And they paid a heavy price for this in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

[Doornbos] The EU intervention in Mostar thus originates in a sense of guilt for past mistakes?

[Koschnik] We should have provided money for this area earlier. If we had used just one half of the budget used by the UN peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia to prevent the war here, things would probably have been different.

[Doornbos] Just like the good intentions of the United Nations, your plans look very good on paper. But what can you do to enforce them if people resist them?

[Koschnik] Nothing. It is a question of what the majority in Mostar want. If they say they want a divided city, then we can no longer work together. Europe can then simply say: O.K., you are free to have your opinion. We will then leave. I am not an old colonialist. But we also do not want people to be forced not to work together. If we fail here, then Europe and the Bosnian federation also fail. Then everything changes.

Sarinic Receives Redman, New U.S. Envoy Thomas

LD2308195894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the national security department of the Republic of Croatia, received Ambassador Charles Redman, the outgoing special U.S. envoy for the former Yugoslavia, and his successor, Ambassador Charles Thomas, in Zagreb today. Here is the statement:

Hrvoje Sarinic briefed the U.S. envoys on the results of his visit to Knin on 5 August and the negotiations that took place there. I was not very optimistic, he said. However, we are now intensifying the pressure on the international community to have the talks resumed in a positive direction; otherwise it is obvious what will happen. I think Ambassador Thomas realizes the complexity of the problem, and I hope we will cooperate very closely in the future, Hrvoje Sarinic said after the talks.

Ambassador Redman said the international community had given its support to the territorial integrity and indivisibility of the Republic of Croatia in its borders. We are convinced it will be possible to reach satisfactory political solutions in the negotiations with Knin. I believe the Croatian Government will find the right way to solve the problem, Ambassador Redman said.

Ambassador Thomas expressed satisfaction with the talks he had had in the Republic of Croatia and said he believed their cooperation would be very successful.

Bosnia Minister Says Abdic To Be Tried

LD2308185594 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic arrived in Zagreb this afternoon. He also called on the people of Velika Kladusa to return to their homes.

[Begin Ljubijankic recording] A bloody and unnecessary episode of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has ended. Fikret Abdic, who is definitely a quisling, has been defeated. The negative consequence is that several thousand refugees have been manipulated, and are still waiting on the Serb-controlled territory in Croatia.

We are very satisfied with the Croatian Government's stand on this problem and with its good cooperation in attempts to return the refugees to their homes. It is very important that these people understand—and this is my message to them as my countrymen—that nobody in Europe wants them as refugees, that Europe is full of our refugees. On the other hand, full safety is guaranteed to them and their property in their homes. They should go back to their homes. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will not go back on its word.

It is an obligation of the ministries of defense and internal affairs to guarantee safety to all people who return to Velika Kladusa. We will thus put an end to this bloody and unnecessary part of our struggle and turn to other, concrete issues.

As regards Fikret Abdic, he is definitely excommunicated from the Bosnian people and will definitely have to be tried, to answer before the court for his crimes and treason.

My message to the Croatian public is that we are still counting on full cooperation of the Croatian authorities, of the kind we have had so far. We would like to thank them for coping successfully with the unnecessary wave of refugees. [end recording]

Deputy Prime Minister Discusses Refugee Problem

LD2308155894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic by correspondent Jadranka Kosor; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kosor] Mr. Kostovic, are there any indications that the refugees from western Bosnia are beginning to return home?

[Kostovic] No, there are no indications of a large-scale return despite the guarantees given by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the stances of the Republic of Croatia. But we expect that later the refugees will reconsider their situation and fully understand the information, and they will understand that their return is the best solution to the refugee crisis.

Regarding the numbers, there are fewer than it appeared yesterday when we added up the refugees coming along the three roads of evacuation. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], and some of our reports, there are between 23,000 and 25,000 people in the area, either in camps in Batnog and Staro Selo or around 3,000 people waiting in the open near Turanj. [passage omitted]

[Kosor] We have heard that the refugees near Turanj are demanding that the Croatian Government allow them transit through our country on the way to third countries.

[Kostovic] Most refugees, especially those around Turanj, want that, but there is a certain procedure for that. Everyone knows that they must have a specific guarantee from the third country, to prove that their transit really is a transit. The rules for that are known and we will stick by them.

[Kosor] Mr. Kostovic, are there any pressures today from international factors for those people to be allowed to enter the free territory of the Republic of Croatia?

[Kostovic] Everything seems to be alright with those with whom we have reached agreements. UNPROFOR, the UNCHR, the ICRC, our office for refugees, and all humanitarian organizations are working together to provide temporary accommodation in the UN Protected Areas. There will certainly be pressures, from our public as well, especially since the political leaders of those people have asked for pressure to be exerted on the Croatian Government. The pressure is expected to be increased, but for the time being there are no changes in the Croatian Government's decision.

Martic Stresses Plight of Muslim Refugees

LD2308172794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1634 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Knin, 23 Aug (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], sent a letter to the UN secretary general today, warning him that unless international institutions take urgent and comprehensive action, the Muslims who have found shelter in the RSK could suffer a humanitarian catastrophe.

Martic recalls that in the RSK territory there are around 60,000 Muslims who have fled before the terror spread by the units of the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina army, whose soldiers, according to eyewitness accounts, are shooting everyone in sight.

"On behalf of the RSK authorities, and personally, I appeal to you to appreciate the gravity of the situation in which the RSK has found itself when it accepted such a large number of refugees in such a small area," the letter from the RSK president says and recalls that over the past three years Krajina has sheltered around 200,000 refugees expelled by the Croatian authorities.

Commenting on the problem of the survival of the fresh refugees, Martic stresses that without the immediate involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] and the UNHCR, the position of the Muslim refugees could become unbearable.

Some 20,000 refugees are in the open, without water, food, medicines, or sanitary facilities, and the RSK authorities are making huge efforts to improve their conditions, the letter says.

Martic recalls UN Security Council Resolution 820 which unjustly imposed sanctions on the RSK, so that it is practically impossible to import even humanitarian goods into Krajina and distribute them to the refugees.

"In this situation, if relevant international organizations fail to initiate urgent and comprehensive action, we can expect a humanitarian catastrophe descending on the Muslim refugees," the letter to Butrus-Ghali says.

The RSK president demands that Butrus-Ghali personally use his influence in taking urgent and necessary steps to provide aid by international organizations to the RSK authorities. He stressed that the ICRC and UNHCR involvement in the past three days has resulted in providing only one tank of drinking water.

RSK Army Staff Issues Communique on Refugees

LD2308214394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1931 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Knin, 23 August (TANJUG)—The information service of the general staff of the Serb Krajina army issued a communique this evening saying that three elderly men, who fled to the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] along with a great number of people from the autonomous province of western Bosnia before the advance of the Fifth Corps loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, have died.

The communique says that four babies have been born among the refugees.

By 1800 this evening 45,800 refugees from the autonomous province of western Bosnia were registered as staying on the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina, though their current living conditions are still alarming, especially as the international humanitarian organizations have been very little involved in providing care for these people, the communique says.

The death of the refugees is in connection with Croatia's failure to allow the seriously ill who cannot be treated in the RSK to enter Croatia.

According to the ISKRA news agency, military and civilian authorities in Banija and Kordun are expecting a fresh wave of refugees, given the brutality displayed by the army loyal to Izetbegovic.

The information service of general staff of the Serb Krajina army has not yet confirmed the news carried around 1700 this afternoon by AFP that the units of the Fifth Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army had left Velika Kladusa and withdrawn to the barracks.

UNPROFOR Violation of UNSC Resolution

94BA0383C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 94 p 21

[Interview with Milivoj Tomas, head of the Office for Relations With UNPROFOR and the EU Observer Mission, by Boris Komadina: "UNPROFOR Is Pretending To Be Deaf"]

[Text] *The more than 1,000 metric tons of fuel taken to the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia during May and June 1994 by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and paid for by UNHCR were taken in accordance with the plan of Mr. Akashi and his colleagues, without the knowledge of the Republic of Croatia.*

[Komadina] How would you comment on the displaced persons' accusations that the government is also indirectly participating in supplying, i.e., smuggling, provisions to the occupied areas?

[Tomas] I don't know who, on behalf of the Community of Displaced Persons, accused the Croatian Government of indirectly participating in supplying the rebels, and smuggling provisions to the occupied areas of Croatia.

One thing is certain: The Croatian Government is not participating in any way in supplying and smuggling provisions to the occupied areas.

The Croatian authorities are continuously taking steps and monitoring the delivery of goods to the occupied areas. Also monitored is the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the UN Protected Areas [UNPA's] of the Republic of Croatia, for which we have sent rules to all the humanitarian organizations. The stories about the government's involvement in supplying the rebels and the alleged smuggling to the occupied areas are malicious, and are told by irresponsible persons.

The more than 1,000 tons of fuel taken to the occupied areas of Croatia during May and June 1994 by UNPROFOR and paid for by UNHCR were taken in accordance with the plan of Mr. Akashi and his colleagues, without the knowledge of the Croatian Government.

The fuel was turned over to the Serbs, and they carried out the distribution according to their own plan. The Croats who live in the UNPA's did not receive any of the stated amount of fuel that was allegedly intended for humanitarian needs, for agricultural work. We have raised that problem to a higher level, through several channels. We involved the Sanctions Committee in it, and they helped us to uncover the entire problem.

[Komadina] Couldn't it have been prevented?

[Tomas] How could we have prevented it if we did not know what they were doing? It was all done illegally. We found out about it later on, when it had already been done. We know, however, that they planned to continue to do it, but now it has been stopped, after we exposed them. Even before the displaced persons' protests began, we made the decision that all international humanitarian organizations should be monitored, and that rules would be set for delivering aid to the occupied areas. First of all, we have to determine precisely how many inhabitants there are in the occupied areas, and how many of them should be assisted. We cannot ban the delivery of humanitarian aid, but we can say, for example, that there are not 10,000 people there who need assistance, but rather 5,000.

[Komadina] Is it known, for example, how much oil UNPROFOR in Croatia needs per month?

[Tomas] With respect to the amounts of fuel needed to conduct the mission of the UN (UNPROFOR, UNICEF, UNHCR, and so forth), it is difficult to give any answer, since every day there are more and more UN personnel on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore also more and more vehicles (combat and passenger vehicles, trucks...).

In the first six months of 1994, the UN purchased from INA about 40,000 tons of fuel for Sector East. The UN occasionally imports fuel from Hungary.

[Komadina] I assume that the oil well in occupied Djeletovci is still in operation?

[Tomas] The rebel Serbs are still extracting oil from Djeletovci. They built a pipeline to the former Yugoslav pipeline and that oil is going toward Pancevo. We sent a full report, which INA prepared, through Ambassador Napolitano to the Sanctions Committee in New York and they have been informed of all the details. It is hard to give a real answer as to why UNPROFOR is not doing anything when we have been persistently reminding it of this for two years now. They pretend to be deaf. Now, however, a different question could be raised. How large are those amounts of oil in Djeletovci, and are they more or less than the humanitarian minimum required for the occupied area of Croatia?

[Komadina] In direct contacts with you, how do UNPROFOR leaders explain the smuggling conducted by their employees?

[Tomas] During our talks the UNPROFOR leaders first demand evidence, and when they are given evidence about certain actions by UN personnel, as a rule we rarely receive a response in spite of all our attempts.

With respect to the participation of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and the Red Cross in supplying the rebel Serbs in the UNPA's, I must say that none of them have a mandate for that task, but we know that they are doing it in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 820, especially Article 12. It gives conditional penalties for the occupied areas of Croatia: Thus, if the Serbs in the occupied area want imports and exports, they have to contact the Croatian authorities. We also issued a decree in that regard. Naturally, the Serbs never contacted us, but UNPROFOR, in cooperation with UNHCR and others, is organizing the violation of the UN Security Council resolution. The case of this oil shows that very clearly.

Achievements of 9th Guard Brigade Outlined

94BA0384B Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 94 pp 23-25

[Article by Vesna Puljak: "Units of the Croatian Army: The Lika Artillerymen Are Heard Far and Wide"]

[Text] When a shell gets lodged, and in the heat of battle the soldier tries to remove it from the mortar, which is still red hot, what more can you say about their determination, motivation, and patriotism? And this happened, although shells were falling all around, but they did not hesitate, hide, or flee, but on the contrary, a strong desire drove them to fire as many shells as possible as accurately as possible toward the target. That is the character of the gunners of the 9th Guards Brigade, that is the character of the Lika "Wolves," who know nothing about shrinking from combat action, because they have been driven by an immense desire to defend what is ours, what is Croatian.

There have been many changes from the first mortars, improvised to the extreme and without target sights, and the untrained people, to today's gunners. When the garrisons of the former JA [Yugoslav Army] in Gospic and Karlovac were captured and a large number of guns and ammunition were taken, the gunners assumed considerable importance at a time of the most intensive enemy attacks. Among the numerous actions in which they took part, the Maslenica and Medak Pocket actions are fresh in the memory; there, the gunners' accuracy should be especially emphasized. They have not forgotten that in support of the Medak Pocket action they destroyed an enemy communications center with a direct hit, causing real chaos on the other side. As well it might, because a few moments later a second shell struck the same target with the same 100-percent accuracy. There is no need to even mention the enthusiasm of the gunners, which, they say, is something that can be experienced only in the field. It is no wonder, then, that after performing missions like that the enemy position fell silent and almost died out. When the people of Gospic hear their artillery, they need nothing more than the confidence and pride guaranteed them by their gunners.

Today, when some kind of loose peace prevails on the Lika battle front, because you never know when the enemy is going to fire off a few, the most important thing is to use the time to gain new knowledge, to master equipment, and to train, both mentally and physically. They know how important this is, because the more ready they are, the more confidence they have in themselves. The work is organized by batteries, so that every soldier knows his place, and the thing that is important to emphasize is that they all have to go through training for every task concerning the weapon. Gun crew members, if anyone is wounded, must be ready to fill the vacancy. Although gunners are not directly exposed on the battle line, every mine and shell is just as dangerous for them as for the infantrymen. That is why the positions have been prepared by the engineers, protected, and camouflaged. Although they have not suffered large casualties, only one wounded member, they emphasize that every man is important and necessary, both as an individual and for the artillery as a whole. And they are particularly esteemed by the infantry units, because the gunners bring about the conditions for them to operate and furnish them direct support.

Today, the Lika "Wolves" have been strengthened with fresh young forces that have arrived from the conscript army to supplement their knowledge in a professional brigade. Their commanders have matured in the homeland war and gained their knowledge and practice in actual combat.

Artillerymen have always distinguished themselves in their sense of community and aid, especially at combat positions. And they themselves are aware that the safety of the crew on the gun depends on every individual. Every gunner knows why they are there, and that is why there are no disciplinary problems either on the position or in training. Discipline is sacred for them, they say. And they add that their relationship is solidly based on trust and friendship, which can be changed only by the situation on the battlefield, when the ties are still stronger.

They say that 20-km marches with full battle gear are an integral part of training, and that is a reason why they have not gotten to know the commander, Captain Darko Sebrek. Assistant Commander Ivan Sokolic mentions that in addition to the marches, the training plan also includes a complete soldier training system, from motor function drills and infantry training to final training on artillery pieces. They do not lack for practice. There are always new things to assimilate, especially concerning the tactics of combat action. They know that the enemy artillery cannot be trusted, because they can issue a challenge at any moment, but that is yet another reason for being as well-organized and prepared as possible. Nevertheless, what the enemy artillery was at the beginning is now only mentioned, because as ours has developed, their shells have become rarer and rarer and quieter and quieter.

The sound vibrations during firing are not a pleasant event at all, but you will rarely see a gunner wearing antisound ear protectors. And they will tell you why—during combat, in the heat of battle, one loses a sense of everything that is secondary. It is important to be as effective and precise as possible. And the range of enemy shells is easier to estimate. They will tell you what importance is given to maintenance of equipment, because the effectiveness and usability of the equipment itself depend on that.

With the signing of the Zagreb agreement, the Lika gunners have been withdrawn from contact areas and deployed at the appropriate distance depthwise, which they did even before the deadline. But one fact they never forget, which is that the enemy army has violated all the agreements up to now, and so they are still cautious. And if a solution to this tangled situation cannot be achieved through negotiation, they will be forced to take back what has been occupied using weapons as their argument, and in that case, the gunners say, they have a great mission, as they have had so many times before. If the order comes to move out, all the batteries are ready, the positions have been fortified, every movement of the enemy army is being monitored. Nothing can catch them unawares or surprise them, they say. They have enough equipment, they have more knowledge than they did before, and with the new personnel who have gone through training in the centers for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, they are still better, stronger, and more resolved.

And when obligations allow them brief moments of rest, they find time even for a little soccer on an improvised playing field, for jokes, or for casual conversation while someone plays a guitar.

Let it be known that the war has not changed them, but that they are ready in a moment to become superb warriors if the enemy shells force them to do that.

Third Anniversary of 111th Brigade Marked

94BA0384A Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 94 pp 14-15

[Article by Gordan Lausic: "Organization of the Croatian Army: Third Anniversary of the 'Rijeka Dragons'"]

[Text] Donje Pazariste, a small town in Lika not far from Klanac, was on Saturday, 2 July, host to the main celebration of the third anniversary of organization of the "Rijeka Dragons," the 111th Brigade. In the presence of numerous guests, among them Josip Bursic and Bruno Ottchiano, deputy zupans of Primorje-Goranje Zupanija, Milan Jurkovic, deputy zupan of Lika-Senj Zupanija, Brigadier Zeljko Prpic, deputy commander of the Gospic Corps District, representatives of the offices of defense of the cities of Rijeka, Senj, Pag, Crikvenica, and Rab, and Brigadiers Sergio Rabar and Frano Primorac, the people who established the 111th Brigade and went with it into its first battles, the ceremonies began with a formation of the brigade's units, and then the members of the "Dragons" and their guests were addressed by Nikola Skunca, commander of the 111th Brigade, who recalled the brigade's battle career and successes.

"The 111th Brigade was the backbone of the defense of western Croatia, it made an important contribution on the battlefield of eastern Slavonia as well, and its regiments were everywhere they were needed. The members of this brigade, which we can safely say is legendary, and which at the same time was the first Rijeka brigade, who went to defense of the homeland at the very outset of the homeland war, led by Brig. Sergio Rabar, achieved important battle victories in defending not only Rijeka, their own city, the islands, and other areas of the Primorje-Goranje Zupanija, but also Otocac, Gospic, Brlog, Dreznica, Vratnik, and many other towns in Lika threatened by the aggression of Serbian expansionism," Commander Nikola Skunca said, and he continued: "Today, the brigade's main task is training conscripts, and it deserves praise for the figure that more than 4,000 soldiers have confirmed their military knowledge and skill in the 111th Brigade, and if the occupied areas are not liberated in a peaceful way, they will continue the struggle for the liberation of every foot of Croatia, which was initiated by the first volunteers in what then was the 111th Brigade of the National Guard Corps [ZNG]." Brig. Zeljko Prpic, deputy commander of the Gospic Corps District, then spoke, congratulating all the former and present members of the 111th and stressing the importance of the brigade's existence, because without it the Gospic Corps District would not have displayed the combat readiness it has at this moment. "The members of the 111th Brigade of the Croatian Army [HV] still face a great responsibility, this time not only the responsibility of defending the homeland, but also the responsibility of training the young army, which it has been doing, and must do in a knowledgeable and effective way."

Rijeka, as the home city of the 111th Brigade, has given exceptional aid to the Lika region, Brig. Prpic continued, and he thanked the people of Rijeka and all the members of the "Dragons," because without their contribution at certain moments in Lika's defense, Lika, the backbone of the Croatian state, would have had difficulty surviving.

The members of the 111th Brigade and their guests were also greeted at the central celebration by Mr. Milan Jurkovic, deputy zupan of Lika and Senj, who congratulated the members of the brigade on their third anniversary and expressed confidence that their contribution to defense of the Republic of Croatia will continue in the future, that the soldiers of the 111th Brigade will certainly continue to perform honorably as they have up to now, making Rijeka and the Primorje-Goranje Zupanija proud. Mr. Josip Bursic, deputy zupan of Primorje-Goranje Zupanija, also expressed gratitude to the commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the "Rijeka Dragons," emphasizing the merit of those who at the very beginning of the military operations realized that the coastal region and Rijeka had to be defended in Lika.

At the conclusion of the gathering, those present were also addressed by Monsignor Dinko Popovic, coordinator of pastoral care of the Croatian Army for the Rijeka-Senj Archepiscopate, who called for God's blessing, prayed for members of the brigade, and called upon all present to take part in the great pilgrimage of the Croatian Army on the Feast of the Assumption to the shrine of Our Lady of Krasno.

The central celebration of the third anniversary of the establishment and organization of the 111th Brigade was concluded with a rich cultural and artistic program that included numerous stars from Primorje-Goranje and Lika-Senj Zupanijas.

Role of 116th Brigade in Southern Battlefield

94BA0384C Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 94 pp 26-28

[Article by Vesna Puljak: "Units of the Croatian Army: "The Neretva Is Still Flowing"]

[Text] Deep in the hills of the southern theater, on the harsh bare rocky ground bathed in the hot June sunshine, only the stunted plants and vipers are accustomed to the baking heat. Among them are fighters, the brave lads of the 116th Neretva Brigade, who long ago became accustomed to the inhospitable nature and all the difficulties which summer and winter make for them. Without even counting the summers they have behind them, they are continuing the tradition of the Neretva corsairs, guarding a portion of the southern borders of Croatia.

Natives of Metkovic, Ploce, and Opuzen, they are the very ones on which the enemy steel shattered when it dared to move into the Neretva Valley, which is their home. Their war began long ago, and the danger is still present, but it is no longer so close to their valley. And that is why, as they endure what is now the fourth summer of war, they have something to look back on and much to be proud of.

The unit's chronicle will note that in the summer and fall of 1991 three regiments were established: the 1st Metkovic Regiment on 28 June, the 2d Regiment, headquartered in Opuzen, in early October, and the 3d Ploce Regiment in November, and then the order came to attach them to the 116th Brigade on 17 November 1991. But the organization of units in the Neretva Valley dates back even earlier. The first armed unit was established in Metkovic on 1 June, at a time when it bore the name of an action company of the ZNG [National Guard Corps]. That unit had its first fire skirmishes in September 1991 and has earned ever higher esteem with successive actions for which it has been commended. Operating independently at the outset, it recorded in its war diary the actions of liberating Cepikuce, Slano, and the city of Dubrovnik itself, together with other units of the Croatian Army [HV]. Beginning in December, the company was part of the 1st Regiment of the 116th Brigade, and on 13 January 1993 it became a part of the 4th Guards Brigade and immediately took part in Operation Maslenica and liberation of the Zadar hinterland.

All the armed units from the area of the Neretva Valley made their full contribution during that summer of war in an action that was extremely important at the time. This was to capture the warehouse for arms and military equipment in Male Bare, the first warehouse that was taken in Croatia, and the Ploce Garrison. This occurred on the night of 14 September 1991, and fortunately the mission was carried out effectively and quickly and was completed more than successfully with minimum casualties, although they were pounded by enemy gunboats and aircraft. Then the HV had in its hands the immense number of guns then needed for all those units being created. From that time forward, the 116th Brigade operated as a far stronger and better-organized unit, and it could begin to plan and organize auxiliary units.

The first official departure from the territory of Metkovic Opcina on the southern battle line took place in early November 1991, and from that time to this the 116th Brigade has been in that area without interruption. They describe as the most difficult period in their war career the time from the end of 1991 to the summer of 1992, that is, up to the moment when the Croatian south was liberated, when they stopped on the line where they are today. They emphasize that Colonel Nedeljko Obradovic deserves the most credit for organizing the 116th Brigade, of which he was also the first commander. After him, command of the brigade was taken over by Col. Ivan Beneta, and in March 1993, Col. Josko Dragovic, who still commands the brigade today.

Many Zagreb, Slavonian, and Dalmatian brigades have come to that area and left, but the 116th has been here since the first time it went into the field, says Corvette Captain Dane Rendulic, the brigade's chief of staff, without denying the role of any one of them in liberating the Neretva Valley, especially the 1st, 2d, and 4th Guards. We can confidently say that Metkovic, Slano, Cepikuce, Ston, Imotic, Topolo...all the way to the westernmost Dubrovnik line, have been defended by all of Croatia. And the 116th Air Defense Brigade has more than once downed important enemy aircraft attacking the area of the valley and Metkovic. In the period of the most frequent enemy attacks, about six aircraft were downed, and one was downed by an automatic rifle in the steady hand of Blasko Mijic.

We must also emphasize the role of the city of Metkovic, which has been the point of departure and logistical base for all the units, and in the very early days we cannot fail to mention the support of the city's civilian structures and of Ante Krsticevic, chairman of the Crisis Management Staff, and Ivo Marget, president of the opstina, who is today the mayor.

Although the brigade mainly consists of natives of Metkovic, Opuzen, and Ploce, there are quite a few who come from the near and far vicinity. The figure of 4,500 men who have been members of the brigade confirms the fact that there are very few who have not made their contribution to defense of their home. Nor did they forget to mention the care given to their wounded fellow fighters and the families of the defenders who were killed.

The 2d Regiment is in the field at the moment, unrelenting vigilance on the battle line being guaranteed by a revolving replacement of the regiments. We arrived at the camp of the 2d Regiment by a dusty macadam road that took us 7,000 meters above sea level. In the rocky encampment, which has been adapted to the maximum for a comfortable stay, we found Lieutenant Ante Brljevic, commander of the 2d Company of the 2d Regiment, solving current problems. There is no great amount of free time here, because there are fighters on one of the nearby peaks. The only way to supply them the water and food and everything else they need is by packhorse. Even here, they are not without women, although they are few and are assigned to the medical service, and for entertainment there are two lively little puppies who have had milk only from a bottle.

And again hardly able to see the vicinity because of the dust that has been raised, we set off for the command of the 2d Regiment, where we were met by Capt. Josko Tosic, its commander, with a few of his associates. In the field the demands are great, and the missions strenuous, but they mentioned that for a year now there has been no enemy artillery action of any great intensity. They recalled how on precisely this day last year the enemy, celebrating St. Vitus' Day, operated against our positions. But now it is still too hot, they said in jest, and if they are repeating that this year, they expect it at twilight. Although for now an apparent peace prevails, referred to in soldier's slang as "fajt," they are ready. The line is very well fortified, the HV holds dominant positions in this area. Now, when the sun gets hot, they think that it is nevertheless easier to take in the wintertime, but those who have several wartime winters and summers behind them in these hills will not agree. You do not know when it is tougher, when the rocks melt or when they burst from the cold. And when the rocks get hot the vipers and adders crawl out and you can see them at every step. But the brigade has a remedy even for that. They will tell you that there are snakes, but they also have a snake specialist. He is a member of the scouts, and his nom de guerre is Stula. He says he has never encountered more snakes than here. When he catches them, he puts them in a pan over the fire and anyone who wants to try is welcome. He was even bitten by one, but it did not affect him. "That is the kind of scouts we have, Stula and Kina and Sibenik...they are ready for anything," says Capt. Kresimir Zilic, assistant commander. And while it is almost a desert around them, the tanks of water are close at hand and the power plant and the TV, so they make the time go faster, at least now during the World Cup matches. Commander Tosic also adds that these are all excellent fighters who are performing in the field all the missions assigned them.

Yet another farewell to the tireless warriors, and again we go into the dust which has made our vehicle almost unrecognizable, to round out the visit. In the brigade's command headquarters, yet another meeting and conversation with Col. Josko Dragovic, brigade commander, and Corvette Capt. Dane Rendulic, chief of staff, to fill in the blanks and assure ourselves once again that in defense of the southern borders of Croatia the fighters of the 116th are occupying a distinguished place. With military succinctness, with no extra words, Commander Dragovic said: "There is no relaxation on the front. Our artillery is on the alert 24 hours a day. At a signal from the superior command, we are ready to open fire from all available weapons in a moment." Now, when there is a dead period at the front, they are not forgetting the families of their fellow fighters who were killed and their wounded. Aside from visiting them regularly, they organize humanitarian concerts, they have all contributed one day of field pay for those who were killed, and they always help wherever they can. But when you ask in casual conversation when this nightmare will be over, the commander says half in jest and half seriously: "When this is over, it will end the way we want it—in a free Croatia in its internationally recognized borders."

Foreign Ministry Protests Greek Air Violation

LD2308143894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1418 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Skopje, 23 Aug (TANJUG)—The Ministry for Foreign Relations in Skopje today lodged a protest note to the Greek Foreign Ministry over a Greek plane violating the airspace over the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia].

The Greek plane entered Macedonian airspace around 0900 today near the Marko's Leg watchtower, it circled over the area and flew back to Greek airspace.

The Macedonian Ministry for Foreign Relations has reported the incident to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and the CSCE in Skopje.

Survey Shows Gligorov Most Trustworthy Politician

AU2408090894 Skopje MIC in English 23 Aug 94

["Poll Conducted by the Brima Agency—Associate Member of Gallup"—MIC headline]

[Text]

Ten Most Popular Politicians in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]

I have confidence in:	Yes	No	Do Not Know
Kiro Gligorov	77	14	9
Vasil Tupurkovski	44	41	15
Stojan Andov	41	45	14
Branko Crvenkovski	40	41	19
Ljubomir Frckovski	40	48	12
Vlado Popovski	34	44	22
Stevo Crvenkovski	33	47	20
Todor Petrov	33	52	15
Petar Gosev	32	53	16
Nikola Popovski	24	51	25

It is evident that the politician with the most credibility in Macedonia is Kiro Gligorov. According to the research, 97 percent of those who put their trust in him will vote for SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], the LP [Liberal Party], and the SPM [Socialist Party of Macedonia]. The same sentiment is also shared by 80 percent of those who would vote for VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], 77 percent of those for DP [Democratic Party], and 36 percent of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] voting body.

According to social groups, the clerks and intelligentsia (88 and 86 percent of them) hold the highest percentage of trust in him, while the private businessmen trust him the least (62 and 68 percent of the students). In terms of percentage, persons over 65 years of age have the most trust in Gligorov, 84 percent of them, as opposed to those aged between 25 and 39 years of age—71 percent. The ethnic background also has an influence on the confidence in the president. Hence, from the Macedonians polled, 90 percent have a positive opinion regarding the confidence in the president, 96 percent for the other nationalities, although also 35 percent of the Albanians.

Although politically inactive for two years, Vasil Tupurkovski holds the high second spot in the rating of the politicians, in which greater trust is given to figures who are positively oriented toward the parliament and the government. The party orientation of the citizens shows that the people who would vote for the opposition—68 percent believe in Tupurkovski to a much greater extent than the sympathizers of the coalition (62 percent of the SDSM, 42 percent of SPM, and 6 percent of PDP and NDP [People's Democratic Party].

According to social groups, the higher percentage of sympathizers of Tupurkovski come from the ranks of the intelligentsia (61 percent), while least from the farm workers (36 percent), while there are not any greater age differences, which, on the other hand, is evident with the ethnic groups: 57 percent of the Macedonians trust Tupurkovski, contrary to 5 percent of the Albanians.

The third place on the list is held by Stojan Andov. Of the sympathizers of the political parties, he has the most devoted followers among his own Liberals (83 percent of them), followed by SDSM (71 percent), and SPM (51 percent). Of the opposition, those who would vote for the Democratic Party have the least confidence in Andov, but on the other hand, the rating that he has with VMRO-DPMNE (41.6 percent) and PDP-NDP (18.5 percent) is high in comparison with the other politicians on the list, and even surprising, seeing that as the top man in parliament he gets the most remarks precisely from these parties.

From the fifth spot in the November rating, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski jumps to the fourth place in the June rating. According to the trust of the citizens in the institutions, mainly those who have confidence in the Government are linked with him (76 percent) while in the same percentage (66 percent) also those who have their trust vested in the Parliament and the politicians. In terms of party orientation, those who would vote for the party whose present he is have the most trust in Crvenkovski (77 percent) of the sympathizers of SDSM.

Contrary to this indicator is the percentage of VMRO-DPMNE voters, who, nonetheless, have 39 percent confidence in him. The sympathizers of the other parties from the coalition are somewhere between these two figures, while the PDP supporters (15 percent) have the lest confidence in the Prime Minister. In terms of age, Crvenkovski enjoys more respect with the older generation than with those under 40 years of age.

Further down the list ate the Minister of the Interior Ljubomir Frckovski and the Minister of Defense Vlado Popovski, followed by the representatives of the opposition, the independent deputy Todor Petrov and the leader of the opposition Petar Gosev.

From the aspect of the social group that they belong to, the largest percentage of the intelligentsia and the private businessmen put their trust in the representatives of the opposition, with the exception of minister Frckovski, who enjoys higher trust than the other members of the opposition.

Otherwise, the older generation, over 65 years of age has greater confidence in the position [government], while the younger people, between 25 and 60 years, give their trust to Gosev. With Petrov, the age limit is between 55 and 64 years.

Brima assesses that from November last year until June this year, the average expressed confidence in the politicians has dropped 4 percent, while the non-confidence has increased 2 percent in average.

Military Equipment Destined for Iran Seized

LD2308153994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1307 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Ljubljana, 23 Aug (TANJUG)—Slovene military equipment seized at Vienna airport was manufactured by the Ljubljana-based Iskra-Elektronika factory for the Iranian armed forces, a TANJUG correspondent has learned in Ljubljana.

According to Slovene military experts and constructors employed by Iskra, the equipment in question is an EFCS-3 system for electronic firing control of the U.S. M-60 tanks.

Optical electronic equipment was sold to the Iranian Army despite the international arms embargo imposed on arms deliveries to Iran.

There have been no official reactions in Ljubljana to the report about the seizure of $10 million worth of Slovene military equipment in Vienna. Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky personally informed Slovene President Milan Kucan about this during a meeting of central European presidents in Alpbach.

Slovene media warns today that this is the third international scandal involving Slovenia over the past few years, after arms smuggling to Croatia and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the confusion involving military equipment at the Greek border. According to DELO, Slovenia is becoming an arms smuggler and the reputation of the state is being undermined for the sake of a few million dollars.

Official Defends Shipment

AU2308160994

[Editorial Report] Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene in its 1330 newscast on 23 August carries several reactions to the news that the Austrian customs officers seized a cargo of Slovene fire control systems destined for Iran.

As the radio says "the Austrian side maintains that the exporter—the Fotona, formerly Iskra Elektrooptika, enterprise—did not have all the necessary export permits demanded by the Austrian Law on Military Hardware." However, as the radio continues to report, the head of the Slovene Customs Directorate Franc Kosir says in a telephone interview given to this station that the cargo consisted of "10 fire control systems," which are not classified as "arms" but as "military equipment" for which "the so-called LB [expansion unknown] regime, that is, the free export regime" applies. Kosir emphasizes that although no Defense Ministry permit is needed for the export of systems, "the original customs declaration also includes Defense Ministry permission." When asked by a reporter whether this kind of trade is contrary to the "embargo on military equipment for Iran," Kosir replies that this is not an issue on which he should comment, but reiterates that "the goods were classified correctly according to the customs tariffs and we have made no mistake in the customs procedure."

Defense Ministry State Secretary Bojan Suligoj comments on the entire affair as follows: "Our electronic equipment manufacturer Iskra Elektrooptika requested Defense Ministry approval for the export of its articles toward the end of 1991. The Defense Ministry issued a permit for the export of the fire control systems on 17 January 1992, which was signed by Minister Janez Jansa. This permission was issued for all trade with foreign partners. Whether this is equipment than kills or not is a subject of wider discussion." As Suligoj says, because the permission was issued, "the deal is not controversial and the conflict at Vienna airport could have occurred earlier because deals of this nature have definitely taken place and are still taking place worldwide." Reporter Veselinovic asks Suligoj to comment on this trade in the light of the arms embargo for Iran by "some Western states." Suligoj replies that "Iskra Elektrooptika made this deal in 1991" and the arms embargo for Iran has been in force only recently, and said "I believe that there is nothing controversial in this case."

The director of Fotona enterprise, Alenka Rozaj Brvar, says that "this news has taken us by surprise. There has been a lot of disinformation and lies. Because of the obligation that we have toward our customers, I would not venture into more elaborate commentaries. I must emphasize that, until now, we have received no official information about any complications with any of our cargo. We trade with countries worldwide. We are not an arms manufacturer, but a manufacturer of high technology equipment that is used for surveillance and for other electro-optical purposes. Austria is only one of the countries though we which we regularly ship our articles. Therefore, this was nothing extraordinary."

When reporter Veselinovic protests that "this is nevertheless evidently military equipment since you applied for the permission of the Defense Ministry," Brvar retorts that "this is technological equipment that can also be used for military purposes. Because we apply for all the necessary permits for all our cargoes as a matter of rule, we also sought the permission of the Ministry of Defense in this case, which we naturally obtained."

Krsko Nuclear Power Station To Be Rehauled

AU1908200194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Text] At 1800 this afternoon, the Krsko nuclear power station will start shutting down for a rehaul. By midnight it will have been completely disconnected from the electricity grid. This time, (?the rehaul) is planned to last until the end of September. [Words indistinct] time, the nuclear (?fuel) will not be replaced. As consumers of the electricity, both the Slovene and Croatian electricity generation companies have paid their dues relatively regularly, so the funds needed for the rehaul have been obtained.

In the first seven months of this year, Krsko produced 2.8 billion kWh of electricity, which is 11 percent more than planned.

Semiannual Economic Results Favorable

94BA0377A Maribor VECER in Slovene 28 Jul 94 p 5

[Article by Irena Ferluga: "Revaluation or Devaluation?"]

[Text] *Favorable picture of semiannual economic activity: What next? The governor of the Bank of Slovenia advocates a restrictive monetary policy; will importers or exporters "win"?*

The Slovene economy's semiannual results indicate marked signs of revival, and on that occasion the prime minister even predicted a 4-percent growth in the gross social product. Economists immediately split into two camps: feasible and unfeasible, they commented. Dr. Joze Mencinger is in the first camp, but he is adding the word "if"—"If there are no unforeseen events," he said.

The day before yesterday the economic part of the government met behind closed doors, and the State Assembly president's collegium met in the evening; yesterday the entire State Assembly met, and probably had different concerns as well as the issue of a possible revaluation. It was learned that the members of the economic part of the government talked primarily about economic policy in the second half of the year, and the exchange rate for the tolar. It seems that we have achieved a crossroads, when it will be necessary to decide again which direction to steer the monetary ship in. This is indicated by the level of the foreign exchange reserves, which reached $1.9839 billion at the end of May (approximately $700 million more than last May), as the exchange rates of foreign currencies have been persuading us for a full month now: the exchange office rate, which has even slightly declined, the enterprise rate, and the official one, which are considerably slowing growth, while foreign exchange revenues have increased drastically. Finally, this is also indicated by the foreign exchange trade surpluses.

Until now, Dr. France Arhar, governor of the Bank of Slovenia, has insisted firmly on a restrictive monetary policy, i.e., he has opposed administrative interventions to control (lower) inflation and the floating exchange rate of the domestic currency. Inflation is somewhat lower again this month, and amounts to 1.1 percent calculated from last month, but is still ranging around 20 percent at the annual level. The question is whether the governor will also remain firm now, when there are intensified pressures from both sides: Exporters want a devaluation, but importers want a revaluation. Foreign currencies would become cheaper, and thus also imports. Back at the beginning of June he rejected any sort of administrative interventions in monetary policy, especially in exchange rate policy, and mentioned that the central bank has enough other instruments through which the central bank can (as it has in the past) effectively take care of strengthening the domestic currency and domestic liquidity—one of these ways is to issue securities. Revaluation of the domestic currency, with trade surpluses and sufficient foreign exchange reserves, is actually something normal—but provided that the exchange rate is fixed. From the very beginning, however, the Bank of Slovenia has been insisting on the policy of a floating (movable) exchange rate.

Federal

Slovene-Bosnian Arms Smuggling Connection

94BA0366C Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 94 pp 32-33

[Article by Svetlana Vasovic-Mekina: "The Slovene Deal of the Century: The Jansa-Cengic Axis"]

[Text] Nearly a year ago, a scandal broke out in Slovenia that is only now getting its epilogue with the interrogation of Hasan Cengic, representative of the Bosnian Government, in the Slovene parliament. That is, Janez Jansa, former defense minister, at one time made a spectacular revelation of 20 containers stored at the Maribor Airport containing more than 120 metric tons of arms; he called a hasty news conference and accused several officials of the VIS (the Slovene intelligence service at the time) and the manager of the airport of what was alleged to be private arms smuggling.

However, it soon became clear that all the key people in Slovene politics knew about this shipment of arms and that revealing the arms (which had become hung up at the airport because of the conflict between Croats and Muslims that flared up at that moment) was Jansa's most recent method of discrediting his political opponents. The accuracy of this has been demonstrated by the transcript of the questioning of Hasan Cengic, 36-year-old Bosnian diplomat, representative of the Defense Ministry, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the military industry, before a commission of the Slovene parliament. The Bosnian weekly LJILJAN was the first in Slovenia to obtain the transcript and publish it in its entirety.

Crown Witness

Hasan Cengic unambiguously confirmed at the very outset of the questioning that the arms that were found were the property of the Bosnian Government and that it was natural "for the Republic of Slovenia to aid Bosnia and Herzegovina on grounds of principle, for reasons of political wisdom, and out of respect for human rights and international justice." At the same time, Cengic expressed regret that the scandal had occurred, which has already cost Slovenia "several hundred million dollars," and he boasted that up to now he has been the "most disciplined Slovene on earth," because he had not whispered a word about the scandal, but he responded to the summons of the Slovene parliamentary commission because he wanted to help in resolving the situation. According to his further testimony, this unique form of aid at the request of the Bosnian government was approved and facilitated by the Slovene Government, and all the key people were informed about the transport of arms.

"Because even then I had very good contacts with the minister of internal affairs and with the civilian intelligence service of Slovenia, I went with this idea to the director (of the Slovene civilian intelligence service—author's note) and proposed that this be done in the most favorable way for us and for Slovenia. It was generally known in those institutions that we would be transporting arms along with humanitarian goods. Because relations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated at that time, it was difficult to transport the arms to our Territorial Defense.... In order to overcome the problem, we decided to establish an airlift from Maribor to the free territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the main reason why we decided on the Maribor Airport and an airport in general," Cengic explains. Asked with whom in particular was the agreement for this aid arranged, Cengic had an unambiguous answer. "The name of the director was Miha Brejc. We agreed that we would first start with the humanitarian goods, and then I said that we would try to include weapons inside." Aside from Miha Brejc, who at that time was director of the VIS, the other intelligence people also knew about this possibility, according to the statement of Hasan Cengic.

In addition, there were also "several other transports of arms over the territory of the Republic of Slovenia," but official contacts were maintained "through Mr. Bavcar, minister of internal affairs, who personally issued the visa, through Mr. Piber, and then through Messrs. Brejc and Predanic," while the collaboration with the Slovene Defense Ministry went through Andrej Lovsin, who headed Jansa's military intelligence service. Cengic denied earlier reports from the office of President Kucan that Slovenia had decided to make a gift of some of its arms to Bosnia because of the aggression against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Humanitarian Theft

"There was no gift from the Republic of Slovenia for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the answer. Everything was paid for. We paid for everything we took. The contract with the Ministry of Internal Affairs was made with Minister Bavcar, the operation went through Brejc and Predanic. In the Defense Ministry, we worked with Lovsin. We paid the Ministry of Internal Affairs in cash and without documents. The Defense Ministry was paid by other people, not me." The Bosnian Government gave Slovenia security for all these "little deals" and transactions in the form of its Bell helicopter, and according to what Cengic said, Jansa was the most difficult with whom to do business. Thus, Jansa offered the Bosnian Government as a receipt for various services performed a "piece of paper with '3.119 million German marks [DM]' written on it. I asked for the documentation to be completed and the price reduced, because it seemed to me too high, and the document was not complete. I asked for an invoice or to pay in cash. Mr. Jansa promised me that he would send the entire documentation to an address in Zagreb (which I gave him), along with the way in which we would pay for that. I have not received anything to this day." In short, because in this case it was a matter of an internationally prohibited transaction, the Bosnian Government almost the entire time paid for the arms taken without an invoice. Minister Jansa laconically responded to the Bosnian protest at the high prices by saying "that cannot be discussed." In addition to the deliveries described for the "troops of the Bosnian Government," Fikret Abdic also obtained several hundred rifles through Slovenia.

In addition to those already described, the Bosnians obtained substantial quantities of smuggled weapons through other nimble- and long-fingered connections in Slovenia. "We received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 3,000 and 3500 long-barrels and several hundred pistols. We paid between DM1.2 million and DM1.6 million for them. We received from the Defense Ministry goods for which we paid between DM1.2 million and DM2 million, plus this undefined claim. Jansa's figure mentioned earlier was reduced in the meantime by all of DM1 million, but no one knows why." The representatives of the Bosnian Government performed all the transactions without paperwork. "Because of the embargo and all the rest, we did not insist on documents. And you would have done the same in a similar situation," Hasan Cengic said in the down-to-earth conclusion of his testimony before members of the parliamentary commission, and then at the very end he said that those whom Janez Jansa publicly accused of smuggling arms were innocent. "The people in Maribor were real professionals. No one received a single dinar. They did only what their official duty called for. I think they are superb professionals and honest men."

Kucan's People

Cengic's testimony, of course, evoked numerous comments, but certainly the most interesting are those in the press close to Jansa; the daily DELO, for example, anxiously awaited Cengic's appearance before the Slovene authorities, but after his testimony, his story was judged to be "worthless," especially because he is a "foreigner who can say what he pleases"!

Former VIS director Brejc, who up to now has been rejecting charges that he knew anything about arms shipments, has in the meantime denied Hasan Cengic's testimony and confirmed that he is sticking to his own first version of the events, which is not really convincing. That version is also unlikely because of the statements of numerous police who testified in the trial that is still taking place in Maribor and confirmed that on several occasions Brejc personally prevented the regular police from inspecting helicopters with incriminating contents at the Maribor Airport.

The truth about the entire case is probably closer to the confession of the Bosnian arms merchant. For that matter, well-informed circles in the Slovene police also confirm the story. The arms shipments which originally went only through Jansa obviously became too expensive at some point (probably because of the high commissions), so that the organization was gradually taken over by the Interior Ministry. Only a few months later, when the first information about arms smuggling leaked out to the Slovene public, did Jansa simply "discover" the arms of the competitive dealers and blame the crime on his favorite scapegoat, known by the working title of "Kucan's people."

Today, it is clearer that Jansa in this way cut off the "Bosnian-Slovene connection," which had previously brought rich earnings to his ministry and quite possibly to him personally, for more than a year: This fact is also confirmed by sources of MLADINA in Ljubljana, according to whom the Bosnian Government spent more than DM36 million to obtain arms in all the transactions with Slovenia. DM30 million of this were paid to the so-called "informal group of merchants" (we know today that these were actually Jansa's associates, personnel of the Defense Ministry), who, in addition to official channels in the police and army, represented a "third source" for buying arms in Slovenia. At the same time, the amount "earned" by the sales of those weapons constitutes only one-tenth of the value of the entire Slovene transaction of the century, because a much larger quantity of arms was sold to Croatia. Where that money ended up, because it quite certainly is not in the Slovene budget, and what commissions were taken by the government tradesmen in debt working on their own account remains an open question. It is not out of the way to say that many of Jansa's friends and relatives have in the meantime built fine houses and restaurants, or on the other hand have leased certain attractive tourist facilities.... This is the epilogue of the story about the "unselfish" aid to the suffering brothers in the Bosnian tragedy. This was a fruitful fraternal friendship—worth nearly DM500 million.

Milosevic Blamed for Unresolved Kosovo Issue

94BA0366B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jul 94 pp 14-16

[Interview with Momcilo Trajkovic, former Serbian deputy prime minister, by Biserka Matic; place and date not given: "The Gambler Throwing Away the Last Chance"]

[Text] Along with Kosta Bulatovic, Tomislav Sekulic, Miroslav Solevic, Bosko Budimirovic, Dusan Ristic, and others, Momcilo Trajkovic was a pillar of the Serbian resistance movement in Kosovo and Metohija. Time has shown that the pillar was prematurely destroyed, but the reasons for resistance have remained.

He was deputy Serbian prime minister at the time when Serbia was "entering" Kosmet. The uncertain fate of the "Serbian cradle" shows that it was only a case of illusionism: Serbia neither entered nor stayed in Kosovo and Metohija.

Trajkovic was then a people's deputy and chairman of the Assembly committee for Kosmet. The "governor of Kosovo and Metohija," as he was called for a time, then broke with the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], and when he established his own party, he lost his job. He is now 43, the president of the Social Democratic Party [SDP], and director of the agricultural enterprise Ratar in his home town. The reader will see that the interview with Trajkovic never touches upon the party program or agriculture.

Born and raised in Kosmet and remaining there, Trajkovic is one of the most reliable informants about Kosmet, a man you have to interview. Aside from participating in Kosmet events, he has also been a man who collaborated closely with the president of Serbia. Along with Slobodan Vucetic, judge on the Constitutional Court of Serbia, Trajkovic is a "renegade" who has been able to see Milosevic's technology of governance from close up. What does he have to say today, after all that has happened, about Kosovo and Metohija, about the effect of Milosevic's policy, and about the attitude of the Serbian government toward "holy Serbian land"?

[Matic] For quite a long time now you have been identifying the attitude of the government toward Kosmet with a fickle playing with the destiny of the people and the state, asserting that the separatists, thanks to that kind of governance, are finishing off the exodus of the Serbs, which is without precedence on the soil of Europe. Where is the deficiency in that policy?

[Trajkovic] Above all in the fact that Kosmet has become the dowry of one party, the party issue of the SPS. All the Serbian discord is manifested over the Serbian national question and then also over the question of Kosmet. Today, the only part of the law-governed state functioning in Kosovo and Metohija is the police, which in the long run leads even that portion of the law-governed state into confusion, because the police are not and cannot be the essence of the rule of law. Because the Albanians are becoming more and more "loyal" to the police and are respecting the laws, I am afraid that the police—and this is already happening—will soon be concerned only with the Serbs.

[Matic] To what extent, Mr. Trajkovic, do you consider the president of Serbia responsible for this confounding effect in Kosmet?

[Trajkovic] On the question of historical responsibility for the fate of Kosovo and Metohija, I do not consider Milosevic the most responsible, because others sold out Kosmet. I consider Milosevic responsible for gambling away the last chance to save Kosmet.

[Matic] Exactly what is Milosevic responsible for?

[Trajkovic] For having managed to deaden the forces for resolving the issue of Kosmet. The energy of the people should have been directed toward the constancy of that people, and toward infusions of what is referred to as fresh blood through settlement, in order to strengthen those very Serbian roots in the south of Serbia. It is evident today that even what was permanent has become temporary, and the Serbian hope has turned into hopelessness. I understand the objective circumstances the Serbian people face, because several fronts have been opened, but the nationality question in the bureaucratic conception (that only the SPS can resolve it) has postponed its resolution for later, and it has marginalized Kosmet and also the political forces which were ready and still able to resolve the political and economic troubles in Kosovo and Metohija.

[Matic] Is the impression being given intentionally that in Kosmet and in Serbia there are no people who could put Kosmet on the right track?

[Trajkovic] There are people, plenty of them, but Kosmet has been turned over to the bureaucratic apparatus, to the commissars and a corrupt government, with honorable exceptions, people with their families in Belgrade, and they "arrange" things in Kosmet by telephone.

[Matic] Where do these new "saviors" live?

[Trajkovic] On Dedinje, on Vidikovac, all over Serbia, and they come to Kosovo to persuade the people to stay, not to move out.

[Matic] Again, then, just as in the time of Fadil Hodza and Ilija Vakic, we have itinerant politicians?

[Trajkovic] I do not want to doubt the honest intentions and abilities of Aleksa Jokic, the new chief of Kosovo District, but without understanding the essence of the problem, and above all until they feel it on their own skin, it takes courage just to accept such a post. Is there any greater defeat for the SPS and the Serbs in Kosmet that among that many Serbs and the 70,000 members of the SPS (!?) there is no man capable of being chief of Kosovo District?

[Matic] Bringing people in from outside is proof to many people that the regime does not have the confidence of the Serbs in Kosmet.

[Trajkovic] The Serbs have gotten into a situation where they are being used. Even among the Socialists, I know some who are able and honest and who could handle that post, but a reopening of the Kosmet problem is approaching, and with that kind of move the present government wants to put the blame on the Serbs for the increase in the troubles, and that is why it is sending "saviors" from Belgrade.

[Matic] Nevertheless, they still like Milosevic in Kosmet. What does loyalty to Milosevic signify?

[Trajkovic] Let us take the example of Tomislav Sekulic, certainly the most authoritative and most competent man in Kosovo and Metohija. On behalf of the interests of the Serbian people in Kosmet, he consented to help the man and the party which has the greatest strength. As is evident, neither Milosevic nor the SPS has ever had an honest attitude toward such efforts by people who are able, realistic, and sincere.

[Matic] It is obvious that the government personified by Slobodan Milosevic has not offered a solution for Kosovo and Metohija. Is there a solution?

[Trajkovic] Without radical changes in the political system, there is no solution for Kosmet. That is why I am proposing to Milosevic that he correct his policy on the nationality question, and accordingly on Kosmet, which is only a part of that question. The first and basic thing, then: The nationality question cannot be resolved piecemeal and the little parts activated when there is a need to take, consolidate, or preserve power. Second, it is obvious that Milosevic's version of the civil concept of the state of Serbia will result in our resolving the Serbian question in central Serbia.

[Matic] What would a civil state mean in Kosmet, given the way it is?

[Trajkovic] It sounds paradoxical, but nothing other than a plunge into conflicts, because the present Serbian government has been unable to provide the instruments for the Serbian people to protect itself against majority rule. This indicates that the Serbs, unless they change the holder or holders of power, will in real relations be in a similar, perhaps even worse position than they were earlier. The democratic principle of the majority is everything to the Albanians under the conditions of Kosmet and nothing to the Serbs. Except in three opstinas, all other power—opstina, city, and province—will go to the Albanians. Only when the Albanians vote in an election will the Serbs realize how far the resolution of their problem has gone. And a proposition disastrous for the Serbs will be confirmed—that the meadow belongs to the one who has the sheep.

[Matic] In a way, it turns out to be a good thing that the Albanians are boycotting the election. This is nevertheless to someone's benefit?

[Trajkovic] It benefits the group of mafiosi and thieves on the Serbian side and the Albanian separatists on the other. Those around the government on the Serbian side are supporting the Belgrade regime, because they are getting rich from the misfortune of the people, and the Albanians are passively supporting the system by not going to vote, because through that government they are realizing their strategic objectives, which are—territory and capital. Taking power would only give them trouble, because they would have taken responsibility before the international factors for the processes in Kosmet.

[Matic] Although it is obvious that it has been shaken temporarily, the separatist movement has again gained strength and shown great power to adapt and endure, while official policy is persistently spreading the illusion that this movement is dying out.

[Trajkovic] It is not dying out. On the contrary, with every passing day it is closer to realization of its ultimate objective, which only confirms that Serbia does not have an answer to the Albanian strategy. The ignorant attitude of Serbia's policy toward the perfidious political game of the separatist movement and its helpers and ideologues from the world at large are affording an ever better chance to proclaim the victim at fault. We should not kneel down before the Albanian question, but neither should we ignore it, and that is certain.

[Matic] Predisposed to superficial reasoning and the habit of not calling things by their right names, for years we have talked about the irridenta, then about the counterrevolution, and finally we have arrived at the truth—that it is a question of separatism. Who is in conflict in Kosovo and with whom?

[Trajkovic] It is mistakenly thought that the Serbs and Albanians are in conflict in Kosmet. The conflict is between the Serbian state and the Albanians who do not recognize it. To tell the truth, the separatist movement does not recognize any state which will not help the Albanians to realize their ultimate goal. Serbia is keeping its eyes closed and ignoring the essence of the problem, which lies in a conflict between two different philosophies: the Albanian philosophy, whose objective is territory, and the Serbian philosophy, whose objective is power. In the conflict of those two philosophies, the Serbian philosophy will always be defeated. Everything that has been happening in Kosovo, life in its entirety, has been favoring that separatist movement. Albanians are being born, they are building, they are working, and all of this is serving a single objective—territory and only territory. More than 50,000 Albanians are born every year in Kosmet! A Smederevo of Albanians every year!

[Matic] But Serbia did adopt a program for settling Kosmet?

[Trajkovic] Yes, in 1990, when the government promised that in five years it would bring 100,000 Serbs back to Kosmet; the opposite has happened—the Serbs are moving, selling their dwellings and land, and during that time another 200,000 Albanians have been born in Kosovo and Metohija! And that is why, without attacking anyone, I want to say openly that Serbia must get wise and seriously put the Kosmet issue on the agenda along with a strategy for resolving it. In Kosmet, the key factor is time, and Serbia has frittered away the last four years. Tomorrow is too late for Kosmet!

[Matic] Did Milosevic miss a chance to arrive at some solution with the Albanian leaders through dialogue?

[Trajkovic] No, he did not. The Serbian state has for an opponent a serious separatist movement which has set itself its war objective. That war objective is for Kosovo to be a republic. And the international community has proclaimed the fight to keep Kosmet in Serbia, to which it belongs historically and naturally, the war objective of Serbia.

[Matic] You say that Milosevic did not miss an occasion for dialogue. Which means there is still hope for negotiations. Do you think the Serbs are prepared for that?

[Trajkovic] I think that Milosevic has not prepared the Serbs for dialogue with the Albanians, because, first, he did not provide institutions for their protection against majority rule. A talk with the Albanians, without that instrument, is disastrous even for Milosevic, but also for that Serbian people who have remained down there. Second, Milosevic has established contact with those Albanians who are not a serious force for establishment of a real connection with the entire Albanian ethnic minority. You get further away from dialogue if you take for a partner those Albanians whom no one considers to be in authority. I do not mean by this that the leaders of the separatist movement should be begged for dialogue, but certainly there was no need to irritate the real Albanian forces which tomorrow could be a partner in bringing the Albanians closer to the state of Serbia.

[Matic] Aside from the Albanians, Milosevic realistically has a problem in Kosmet with the Serbs as well. Should he somehow bring them down to earth?

[Trajkovic] A very important question for me is how Milosevic, who launched the Serbs in a flight toward the heavens, is going to bring them down to earth. Although I am amazed by their incredible enthusiasm, which has kept them in flight so long with such weak wings. I am afraid that if they fall on their own, this will be bad for Kosmet—it will have no Serbs, but if they are brought down by force, they could fly over the southern province.

[Matic] Can the Serbs in Kosmet, obviously exposed to the danger of really being left only a "celestial people," nevertheless have an effect on their destiny?

[Trajkovic] The destiny of the Serbian people in Kosmet is most directly bound up with the destiny of Milosevic's policy. The solution does not lie in bringing down Milosevic, but in his having to appeal to all the political forces in Serbia and in Kosmet, which, regardless of all that has happened down there up to now, are ready to save what can be saved and in that way to open up the future for solving the Kosmet question on behalf of the people who live there.

[Matic] What does it mean for Serbia to go down to Kosmet?

[Trajkovic] It means installing the key institutions of government down there, which was in fact promised at the time when the program was adopted for resolving the Kosmet question. Why would it bother the Serbs and the Serbian people for the capital to be in Prizren and the patriarchate in Pec? From the psychological standpoint and in order to solve the problems, it would mean a great deal, because processes would be given a push in that direction. Resolution of the Kosmet question is a long-term affair, and that is why I insist on process. It must be clear to us, above all the Serbs down there, that Serbia cannot settle Kosmet overnight with "one-child families." An occasion was missed to send the refugees from the Serbian lands to Kosmet instead of Belgrade and Vojvodina. That merely indicates to what extent Serbia was caught by surprise, with no national strategy, and with no answer to the major issues, when it undertook to settle the Serbian question. That is why Belgrade has chaos with the refugees, and in Kosmet it has a disaster without new Serbian settlers.

[Matic] Who is causing the greatest damage to the Serbian people in Kosmet?

[Trajkovic] With honorable exceptions, Kosmet is ruled today by those who sold it out, that is, petty Serbs who in order to wash away their earlier sins are trying to represent themselves as big men, and they are proclaiming the figures in the Serbian resistance movement to be traitors. They are causing great damage to Serbia and the Serbian people, because they are becoming "Serbian expansionists" at the wrong time, when Serbia and the Serbian people need wise men. In order to initiate a dialogue with the Albanians and to provide the Serbs protection against majority rule, Milosevic must rid himself of Serbs of that kind.

[Matic] Are you thinking of anyone in particular?

[Trajkovic] The regime has rid itself of one of them. I am referring to the former chief of the Kosovo District, and I hope that he surely will not be put in a better post. Another typical example of such people is the rector of Pristina University, whom some people in Kosmet would like to set up as some Milosevic bigger than Milosevic himself. I simply fear for the destiny of our president!

[Matic] To divert attention from the powerlessness to resolve the Kosmet question, people often resort to divisions among the Serbs and cast the blame in that direction. How far have those divisions gone, how dangerous are they?

[Trajkovic] These two elements are evident in Kosmet—the old settlers and the new settlers. While the old settlers, thanks to their age-old weapon—passive resistance—have managed to preserve Kosovo and Metohija as Serbian land, which is why we have the historic and ethnic right to talk about a Serbian Kosovo, the new settlers, abandoning their homes, have been sent to the south of Serbia on patriotic grounds in order to strengthen Serbian roots and to preserve Kosmet.

Today, both are a drop in the ocean. Unless "new people" move in, even they will not stay. Who is more important? Is there any point in even talking about that? I am certain that reasons can always be found for exchanging accusations.

[Matic] Those accusations are nevertheless beneficial to someone?

[Trajkovic] Certainly, they benefit the regime, but I think that more important than that is to bring about conditions for both elements of our people to be a creative factor in resolving the Serbian nationality question. By taking part in the Pan-Serbian resistance movement, both the old settlers and new settlers have shown that their common misfortune, which is the same, has come closer.

[Matic] While the Serbs are continuing to talk all the time about the past, the Albanians have turned to the future and to business. The former have become prisoners of the temporary, while the others are on the way up. Does the Serbian regime see that difference, which is obvious even from a car window?

[Trajkovic] One of the largest Albanian cities is being built today between Podujevo and Pristina with an infinite number of fortresses, gasoline stations, and stores. Any leader who comes from Serbia can see that this is horrifying. And what does construction of that many houses mean in this region? It means an Albanian wall of defense from Serbia! Everyone sees that, and no one does anything about it. I do not want to be misunderstood as being against the development of the Albanian ethnic minority, but it is obvious that this is a part of the Albanian strategy for separatism. The Albanians are not to blame for that. More than 100 gasoline stations are in their hands, and they were obtained with consent of the Serbian state.

[Matic] In fact, the Serbian government is again becoming a point of support for the Albanian separatist movement?

[Trajkovic] Everything indicates that the Albanian separatist movement was upset only temporarily and that it is very effectively reorganizing along its earlier paths and once again attaching its tentacles and feeding capillaries to the Serbian "fattening trough," to the Serbian manger. How absurd it is: Serbia is again becoming a point of support for the separatist movement! The Albanian Mafia is through corruption and smuggling providing the main sources for the turnover and growth (of the money arriving from abroad) and creation of the immense capital supporting the separatist movement. The main problem, then, lies in the political system itself, which is generating these relations and proving that these dangerous processes cannot be stopped with the old mechanisms of power.

[Matic] You favor installing Serbian power in Kosmet, while Vucelic in Pristina is closing down the bureau of TV Serbia. Is that strengthening a unified Serbia or distancing the drama of Kosmet from the view of the Serbian public?

[Trajkovic] That studio in Pristina played a large role in spreading the truth about the struggle of the Serbian people. It was a Serbian institution personified by the journalist Milisav Milic, and it is a clumsy and transparent lie that it is being shut down in order to strengthen a unified Serbia. What if tomorrow the Albanians return to the political stage, and the Albanian journalists again take jobs in Pristina TV?

[Matic] Why is Milosevic still there in spite of everything?

[Trajkovic] Because at a turning point for Kosmet he was the first to stand up with the Serbian resistance movement and ride the horse which that movement saddled for him. It is a pity for Serbia, for Kosmet, and for Milosevic himself that he did not stick to his initial position and did not strengthen the pillars of Serbian power with the real, able, and honest forces. As far as I can understand, Milosevic has destroyed every alternative, and today when you ask people about him, they usually say—he is wrong, but who else is there? It is not just a question of an alternative to Milosevic, but of a party alternative. The objective is not to allow any other alternative to be created, to remain without competition. This is a version dangerous to Serbia, to the Serbian people, and to Milosevic himself.

[Matic] I must ask you in conclusion: Is Kosmet lost? Will the division of Kosovo and Metohija nevertheless be inevitable?

[Trajkovic] It is unfortunate that even that scenario exists for resolving the question of Kosmet. The absurdity is that such a proposal comes from people who are in favor of resolving the problem of Kosovo and Metohija peacefully, but are not aware that they are actually favoring the war option. The division of Kosmet on an ethnic basis cannot take place without war, as confirmed by the example of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. How would those who want to divide Kosmet resettle peacefully the nearly one million Albanians from Kosovo to Metohija or the Serbs from their homeland to the other side? Even if that were possible, who would finance that movement of people, unless they are thinking of stuffing people into trucks and dumping them out on the bare ground. Those are all illusions. In the end, who has the right to bargain with Serbian territory? The Serbs in Kosmet will not consent to that trade, but the Serbs from Kosmet, as is well-known, have been living other places besides Kosmet for a long time now.

Serbia

Political Parties Undecided on Unification Issue

AU2308161194 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Aug 94 p 5

[Report by A. Vasin: "Both in Favor and Against"]

[Text] The day before yesterday, the Assembly of the Srpska republic [RS] adopted a motion for the unification of all Serbian parliaments. An SRNA report also states that Branko Vojnica, chairman of the assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], who attended the session in Pale, said that the RSK assembly supports the initiative for the unification of all Serbian lands.

At the same time, an extraordinary session of the Serbian Assembly has been convened for 25 August at the request of the opposition parties in Serbia.

We asked leading people of the political parties in Serbia what they thought about Pale's motion and whether there was a possibility of the Serbian Assembly voting on that matter on Thursday, 25 August.

Zarko Jokanovic, head of the Nova Demokratija deputies' caucus in the Serbian Assembly:

"This is a very sensitive political issue and we in our party have not taken a stand on the initiative of the RS parliament. And not only that, we cannot vote on something on the basis of newspaper reports, but must acquaint ourselves with the integral version of the document. Therefore, we cannot comment on this now, and this will probably remain the case until Monday, when we expect Dusan Mihajlovic, president of the Nova Demokratija, to return."

Zoran Andjelkovic, deputy head of the deputies' caucus of the Socialist Party of Serbia in the Serbian Assembly:

"Regarding unification, I will remind you of a statement by Dragan Tomic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly, on 6 August, which reads: 'There is no sense whatsoever for the people from the RS to talk about unification, because, by rejecting the peace plan, they rejected unification. The citizens should know that the result of the negotiations with the international community is that the Srpska republic can enter into federation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] would have the legitimate right to the protection of its borders. The RS leadership knows all this very well. This is why the citizens should know that these proposals have been presented to their leadership. It is therefore better that they do not mention unification, which they have seriously imperiled by rejecting the peace plan and lost the moral right to talk about it.'"

Djordje Basic, chairman of the Provincial Committee of the Democratic Party and vice chairman of the Serbian Assembly:

"I think that this initiative must be approached very seriously. This implies that, at a request of the contact group, the United Nations first verify the status of the RS in Bosnia so that the RS has international borders before it unites with whomever it wants, in this case with the FRY. I think that the intention concerning possible unification in the future should be given a definite form. This means that one should define the political rationale of the unification, and, of course, analyze all the consequences of that act.

"I am not sure whether the Serbian Assembly will vote on the motion of the RS Parliament at its session scheduled for next week, that is, 25 August. According to the rules of procedure of the People's Assembly of Serbia, the proposed agenda cannot be changed after the session had been convened. The initiative of the 84 deputies does not propose anywhere that a vote be held on Pan-Serbian unification.

"The Democratic Party expects those who called the session to prepare the session and propose draft documents that the assembly should adopt. A proposal for the republican assembly's deputies to vote on the Pale motion could happen to be in these draft documents. We do not know anything about this possibility at present."

Milan Komnenic, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Renewal Movement:

"I cannot comment on the motion for the parliamentary unification of all Serbian lands because I have not heard about this initiative until you mentioned it. I did not read newspapers this morning.... We will try to contact today the head of our assembly deputy caucus and the party president, Vuk Draskovic, who is on vacation in Budva. If we get in touch with Vuk, we will send you a statement."

Mirko Petrovic, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of Serbia and a deputy in the republican assembly:

"It is a legitimate right of the Serbian people to live in one state after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. All other nations had their right to a state recognized, and therefore this right must be given to the Serbs. The Serbian people have the right to self-determination in the former Yugoslavia and the right to their state.

"A consensus on this issue existed among all the significant political parties in Serbia. However, I do not know whether the ruling party in Serbia has changed its stand, and whether the statement by Dragan Tomic, chairman of the Serbian assembly, is still valid. He said that if the Serbs in Bosnia reject the peace plan they would place a question mark of over confederation with Serbia and Montenegro."

The Citizens' Alliance of Serbia reacted with a statement signed by Vesna Pesic. The statement says that the party holds the view that the "proposal from Pale on unification of the so-called RS and the so-called RSK with Serbia and Montenegro is totally unacceptable because no unification can be carried out in war conditions. This proposal practically amounts to a call that Serbia and Montenegro directly take part in the war. Besides, the aim of this proposal is to undermine the peace efforts of the FRY and the international community."

'Incredible Expansion' of Small Private Firms

94BA0376A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 94 p 12

[Unattributed article: "Trade: The Small-Fry Have Swallowed Up the Big Fish"]

[Text] In April, the trade sector accounted for 23 percent of all obligations unmet in the economy. Otherwise put, more than 60 percent of the 740 legal entities that did not meet their obligations belong to the trade sector.

This figure, which was heard recently in the Committee for Trade of the Economic Chamber of Serbia, is a bit stale, but it is a good illustration, because nothing has changed for the better in the meantime. Illiquidity, that is, a shortage of working capital of the large commercial firms, is labelling this moment in Serbian trade with yet another attribute: the incredible expansion of small private commercial firms, which now make up 95 percent of all commercial firms!

The Bugbear of "Gray Trade"

The small-fry, of course, have their own capital, and, by all appearances, they have survived last year's megainflation better than the big fish. According to figures from year-end statements for last year, the private trade sector had a share of 62.8 percent in total profit and 25.6 percent in losses. These figures are particularly interesting when compared to the success and failure of socialized and mixed commercial firms. The former have a share of 2.5 percent in the total number of commercial firms, but a healthy 15.9 percent of total losses. The balance sheet of the mixed firms is still worse; they have approximately the same share as the socialized firms in the total number, but they incurred almost half of all the losses—46.5 percent.

Although no one has openly demanded "smothering" the private sector, the material prepared for the meeting and the reflections of representatives of the large commercial firms who spoke suggested that there is in fact reason to halt expansion of private competition. Some of the arguments made were that the private people are employing only 13.6 percent of all the people working in the trade sector, and it was said that the problem of gray or illegal trade can be associated predominantly with the private sector. The fact that the number of private commercial firms is greater than the total number of persons they employ (the average private commercial firm has 0.89 of an employee) was used to explain the greater competitive capability of the private firms, along with the nonpayment of taxes, customs duties, and other payments to the state, which has already been mentioned. Serbia's chief market inspector, who was present, agreed with the observation that the problem of illegal trade is great, and he mentioned that his department is operating on two shifts and has confiscated goods worth 2 million dinars on the basis of illegal buying and selling, but that the practice of keeping two sets of books cannot be associated exclusively with the private sector. That is, this is being done by managers in the large socialized and mixed firms as well: They buy goods on the street from smugglers and sell them in their stores, where they are working on their own account and for their own pocket.

The reason for the fragmentation of the state sector, a process that runs counter to the prevailing trend in the world (Marks & Spenser, with over 70,000 employees and 2,760 sales outlets in Europe, the United States, and Canada, Spar, Migros, Ikea, have a profitability between 15 and 17 percent, and they are among the world companies with a high yield of capital), should be properly assigned: The unresolved system for financing, the lack of commercial capital, and the general illiquidity of the banks are the long-lasting drawbacks of large commercial systems in our country. This is in fact stated in the analysis of the Committee for Trade we mentioned, but these problems have been given disproportionately small importance compared to the lament about past times, when the socialized sector in trade was absolutely dominant. When the share of cash payments in our country is driven below 10 percent (it is now between 27 and 30 percent), when the system of credit financing is set up once again, either through consumer credits or other instruments (bank cards, for example), then the comparative advantages of the large commercial firms will also become evident. It is not the private merchants who are creating the operating system and the environment for operation, is it?

Montenegro

Seselj's Deportation From Montenegro Viewed

*94BA0391A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
8 Aug 94 pp 26-29*

[Article by Velizar Brajovic: "Shattered Love: How Montenegrins Carried Seselj"]

[Text] *The clash between the authorities and the Radicals in Montenegro is only just beginning. SRS [Serbian Radical Party] leader Acim Visnjic claims that Slavko Perovic will help him in his showdown with Milo Djukanovic.*

The Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] announced that "Seselj was expelled from Montenegro because of positions that he expressed at an SRS rally in Herceg Novi, held on 30 July 1994, in which the Republic of Montenegro, its constitutional position within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the highest ranking state leaders of Montenegro and Serbia were insulted in a primitive and indecent fashion." However, there are few people who found in this statement worthy substantiation for the spectacularly conducted action to silence the man who was until recently a beloved duke. Even less substantiated was the message from the announcement that "Seselj will not be permitted to enter Montenegro until the Federal Assembly allows criminal charges to be brought against him."

The move to expel Seselj from Montenegro was not viewed with indifference even by the most bitter political opponents of the Serbian Radicals. All the more so since they, who recently publicly challenged the Radicals to renounce parliamentary immunity so that they could be sentenced for offending the Montenegrin nation and state, also recognized that the action by the Montenegrin MUP is a drastic violation of constitutional legal norms.

Give Us a Blanket

The operation began on 31 July at around 0400, when strong forces of members of special MUP units surrounded the villa in Perast where Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radicals, and 10 other people from the party leadership and their families had been staying since 16 July. They raided the Radical leader's apartment and demanded that he go with them to talk to Nikola Pejakovic, the chief of the Montenegrin police, who was waiting for him at the Kotor police station. Seselj asked them to show him a warrant for that, and since the policemen did not have one, the duke cited parliamentary immunity and demanded that they leave his room. The police were insistent, but Mr. Seselj informed them that he would not go, and that they would have to carry him out. The special police officers were in a quandary, obviously because of the order that Seselj must be brought in, so they went off looking for stretchers and asked the host for a blanket. Since they did not get one, two of them grabbed the duke by the legs, two by the waist, and two by the shoulders. The duke warned them to carry him carefully so that they did not injure his back, which had been operated on. They worked up quite a sweat on the way to the car.

Minister Pejakovic held Seselj for around an hour and a half, but the Radicals say that Seselj refused to answer any questions, and everything that Mr. Pejakovic said boiled down to accusations that he had attacked Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic in his public appearances. At the airport in Tivat, Seselj and his family were met by the Montenegrin Government airplane, which transported him to Surcin Airport. On a second flight by the same airplane, according to Acim Visnjic, the vice chairman of the Central Fatherland Office of the SRS and chairman of the SRS caucus in the Montenegrin Assembly, Tomislav Nikolic and his family were also "deported." While that was happening, a real drama was being played out in the Perast villa, which Visnjic says had been rented from the Montenegrin Government for the whole year by Cedomir Vasiljevic, a federal deputy for the Radicals. The special police woke up all the Radicals and members of their families, a total of 40 people, including many women and children. The children were frightened by the raid being conducted by special police in almost black uniforms, who told the Radicals to pack their things as quickly as possible. They were escorted to the Serbian border. This is a classic case of deportation, says Acim Visnjic.

No one from the government has explained the police action, aside from the public announcement by the Opstina Committee of the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists] lending full support to the state institutions. "The DPS does not accept the type of political activity practiced by the leaders of the Serbian Radical Party at the gathering held on Nikola Djurkovic Square, based on serious insults against the legitimate leadership of Montenegro and Serbia. Whenever the promotion of any political party is based exclusively on unproven accusations, slander, and qualifications, the Opstina Committee of the DPS gives its full support to state institutions to act in accordance with their legal authorities."

Reverberations and Reactions

"The Last Straw" was the headline of the review of this case by Podgorica's POBJEDA. "It is finally clear," POBJEDA wrote, "that democracy training in Seselj's style leads to anarchy [passage indistinct] immunity to irresponsibility for hardly understandable and acceptable public speech. There is not one state that will permit such a thing, and presumably this includes Montenegro and Serbia, or rather the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

The assessment by the Liberal Alliance, the most bitter political adversary of the Serbian Radicals, is that by expelling Seselj the Montenegrin MUP reacted in an unconstitutional and illegal way, "cloaking de facto protection of certain circles of the DPS leadership in ostensible concern for preserving the status of Montenegro under international law, for the dignity of the Montenegrin nation, and for avoiding the propagation of religious and national hatred and intolerance." The Liberals say that the MUP has no right to expel anyone from Montenegro, especially [passage indistinct] court. We believe that the entire campaign is directed not only against the national-chauvinistic SRS, but also against all those who, in whatever way, oppose the will of individual powerful figures in the DPS. The Liberals demand that the minister of police resign, or that he be dismissed by Prime Minister Djukanovic.

What, then, did Seselj say at the rally in Herceg Novi? The general assessment is that it was nothing more than what he had said in Podgorica several days earlier. The impression is that in recent appearances he has radically taken the sting out of his repudiation of the existence of a Montenegrin nation and state. Before arriving in Perast, he took a stroll around Cetinje and aside from some heckling there were no incidents on that occasion, which, admittedly, some people of Cetinje interpret as a pity reflex by the local Liberals, bearing in mind the current campaign and the inevitable showdown between the Belgrade and Podgorica regimes on the one hand and the Radicals on the other, so that they did not want to cause him even more trouble. In Perast it is said that local teenagers managed to provoke Seselj with songs about Montenegro, but that Seselj's security guards did not react once.

Who Was Insulted

In Herceg Novi, he repeated his statement that Milo Djukanovic is the biggest criminal after Slobodan Milosevic. He openly shouted that he is a thief and invited him to arrest him at that very rally. He called out to him several times, which amused the several thousand citizens present, and after a few moments of waiting he concluded that Milo Djukanovic was not there to arrest him, because he is a coward. There were many refugees in the audience, to whom he said that Slobodan Milosevic can give his villa in Dedinje to the Croats and Muslims, but not an inch of Serb land, not a single Serb village or city. He repeated what he has already said about Slobodan Milosevic to newspapers and at various gatherings, calling him a henpecked husband, he sharply criticized the SK-PJ [League of Communists-Party of Yugoslavia], and so on.

"He did not insult Montenegro or the Montenegrin nation in any way," contends Acim Visnjic, "but we knew that the police were planning something even before the rally began. On the way from Perast to Herceg Novi, we were searched by five police patrols. They asked us to turn over our weapons, for which we had valid papers. Some people had their weapons taken right as we were entering Herceg Novi. Some interested people directed us to Igalo, claiming that the rally was being held there. Several days before the rally, a river of policemen from the northern part of Montenegro was flowing toward Herceg Novi, and we know that some of them were from Serbia as well. As if they were counting on wide-scale unrest...."

Attempts to learn who issued the order in the night to deport the members of the Serbian Radical Party have been unsuccessful. Our source close to the police authorities claims that the decision was made personally by Minister Pejakovic, but that he may have done so at the suggestion of powerful figures from Belgrade. The same source alleges that in well-informed police circles mention is made of the possibility of contact between Vojislav Seselj and Radovan Karadzic, an alleged trip to Trebinje by Seselj, and discussion of measures to undermine Milosevic's and Bulatovic's positions on the Contact Group's peace package.

Time of Love

Thus far in Montenegro, there have been countless cases that have forced the authorities to at least threaten the Radicals and certain other "patriotic" forces. It is known, for example, that the Radicals carried out the famous armed rebellion in Pljevlje, but that the court has yet to give its final word on the matter; it is also known that on several occasions Seselj has threatened parties that advocate a sovereign Montenegro, even mentioning that the military will have at its disposal 11,000 armed warriors in the event that Montenegro in any way separates from Serbia; also known are his declarations that from the moment that he comes to power, no one in Montenegro will identify himself as Montenegrin in the census. The authorities have never reacted, on the contrary. Seselj was received several times by President Momir Bulatovic and by Svetozar Marovic, who was then the secretary general of the ruling party. Complements have been exchanged, and mutual acknowledgements of patriotism have been traded. Last year in Berani, Momir Bulatovic called the SRS a patriotic party, and exactly one year ago, after a meeting with Seselj—ironically in Herceg Novi—Marovic announced that their parties have identical or very close political positions.

Relations between the Radicals and the ruling party in the Montenegrin parliament have long been almost idyllic. The Radicals accepted the post of vice chairman of the Assembly, but refused to take even a single minister's post in the Djukanovic government. The Radicals were not reproached for their sharp criticism of certain ministers and businessmen until the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and the Radicals began clashing in Belgrade. At that point, relations between the Radicals and the authorities in Podgorica quickly began to deteriorate. Last March, a schism arose in the Radical leadership. Seselj replaced chairman Radovan Vukcevic and stripped three federal deputies of their seats. The party split along the line of those who unconditionally support Seselj and those who challenge his right to rule the Radicals in Montenegro with impunity. Seselj sought support mainly in Drago Bakrac and Acim Visnjic, while in the opposing camp were the federal deputies and the previously dismissed Ceko Dacevic, the strategist of the armed rebellion in Pljevlje. Seselj, Bakrac, and Visnjic accuse the authorities and the police of intentionally provoking the split.

Quarrel in Parliament

In the meantime, Acim Visnjic has voiced increasingly sharp criticism of the government and of Prime Minister Djukanovic personally, making increasingly serious charges of economic crime. The clash along that line came to a head at the July session of the Montenegrin parliament, when Predrag Bulatovic, the chairman of the ruling party caucus, publicly invited Djukanovic to come to the Assembly and respond to Visnjic's charges. In the meantime, state prosecutor Vlado Susovic had shown up in the Assembly, and he asked for the floor, but the opposition kept him from speaking. Milo Djukanovic arrived, visibly infuriated, and got into a scuffle with Visnjic. The public was surprised by the prime minister's fit and his rather unconvincing explanation. The state prosecutor called a news conference at which he tried to refute Acim Visnjic's allegations, and then read a letter from Prime Minister Djukanovic in which he was asked to officially check out Acim Visnjic's allegations and in accordance with that to take corresponding legal measures, but in the event that the charges prove untrue, to initiate corresponding proceedings against Visnjic. The journalists' belief that even at the news conference prosecutor Susovic already had a request to lift Acim Visnjic's parliamentary immunity was confirmed the next day when it was announced that the prosecutor had already sent in that request. At the request of Malisa Milovic, the prosecutor in Podgorica, the Parliamentary Immunity Committee of the Montenegrin Assembly reacted quickly and recommended that the Assembly approve the bringing of criminal charges against Visnjic. It has been learned that the Assembly will convene as early as next week. On the other hand, Acim Visnjic is also seeking a special session of the Assembly with one item on the agenda—the deportation of Vojislav Seselj and part of the SRS leadership out of Montenegro. For that the Radicals need the signatures of 10 deputies, but the Radicals number only eight. Visnjic says that he will turn to Slavko Perovic, the chairman of the Liberal Alliance, for help, and that he has promised him that his deputies will sign. The conflict will probably enter an even more bitter phase. Concerning all this, Visnjic tells VREME that the ruling party is seized by panic resulting from the well-substantiated roll calls by the Radicals, because when it concerns crime by the authorities, the people believe the Radicals. It is hard to say whether this possible fear felt by the authorities was heightened by Seselj's presence in Montenegro, but POBJEDA concludes that "from his cool retreat in Perast, with an entourage of 40 people, he directed the actions of Radical deputies in the Montenegrin Assembly for days." It appears that the authorities do not disparage the stories of various fraudulent practices and of the brandishing of paper in the Montenegrin cities where the Radicals have had rallies or prepared for them. Acim Visnjic claims that he was personally threatened with liquidation by Aco Djukanovic, the Montenegrin prime minister's brother. "He promised that he would not liquidate me while his brother was in power," says Visnjic.

The ruling party has a majority and could lift Acim Visnjic's immunity, but it is quite certain that the opposition, although heterogeneous, could once again be united in demanding that things take a different course, especially since tney clearly know that the ruling party could take the same action against them tomorrow. In that sense, the Liberals have already voiced sharp opposition to this sort of intention by the authorities. The Social Democrats will join in amid some sort of explanation, and the same is expected of the People's Party.

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